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The dissertation research is a project to understand morality better through the concept of ‘Social 
Software.’ The dissertation is, consequently, to argue that the morality in a human society 
functions as a form of social software in the society. The three aspects of morality as social 
software are discussed in detail: the evolutionary, anti-entropic, and epistemic game-theoretic 
aspect.   
We humans ‘usually’ think that, for example, (a) killing other humans without any necessary 
reason is morally wrong, and (b) helping other humans in need is morally right. We want to know, 
in this dissertation research project, why we think in such ways. Myriads of answers to this 
question have already been offered. We will pursue an answer that has more explanatory power 
and enlightening lucidity. 
The term, ‘Social Software’ was coined by Rohit Parikh to connote, broadly, social 
“procedures that structure social reality” (van Eijck and Parikh 2009, p. 2). The term can be 
understood, “more or less equivalently,” (Parikh 2002-1, note 2) as ‘social procedure,’ ‘social 
algorithm,’ or ‘social game.’  
(1) The first aspect of ‘morality as social software,’ to be discussed is the evolutionary: human 




is the anti-entropic: human morality is human resistance against the universal law of entropy that 
tends to annihilate everything from order to disorder; (3) the third aspect is the epistemic game-
theoretic: human morality is understood better by epistemic game theory, which is a combination 
of ‘classical game theory’ and relatively new ‘epistemic logic.’  
As more specific case studies for the epistemic game-theoretic aspect, the concepts of 
backward induction and “the less we know, the more rational and moral,” are discussed. Finally, 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Philosophical Motivation and Background 
§1-1. The Spirit: From the Ultimate Questions to Morality as Social Software 
“How ought I to live?” This is one of the ultimate questions that make inquisitive children or adults 
become interested in philosophy. This question is investigated mainly, among others, in the field 
of ethics (moral philosophy). When an additional phrase is added to the ethical question, we have 
the next ultimate question, “How ought I to live ‘together with other human beings’?” This 
question is investigated mainly in socio-political philosophy. If, once more, an additional phrase 
is added to the socio-political question, we have a third ultimate question, “How ought I to live 
together with other human beings and ‘all other sentient beings’ 1 ?” Now this question is 
‘metamorphosed’ from axiological into ontological, and so it becomes closer to another ultimate 
question, “Who am I? (or What am I?).” 
I believe that discussions about ethical problems cannot be separated from discussions about 
socio-political and ontological problems, because a human being is, figuratively speaking, not an 
individual atom (or island), but rather a multifaceted jewel tied to a knot of the ‘Indra’s Net.’2 All 
the jewels in Indra’s Net reflect, and are reflected in, all the others repeatedly and infinitely. 
Following this metaphor, we cannot discuss completely the morality of an action of a person 
without discussing his relationships with others, his knowledge of the morality of others, others’ 
knowledge of his morality, and so on, ad infinitum (like ‘common knowledge’ in epistemic logic). 
Until I entered a college, though I was a strict rule-following teenager, my curiosity about the 
foundation of moral rules was trivial. I was more inclined to ask questions such as “What is the 
beginning (or end) of the universe?” and “What is the meaning of life?.” So, perhaps, I was more 
                                                          
1 By the term, “sentient beings,” I mean, in this dissertation, a vague definition, “things that can feel.” 
2 A recent philosophical discussion on Indra’s net is found in Priest (2014), One: Being an Investigation into the 
Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness, Ch. 11. Absence of Self, and the 




of a metaphysical kid than a practical one. When I started college, then everything changed. In my 
college years, I was a feeble sentient being who suffered, most seriously among others, from some 
fellow young men’s tragic instances of self-immolation for social causes. They screamed: for 
example, “Justice for equal labor!,” “Free general vote in presidential elections!,” and “Restore 
democracy!” Those young men did not harm any other persons, but themselves; they did not follow 
any others, but their own autonomy and conscience. I did not participate in the student protests 
actively; I was just trying to resolve differential equations in natural science, while feeling a guilty 
conscience sharply. Ever since I watched or heard those instances, I have been eager to know the 
answers to the questions, such as “What makes an action right or wrong?,” “What is the foundation 
of morality?,” and, hence “How ought I to live?.” The research project of this dissertation is my 
quest for answers to such questions. I argue, throughout this project, that better answers, if not the 
best, can be centered on the concept of ‘Morality as Social Software.’  
     
§1-2. A Thought on the Foundation of Morality 
An agent’s morality is composed of the standards that the agent holds regarding what is right or 
wrong. The agent’s moral standards are ideal goals that the agent tries to follow when choosing 
what is right or wrong. A moral standard is like a ruler. Just as an agent may use a ruler when she 
measures the length of a thing, so she depends on her moral standards when she performs some 
actions. These words describing an individual agent’s morality should equally apply to a group of 
agents, too. For example, the morality of a society is made up of the moral standards that the 
members of the society hold, though, of course, it is altogether different and difficult matter to 




The concept of morality need not be so mysterious. Though people may not have an explicit 
sense of their morality, they usually have the sense that certain ways of living are more worthwhile 
than others. And, that sense becomes more explicit, when the issue is involved in bringing up their 
children. Bernard Williams (1985/2006, p. 48) writes: “we have much reason for, and little reason 
against, bringing up children within the ethical world we inhabit.” The moral standards which 
parents try to raise their children to share are likely to be the morality of the parents. Perhaps, not 
many parents intentionally raise their children with some vices. Imagine the long list of hot moral 
issues in the contemporary world. We might not be sure whether we are praising, endorsing, or 
blaming those controversial moral claims. But, if we apply those claims to our children (e.g., if a 
father imagines that his son supports such-and-such a controversial moral claim), we become much 
more certain of our positions for or against those claims. Of course, it is another matter whether 
those children obey their parents. 
The foundation of morality is the origin of moral standards. When we ask about the 
foundation of morality, we ask who or what has given us the moral standards, and how they have 
been made. The current standard of, for example, length and time have been stipulated by scientists. 
The meter is, ‘operationally,’ defined as the “distance traveled by light in vacuum during a time 
interval of 1/299,792,458 of a second.”3 Likewise, there are some moral standards. Then, there 
must be someone, something or some entity that has made the moral standards. The way in which 
morality has been constructed, I argue, is not very different form the ways in which the units of 
the meter and the second have been stipulated by scientists, that is, human beings. 
                                                          
3  https://physics.nist.gov/cuu/Units/meter.html. In addition, the “second is defined as the duration of 
9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the 




According to common theories of the foundation of morality in ethics (for example, in 
(Rachels 1986) and (Pojman 1990)), it can be argued that the moral standards are given by God 
(Divine Command Theory), Nature (Natural Law Ethics), human reason (Kantian deontology), 
the consequences of actions (of an individual, Ethical Egoism; of the group involved, 
utilitarianism), Social agreement (Social Contract Theory); or moral standards depend on our 
characters (Aristotelian virtue ethics): Many different foundations of moralities have been claimed. 
Of course, each claim has problems. For example, there are many gods worshiped in many 
religions, and the moral standards of one religion often conflict with those of others. We do not 
know which god is the absolute one; therefore we do not know which moral standards are the 
absolute ones. Regarding Nature, there are many human interpretations of Nature, though there 
may be only one Nature. People have different views on how to live according to Nature. If we 
understand the situation wherein many different kinds of foundations of morality are claimed to 
be correct, and many different kinds of problems are also raised, then we may accept that ethical 
relativism is unavoidable. And also, we may pursue a less problematic and more explanatory 
foundation of morality. 
 
§1-3. Morality by Social Contract 
It is social contract theory that has a deep evolutionary connection with the main thesis of this 
dissertation, morality as social software. According to social contract theory, broadly, by Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau, the common morality (and its realization through laws of nations) has been 
agreed upon by people (members of society) via a shared social contract. On this view, morality 
is a human invention and construct, not given to us by other entities such as Gods or Nature. It is 




real historical persons have neither signed the contract nor witnessed, say, the signing ceremonies: 
the contract is simply a fiction fabricated by imaginative theorists. One of my theses in this 
dissertation is that we can explain the existence of this contract based on an evolutionary epistemic 
game-theoretic process which could change this fictional fabrication into a real historical story. 
In Western history, there is a strong intellectual tradition claiming that morality is a human 
invention, not given by Gods or Nature. Callicles, in Plato’s Gorgias, may be the first prominent 
figure who explicitly argues for the idea that morality is a human invention. Then, the idea was 
followed by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and 
Marx. Perhaps, Nietzsche was the last prominent philosopher before the 20th century who argued 
for this idea.4 Contemporary theorists of social contact theory include Rawls, Scanlon and Gauthier, 
among others.5  
Callicles (483b)6 claims that “the people who institute our laws [that is, justice or morality] 
are the weak and the many. They do this, and they assign praise and blame with themselves and 
their own advantage in mind.”7 The most distinctive points of this claim are that laws are made by 
us, humans, and that these humans are weak and many (like the humans in democracy). 
Unlike Callicles, Thrasymachus argues that “justice [that is, law or morality] is the advantage 
of the stronger” (338c), not the weaker. Nevertheless, like Callicles, Thrasymachus’ argument is 
based on the idea that morality is a human invention. A succinct summary of his argument is as 
follows: Rulers make laws for their own advantage; they are the stronger; therefore, justice is 
nothing other than the advantage of the stronger. In Book 1 of Republic, Socrates’ refutation of 
                                                          
4 A recent discussion on Nietzsche’s moral philosophy is found in Prinz (2007), The Emotional Construction of 
Morals, Chapter 6, The Genealogy of Morals. 
5 The more specific thoughts and books of these philosophers, from Callicles to Gauthier, will be discussed 
through the dissertation, when appropriate. 
6 When quoting from Plato’s works, we use the traditional “Stephanus Pagination.” 




Thrasymachus is humble and weak. It looks as if the author of the book, i.e., Plato, was somewhat 
sympathetic with Thrasymachus’ argument. I think that Thrasymachus’ claim is more subversive 
and revelatory than Callicles’, in the sense that Thrasymachus’ claim highlights the stronger people, 
not the weaker, so that it foreshadows Machiavelli, Marx, and Nietzsche, among others. 
The idea in the tale of the “Ring of Gyges” in Republic is also similar to the idea that morality 
is a human invention (359a-360d). In the tale’s lesson, humans are no longer moral when they 
become invisible because they do not fear punishment for their wrong actions. I do not think it is 
a coincidence that the tale appears in Book [chapter] 2 of Republic, which is near Thrasymachus’ 
fervent speech in Book [chapter] 1: the two ideas may be purposely arranged that way in the books 
[chapters] by Plato, to deal with similar ideas. Since the tale will be investigated as a typical 
example of a context in which epistemic logic plays an important role, I think we may develop a 
further thought experiment, in which, not just one person has such a ring, but two, many, or all 
persons have their own rings of Gyges (another epistemic issue!). 
Social contract theories can be divided into two categories: the egoistic (self-interested) 
Hobbesian line and the altruistic Kantian line (cf. Cudd 2000/2017, “Contractarianism.”). The 
egoistic Hobbesian line holds that humans are self-interested, so that humans consent to the social 
contract in order to maximize their self-interest. By contrast, the Kantian line holds that human 
rationality requires us to respect other persons, and therefore, humans consent to the social contract. 
On the one hand, the Hobbesian line is often connected to the term, ‘contractarianism,’ while the 
Kantian line is connected to ‘contractualism’ (Ibid.).  On the other hand, Ashford and Mulgan 
(2012) distinguish contractualism from Kantian moral philosophy, and instead, they connect it to 
Rousseau. (“Contractualism,” Section 2.  How does contractualism differ from other social 




‘contractualism’; rather, I prefer using the terms, ‘egoistic Hobbesian line’ and ‘altruistic Kantian 
line,’ since I believe these terms are simpler than others, intuitively, at least for the current purpose. 
Cudd (Ibid.) puts Gauthier (1986 Morals by Agreement) in the Hobbesian line; while Rawls 
(1971/1998 A Theory of Justice) and Scanlon (1998 What We Owe to Each Other) in the Kantian 
line. I think Rawls can also be regarded as the self-interested Hobbesian line, too, since humans 
behind the veil of ignorance in Rawls’s theory try to maximize their self-interest. (See chapter 6 
below for further discussion.) 8 
 
§1-4. The Three Aspects of Morality 
The topic of morality raises many questions. Everyone has his or her own views on morality, 
regardless of her or his circumstances such as religion, political views, and education. I think that 
discussing morality can be compared to the famous ancient parable of ‘the blind men and an 
elephant.’ If a person’s sight is disabled, he may recognize an elephant as a snake, a fan, a pillar, 
a wall, or a rope, depending on which part of the elephant he is touching with his hands. So, if the 
topic of morality is like an elephant, then I am like a man whose sight is disabled. Given this 
limiting condition, my discussion in this dissertation will focus on only three aspects of morality: 
evolutionary, anti-entropic, and epistemic game-theoretic aspects. 
 
 
                                                          
8 It will be continued and repeated later in this dissertation to discuss the theme of comparison between the 
egoistic Hobbesian line and the altruistic Kantian line, together with some variants of the theme, such as: the debate 
between Nature and Nurture; between Darwin’s moral theory and Huxley’s moral theory; and, in ancient Chinese 
philosophy, the debate between Mencius (circa 372-289 BCE) and Xunzi (circa 310-220 BCE) on whether human 
nature is good or evil: briefly, Mencius argues for the innate goodness of humans, basing on four sprouts of human 
nature; while Xunzi argues that human nature is evil, so humans need to reform it radically, to live together. It may 
not be exact, but still it can be contrasted that the Mencius thought is related to the altruistic line above, and the 




§1-5. A Longer Abstract: Nine Points 
In addition to the shorter abstract above, the following nine points are argued in more specific 
detail. 
 
(1) Social software is a complex concept: The initial coinage of the term ‘social software’ 
need not restrict its enlarging and enriching use. Once artwork such as novels, poems, paintings, 
and music are released to the audience, the interpretations are open to them, the audience. 
Analogously, the initial concepts of ‘social algorithm’ or ‘social procedure’ can be expanded to 
contain morality. I will focus on this point and argue that if we view morality as social software, 
we can better understand morality. 
 
(2) Societies with better social software have advantages in evolution: The first of my 
three aspects of morality as social software is the evolutionary aspect. I endorse the evolutionary 
view of morality, that is, the view that morality has been developed through the process of 
evolution in human history. For instance, we may view that, ‘Homo Sapiens’ or ‘we’ have 
flourished while Neanderthal people went extinct, because Homo Sapiens have developed more 
advantageous morality as social software than Neanderthals.9 
 
(3) Humans have evolved to be cooperative: In the evolutionary process of morality, 
cooperation plays a crucial role. I discuss further the similarities and differences among these 
concepts: ‘cooperation,’ ‘altruism,’ ‘mutualism,’ ‘collaboration,’ and ‘selfishness.’ Michael 
                                                          
9 Whether this view is true or not is not a topic of the dissertation. I am just introducing an exemplary discourse. 
Still I believe that the claims in anthropology that Homo Sapiens and Neanderthal met, mate, and (sometimes) ate 




Tomasello (2008) gives dramatic examples of how helpful even toddlers tend to be. This 
cooperative nature allows humans to carry out large and complex enterprises. 
 
(4) Complex software requires coordination and cooperation: While cooperation is 
crucial in morality, how humans coordinate cooperation is a significant question. Here, the second 
of the three aspects of morality is discussed: I argue that some common concepts in epistemic 
game theory such as backward induction, common knowledge, and logical powers are often used 
in human social coordination. 
 
(5) Individuals making plans within the context of social software use backward 
induction: In this dissertation, I discuss backward induction in more detail. (Common knowledge 
will not be discussed, only mentioned.) When an individual is making plans such as to go 
somewhere, she asks, “Where do I want to go?  What are the intermediate steps?  What resources 
will I need?” and then after performing the backward induction, working backward from her goal, 
she then relies on the existence of social software like a bus system or the currency system to pay 
her fare.  And honesty plays an important role.  
 
Adam Smith says, 
 
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our 





But Smith is mistaken because self-interest is only part of the story.  The morality to which 
the butcher and the baker are committed also plays a large role.  For example, when a toddler helps 
his mother vacuum her apartment he is not thinking of what is “in it for him.”  He wants to help!  
Some butchers are dishonest, but if most butchers were dishonest, the system would break down.10 
 
(6) Societies with less entropy are able to have better algorithms: The third of the three 
aspects of morality as social software is that morality is against entropic disorder. The universe 
has an intrinsic inclination to make things disorderly, following the law of entropy. By contrast, 
living organisms, from amoebas to humans, are the exceptions to this inclination. In order for an 
organism (a life form) to live its life, it must resist this inclination, and its resistance tends to be a 
struggle. I suggest that humans build societies to win this struggle, and the morality of a society 
functions as an algorithm to reduce the entropic disorder. 
 
(7) These three aspects can only work if most people are moral: This dissertation project 
is based on the relativistic view of morality. There is no such thing as absolute morality given by 
any supernatural entity; rather, we humans construct our own morality. There is no absolute moral 
or immoral person. To say that most people in a society are moral means that those people 
recognize these three aspects of morality as social software, regardless of whether it is conscious 
or not. 
 
(8) Our sense of morality is not vulnerable to Hume’s Law and the naturalist fallacy: As 
a concluding philosophical remark on my work so far, I discuss Hume’s Law (no ‘ought’ can be 
                                                          




derived from an ‘is’) and its sibling, the naturalistic fallacy (drawing non-natural moral values 
from natural values), to argue that these criticisms are not as powerful as they might seem at first 
glance. While I do not completely rely on emotion in order to refute the naturalistic fallacy, I find 
that emotion – and an emotional feeling of the desire to be moral can also have its own function in 
moral discourses to a degree.11 
 
(9) Humans need knowledge to do their moral jobs: In order for humans to do moral works, 
we need some, or any, form of knowing. A person taking part in a social algorithm needs to know 
when to act and how to act.  The bus driver needs to know when he should show up at the bus stop 
and the passenger needs to know when he will show up. 
 
§1-6. A Background: Teaching Artificial Intelligence Morality as Social Software  
While focusing on only the three aspects above and below, I should mention a motivational 
background to this entire dissertation project in a larger landscape. We humans have been watching 
the advent of artificial intelligence (AI): rumors, omens, warnings, and curses, as well as the good 
news of a utopian society. In 2016, AlphaGo of Google Deep Mind, an AI program that plays the 
board game Go, amazed the world by defeating the reigning human world Go champion. This 
victory of AI is in addition to AI’s history of defeating humans in chess by IBM’s Deep Blue in 
1997 and in the TV quiz show by IBM’s Watson in 2011. If the advancement of AI continues at 
this speed, then it is claimed that, ‘soon’ (within 30 years, 50 years or some uncertain time in the 
future,) AI will reach so-called ‘Singularity’ (Kurzweil 2006, Chalmers 2010, 2012; and as a 
critique of Singularity, Prinz 2012) or ‘Superintelligence’ (Bostrom 2014) where AI exceeds 
                                                          





humans in (almost) all aspects of humanity (more human than humans): e.g. intentionality. Since 
I watched the ‘AlphaGo Shock,’ I have thought that this kind of discourse is not frivolous science 
fiction. As I watched AlphaGo’s ‘mysterious’ moves in the Go games (which, at first sight, were 
regarded as blatant mistakes, but then later, confirmed as great moves), I felt as if AlphaGo were 
whispering in my ear, “Hey Humans, shut up!” I believe, with other philosophers, computer 
scientists, and policy makers, that teaching AI morality is a vital issue that we as the human race 
must deal with right now to maintain the continuity of humanity. Just now, in February of 2018, a 
group of scholars published a warning report: The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: 
Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation (Miles Brundage, Avin Shahar et al.). “Are humans going 
to be irrelevant?”  So, the questions arise, “How can artificial agents act morally?” and “What 
moral actions can we humans perform in order to counter the threat to humans from cheap AI 
agents?” A guaranteed basic income for all citizens, as a palliative, has been suggested by some, 
to maintain society when AI programs take most of the jobs.12 Here, the concept of morality as 
social software is well-timed. I argue that, in order to ‘teach AI morality,’ viewing morality as a 
form of software is a legitimate idea. Again, this topic of ‘teaching AI morality’ will not be 






                                                          
12 Van Parijs, Philippe. "Basic Income: A simple and powerful idea for the 21st century." Redesigning Distribution 
(2001): 4. 





§1-7. The Structure of the Dissertation with a Diagram 
The following diagram is to explain the structure of the dissertation more visually: 
 
 
                                 
 
 













The Less We Know, the 







§1-8. Plan of the Chapters14 
Chapter 2: The purpose of chapter 2 is to incorporate the relatively new term, ‘Social Software,’ 
into my discourse on morality. I first discuss the essential characteristics of the concept, ‘social 
software.’ Then, I introduce the reader to three prototypical examples that demonstrate the concept, 
‘morality as social software’: Those are 1) King Solomon’s dilemma, 2) cake cutting procedure, 
and 3) freedom and knowledge-based obligation. Some brief and less technical discussions on 
these topics are summarized, for the purpose of providing the reader with a foretaste of later 
discussions on ‘morality as social software.’ Finally, I introduce and discuss an analogy between 
evolutionary morality and Monte Carlo tree search in artificial intelligence.  
 
Chapter3: The main subject to be discussed in this chapter is my interpretation of the thesis, 
“Morality is evolutionary.” I will make it clear what I mean by that, among a discussion of a variety 
of interpretations of scholars and thinkers. More specifically, I first discuss the concept, ‘Natural 
Selection’ and its units (or levels). Second, I introduce three cases that demonstrate the concept of 
natural selection through morality. I then discuss altruism and cooperation, which have been 
central to the debates about evolutionary morality. Finally, I summarize my interpretation, while 
discussing Jesse Prinz’s ‘sentimentalist theory of morality.’ The whole purpose of this chapter is 
to set a ‘playground,’ where the two concepts, social software and evolutionary morality can ‘play’ 
with each other. While I touch on subtle and controversial matters, I will mainly try to summarize 
the standard views of the major topics in evolutionary moral philosophy. 
 
                                                          
14 N.B. This summary of chapters is copied from the beginning paragraphs of each chapter, and is pasted here, 
“verbatim,” in order to help the reader grasp the main theses of the dissertation at one place, more conveniently. 




Chapter 4: The single main thesis that I argue in this chapter is as follows: 
 
(1) Main Thesis: Morality as social software is anti-entropic, that is, against entropy. 
 
This main thesis has three connections here: (a) foundation (or background); (b) argument; and (c) 
corollary. The (a) foundation part is, ‘roughly put,’ as follows: 
 
(2) The second law of thermodynamics holds that the total entropy of a system tends to 
increase over time.  
(3) The concept of entropy often translates, ‘mistakenly,’ as ‘disorder’ in ordinary language.  
(4) So, the second law may be interpreted, ‘mistakenly,’ as stating that the disorder of a system 
tends to increase over time.  
(5) The inexorable tendency of entropy governs everything in the universe.  
(6) Or, for some moment of time, there are exceptions, which are living organisms.  
(7) From this ontology of nature, a normative rule can be deduced: organisms such as 
amoebae and my life do, and should do, resist the law of entropy in order to live lives. 
 
The (b) argument for the main thesis (that morality as social software is anti-entropic) is as follows:  
 
(8) Premise 1: Entropy and information are sibling concepts. 
(9) Premise 2: Entropy and equilibrium are also sibling concepts. 
(10) Conclusion IE (also, Premise 3) (‘I’ for ‘information’; ‘E’ for ‘equilibrium’): Therefore, 




(11) Premise 4: Information and software are sibling concepts. 
(12) Premise 5: Equilibrium and morality are also sibling concepts. 
(13) Conclusion MS (also, Premise 6) (‘M’ for ‘morality’; ‘S’ for ‘software’): Therefore, 
morality and (social) software are sibling concepts, that is, morality as social software. 
(14 = 1) Main Thesis: Therefore, morality as social software is anti-entropic, that is, against 
entropy. 
 
Lastly, two corollaries, which result from this main thesis, will be discussed. 
 
Chapter 5: The main subject to be discussed in this chapter is the inference of backward induction. 
I argue that backward induction is one of the most common and vital kind of inferences related to 
morality as social software. I first introduce backward induction intuitively by discussing the 
centipede game and a dialogue between Alexander the Great and a philosopher. I then argue that 
Popperian creatures in Dennett’s theory are, basically, animals who exercise backward induction, 
and I introduce some exemplary animals from an Indian tale. I finally discuss the relationship 
between morality and backward induction. At the end of the chapter, a very brief précis of 
epistemic logic and epistemic game theory is attached, as an appendix. 
 
Chapter 6: The main subject to be discussed in this chapter is a combination of a series of ideas: 
that is, (1) if we know less, then it is sometimes possible that we become more rational; (2) being 
rational is being moral; ‘therefore,’ (3) if we know less, it is sometimes possible that we become 
more moral. The first idea of (1) above is discussed in Parikh (2017), and I develop it further by 




motivational introduction of this chapter. I then discuss John Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’ in the 
‘original position.’ I finally discuss a verse of T.S. Eliot’s poem “April,” comparing to Norbert 
Wiener’s thought of information.  
 
Chapter 7: The main thesis to be argued in this chapter is that the naturalistic fallacy and its ‘living 
ancestor,’ Hume’s Law, can be resolved from the viewpoint of morality as social software that we 
have developed so far. The naturalistic fallacy is committed, on G. E. Moore’s accusation, when 
one draws X’s goodness from any of its natural properties; and, an ‘ought’ (value), on Hume’s 
contention, cannot be deduced from ‘is’ (fact). Since this dissertation project is, essentially, based 
on the evolutionary concept of morality, the project may not be completely immune to the 
criticisms from the naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s Law. That is, it may be critiqued that the 
construction of evolutionary morality as social software here is not enough to explain why we 
ought to follow ‘that’ morality just constructed. It seems inevitable, therefore, that I should provide 
sound replies to these kinds of criticisms before concluding the dissertation. I hope that the 
discussion in this chapter instills a bit more philosophical rigor into the theses of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 8: I conclude the dissertation by mentioning the topic of ethical relativism, which is 
seemingly necessary but has been neglected so far; and some future research topics, which have 
been recognized, but not developed in my dissertation research, and still look promising. And 






Chapter 2. Social Software 
The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the relatively new term, ‘Social Software,’ into my 
discourse on morality. First, I discuss the essential characteristics of the concept, ‘social software.’ 
Then, I introduce the reader to three prototypical examples that demonstrate the concept, ‘morality 
as social software’: 1) King Solomon’s dilemma, 2) cake cutting procedure, and 3) freedom and 
knowledge-based obligation. Some brief and less technical discussions on these topics are 
summarized, to provide the reader with a ‘foretaste’ of later discussions on ‘morality as social 
software.’ Finally, I introduce and discuss an analogy between evolutionary morality and the 
Monte Carlo tree search in artificial intelligence. 
 
         §2-1. Various Definitions of Social Software 
The term, ‘Social Software,’ was coined by Rohit Parikh in his paper “Language as Social 
Software” (1995), and developed further in his later literature (especially 2001, 2002-1, 2002-2, 
2014) and in collaborations (especially Pauly 2001; Pacuit 2005; van Eijck and Verbrugge 2009, 
2012; van Eijck 2009, 2014). 
The concept, ‘social software,’ can be understood interchangeably as: 1) ‘social procedure,’ 
if the reader is not familiar with computer science, 2) ‘social algorithm,’ if familiar, and 3) ‘social 
game’ if familiar with game theory. Parikh uses these terms “more or less equivalently” in his 
paper “Social Software” (Parikh 2002-1, note 2), which was monumental to the research program 
on social software. He uses ‘social software’ broadly as “procedures that structure social reality,” 
without fixing the term to a precise definition (van Eijck and Parikh 2009, p. 2). This broad usage 





Eric Pacuit later (2005, p. 3) says: 
 
Social software is an interdisciplinary research program [emphasis is mine] that combines 
mathematical tools and techniques from game theory and computer science in order to 
analyze and design social procedures. 
 
I emphasize the expression, “research program.” The term ‘social software’ in Pacuit’s definition 
denotes, not only specific social procedures for social realities, but also the “emerging 
interdisciplinary field” (Pacuit 2005, p. iv) itself. This kind of broader connotation is similar to 
that of, for example, ‘artificial intelligence,’ in that the term ‘artificial intelligence’ now denotes, 
not only computers or computer programs that can perform human-like intelligence, but also the 
‘research program’ itself. Van Eijck and Verbrugge give us a more recent definition (2014) of 
‘social software’ as denoting: “the emerging interdisciplinary enterprise that is concerned with the 
design and analysis of algorithms that regulate social processes,” which is similar to Pacuit’s.  
The analogies between ‘social’ software/hardware and ‘computer’ software/hardware are 
useful to explicate our current topic, though there are still differences between them.  
Firstly, on the one hand, it may be hard to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation between 
computer “hardware (the machine) and software (the programs running on the machine),” since 
many of the built-in system jobs are done by hardware (van Eijck and Parikh 2009, p. 2). 
Nevertheless, the demarcation is not always impossible. “[W]hat can be changed without changing 
the machine itself is called software” (Ibid.).15  
                                                          




Analogously, there also seems a demarcation problem between social hardware and software, 
but nevertheless demarcating is not always impossible. Van Eijck and Parikh (2009) say that: 
 
[Social] hardware consists of institutions such as schools, churches, law courts, 
parliaments, banks, newspapers, supermarkets and prisons, while social software consists 
of the more specific procedures followed in these institutions. 
 
We may simply regard, as social hardware, optical fibers that connect bank buildings; and, as 
social software, the banking systems. But, what about “banks as institutions,” in the definition 
above? Are “banks as institutions” social hardware or software?  The demarcation issue here is not 
simple, so we need further discussion.16 
Secondly, 
 
[Computer] software is roughly divided into system software, namely, the software that is 
needed to make other software run, and application software, the software that turns the 
computer into a tool for a specific task (van Eijck and Parikh 2009, p. 2).  
 
Analogously, I argue in this dissertation that the morality in a society corresponds to social system 
software; by contrast, a specific ethical code for a particular behavior corresponds to application 
software. 
Thirdly, although most computer software is designed directly by programmers, some other 
software systems result from evolutionary processes. 
                                                          
16 Perhaps, there are more than two levels. We may consider “harder software” and “softer hardware” as the 




[Large] software systems such as the Linux operating system, --- can certainly be viewed 
as products of evolution of a certain kind, --- and by a process of genesis and natural 
selection (van Eijck and Parikh 2009, pp. 2-3).  
 
Note those familiar terms in evolutionary theories, such as ‘genesis’ and ‘natural selection.’ 
Analogously, again, 
 
There is a large class of social practices that have evolved in the course of development of 
a civilization. --- Other social practices were designed and redesigned over a long period 
of time, e.g., the principles of common law. --- It is obvious that the foundations and 
principles of legislation are part and parcel of the broad field of social software (van Eijck 
and Parikh 2009, pp. 3-4).  
 
Let’s remember that one of the main theses of this dissertation is that morality has evolved through 
the evolutionary, epistemic, game-theoretic process. The morality in a society is certainly one of 
“a large class of social practices” above. And also, let’s remember the common saying that 
“Obeying the law is the minimum level of ethical conduct enforced in society.” If the law in a 
society is social (system) software, so is the morality. 
Fourthly, Parikh, as another approach, divides social software into two categories: individual 
level and social (societal) level (Parikh 2014). Parikh’s own example demonstrates the individual 
level. If one goes from his apartment to a hotel in Chicago, his schedule will consist of several 





1. Taking a cab to the airport, 
2. Boarding the plane, 
3. In Chicago, taking a cab to the hotel, 
 
and these steps constitute a social procedure, which is social software in an individual level (Parikh 
2014, p. 2). By contrast, on the societal level, more (or multi-) agents and social structures are 
involved, and the interactions among the multi-agents are important factors of that social software. 
I think that, roughly, the concept of social system software matches social software in the societal 
level, and the concept of social application software matches social software in the individual level 
(though further investigation will be needed). As Parikh observes, one role of our society is “to 
serve as an operating system within which we can write our individual program” (Parikh 2014, p. 
3). Common operating systems are those old-fashioned UNIX and DOS, and more recent Apple 
OS, Microsoft Windows, and Google Android. If we regard a function of our society as an 
operating system like those, the morality of a society serves as built-in social system software. 
 
The most recent discussion on social software that I can find in the literature is Başkent’s 
(2017) “A Non-classical Logical Approach to Social Software,” in the Book, Rohit Parikh on 
Logic, Language and Society (eds. Başkent, Moss, and Ramanujam 2017). Başkent argues that 
“non-classical logical approaches can enrich, broaden and support the agenda of social software” 
(Başkent 2017, p. 91). By “non-classical logics” (and, interchangeably in the paper, by logical 
pluralism), Başkent means paraconsistent logics, where the “rule of explosion” fails, that is, “non-
trivial inconsistent theories” are possible; in short, paraconsistent logics allow “inconsistent-




It may seem no wonder that “enriching, broadening and supporting” the discourses of social 
software can be done by adding the non-classical perspective, once we recall that logic developed 
throughout history when various non-classical logics were added into the classical Aristotelian 
logic. What is novel in Başkent’s discussion, I think, is that he applies this paraconsistent addition 
to the broader fields of ethics and economics, which are outside logic. He discusses, in ethics, the 
incident of ‘Kitty Genovese’17 and Priest’s (1987/2006 2nd (Extended) edition) example of the 
situation where someone is obliged to do x and not to do x, and in economics, the real-world 
economics movement. In all these examples, it is possible that inconsistent normativity (that is, 
inconsistent action-guiding rules) can arise. I think that Başkent’s discussion is a natural form of 
development of the term, ‘social software’ as part of the process of its evolution, though he seems 
to focus his attention on “using tools in logic and computer science” (Başkent 2017, p. 91). 
I do not impose such restrictions to the definition as “tools in logic and computer science” in 
my theses of morality as social software in this dissertation. My argument will be that the concept, 
“social software” does not have to be restricted within concepts such as ‘procedure,’ ‘algorithm,’ 
or ‘tool,’ to which we have been introduced so far. My argument will be that morality itself (not 
just some rules or procedures that may constitute the higher-level morality) can be understood as 
social software. This kind of enlarging of a concept is not unusual, if we look around at things in 
the world and in the universe. Artworks such as novels, poems, paintings, songs, and movies are 
open to various interpretations: they are, on Sir Karl Popper’s terminology, the products in ‘World 
3’18; organisms such as amoebas, roses, and human beings are open to the process of evolution. 
                                                          
17  This tragic incident is discussed in many ethics textbook, as a provoking moral question. An original 
newspaper report: Martin Gansberg, “37 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police,” New York Times, March 27, 1964. 
18 As well known, Popper, while developing his theory of evolutionary epistemology, distinguishes the world 
(and, actually, the universe) into three categories: World 1, World 2, and World 3. See (Kim 1998, “Cyberspace and 




Our very concept, social software, has been evolved through the discussions of various 
philosophers and logicians since its birth, and will continue to evolve. I am attempting, in this 
dissertation, to add one more pebble into the evolutionary process.       
 
§2-2. Fair Division 1: King Solomon’s Dilemma 
Fair division of goods (and services) has been a vital practice for human societies in order to 
survive and flourish, since, probably, the human species started thinking about the concepts of 
property and its ownership. If we set aside the prehistory of the world for a moment, human history 
shows that a society that fails to divide its goods (and services) fairly to its members tends to 
collapse in the end. I am now considering, for example, the Roman Empire and the current 21st 
century global village of human society. The decline and fall of the Roman Empire resulted 
partially from its failure to divide goods fairly; and the 21st century global village might collapse 
unless the current convergence of economic wealth toward a relatively small number of people, is 
fixed. 
‘Distributive justice’ has been a crucial element of the just society, since the time of, at least, 
the hunter-gatherer societies needed to discuss important issues like who eats the most delicious 
part of their hunted prey (e.g. the sirloin part of a hunted buffalo), and how to share what is gathered, 
especially since their prey had to be hunted by groups of people who all contributed to the effort. 
And later, ‘distributive justice’ became significant due to, for example, the work of Adam Smith 
and Karl Marx, which has continued with John Rawls in the 20th century, and to Joseph Stiglitz, 
Paul Krugman, and Thomas Piketty in the 21st century. The common English expression that 
represents fair division between two people is: ‘I cut, you choose.’ It is the procedure in which one 




to make the division fair. We can apply this procedure to large groups of people, not just two, and 
this is further discussed in the examples below. 
        
2-2-1. The First Dispute 
The Old Testament (1 Kings 3:16-28) tells a story of two women claiming the same baby, and 
going to see King Solomon for his adjudication. Solomon settles the dispute by threatening to cut 
the baby in half. The real mother refuses this option preferring to give up her baby in order to save 
its life. The fake mother agrees to share half of a dead baby rather than give up a living infant. 
King Solomon knows which woman is the real mother by their responses and gives the child to 
the woman who agreed to give it away. So, the real mother gained her portion by agreeing to give 
away her entire portion. 
 
2-2-2. A Second Dispute 
Van Eijck and Parikh (2009, pp. 4-6) discuss a possible second dispute about a baby between two 
women. Suppose that another pair of women, who have heard about Solomon’s first judgment, 
come to Solomon claiming one baby as their own. Now, Solomon’s threatening ‘software’ to cut 
the baby in half as he did in the first dispute may not work, since both of the women may say that 
they want the other to have the baby. “Almost all social procedures are susceptible to strategic 
behavior,” so, for example, the fake mother acts strategically by pretending she is willing to give 
up the baby (van Eijck and Parikh 2009, pp. 4-6). What procedure can Solomon use when he 
resolves the matter of the two women with one baby so that the justice of fair division is fulfilled? 
In a nutshell, Solomon can settle this second dispute by proposing to sell the baby to the 




possibilities that van Eijck and Parikh (2009, pp. 4-5) discuss, which I believe show some 
characteristics of morality as social software very well: 
 
- Solomon offers the two women a generous loan from the Temple funds, to be paid back 
in monthly installments plus interest. 
- The rules are publicly announced: bids in closed papyri, the highest bidder gets the baby 
at the offered price, and the loser pays a fee into the Temple funds to cover court expenses. 
-This might not work if the fake mother has more money than the real mother, so it is better 
to ask them how many times their annual income they are willing to bid for the baby. 
-If, in closed papyri, the first mother offers A times her annual income and the second B 
times, with A > B, then the child should go to the first mother for ‘B times her’ annual 
income.  
-N.B. What the first mother has to pay is neither ‘A times’ her income (which she initially 
offered) nor B times ‘the second’ mother’s income, since ‘B times the first mother’s income’ 
is the amount that she would have paid in an open auction, when the second mother would 




                                                          
19 Some other variations of this solution by Moore (1992) and Pauly (2005) are also introduced in van Eijck and 
Parikh (2009, pp. 5-6): 
-Suppose the baby is worth A times the real mother’s annual income, and B times the fake mother’s, with A > B. 
-After their bids in sealed papyri, Solomon announces the procedure in which he will toss a coin to decide who 
gets the baby, and will rule that the woman who gets the baby pays M times, with A > M > B, and the other pays a 
small fine. 
-Then, since the fake mother is not likely to run the risk of having to pay more than the baby is worth to her, the 




§2-3. Fair Division 2: Cake Cutting Procedure 
In Solomon’s dilemma, the baby is not divisible, and three persons (two women and Solomon) are 
involved. We discuss now the cake cutting procedure, which is about divisible goods that can be 
shared among many persons. Due to this divisibility and the multi-agents involved, the cake cutting 
procedure is a better example of “morality as social software” than Solomon’s. 
The cake cutting procedure can work as “a metaphor for a division of a single heterogeneous 
good” (van Eijck and Parikh 2009, p. 7); (also, Brams and Taylor 1996; Brams 2005). For example, 
dividing an inheritance among n heirs is similar to dividing a cake among n participants, when 
both the inheritance and the cake are heterogeneous. That is, the inheritance (say, a plot of land) 
can be composed of parts that are worth different values like a cake can be composed of parts that 
have different toppings and cream. 
A basic procedure to cut the cake (or land) fairly is as follows:  
 
The first person among n participants cuts out a piece. He is satisfied with that piece if he 
can take it, but first he offers it to the n-1 other participants. If someone else wants it, that 
person takes it, and other n-1 participants, including the first person, continue dividing; if 
no one else wants it, the first person takes it and let the other n-1 participants, now 
excluding the first person, continue (see van Eijck and Parikh 2009, p. 7). 
 
Here, the order is important: who cut first, and next; who chooses first, and so on. Nevertheless, 
this basic cake cutting procedure is not envy-free. “A cake division is called envy-free if each 
person feels that nobody else received a larger piece” (van Eijck and Parikh 2009, p. 7). For 




envious of it, the division procedure is not envy-free. (A division between two persons is envy-
free by nature, since there is no third person.) As a fairer division, ‘Banach and Knaster cake 
cutting algorithm’20 is envy-freer than the basic one above: 
 
The first person among n participants cuts out a piece for him and claims that it is a fair 
share. All other n-1 participants examine it in turn. If nobody objects, the first person takes 
it. If a second person raises an objection, he has a right to cut off a slice and put that back 
with the rest of the cake. Then, he asks if he can take the reduced piece. This procedure 
will continue until someone gets the trimmed piece (see van Eijck and Parikh 2009; Parikh 
2002-1). 
  
§2-4. Freedom and Knowledge-based Moral Obligation   
As a third example of ‘morality as social software,’ I now discuss the thesis that the moral 
obligation of a moral agent depends on the agent’s knowledge about the circumstances (Pacuit, 
Parikh and Cogan 2004; Pacuit and Parikh 2006). And I mention, considering the common 
discussions on freedom and obligation in ethics, that this dependence on knowledge is essentially 
related to the agent’s freedom. In a nutshell, ‘no knowledge, no freedom, no obligation.’ 
Some typical cases are as follows: 
 
a) A female physician Uma has no obligation to treat a patient Sam who is a neighbor of 
hers, if Uma does not know Sam is ill. 
                                                          




b) Sam’s daughter comes to Uma’s house, and tells her. Now Uma does have an 
obligation to treat Sam (Pacuit and Parikh 2006, p. 18). 
 
These cases remind us of the famous ‘Problem of Evil’ in the (Judeo-Christian-Islamic) philosophy 
of religion. According to the argument based on the manifestation (or existence) of evils, God is 
responsible for his ‘non-existence’ (simply put, God does not exist). For, if he is omniscient, 
omnipresent, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, he must stop the occurrence of evils. But evils 
occur, so he does not exist. Relating to our current discussion, God’s all-knowing (omniscient) 
attribute results in his obligation. 
 
c) Mary having a heart attack is a patient in a hospital. Now the hospital has an obligation 
to be aware of Mary’s condition at all times and to provide emergency treatment as 
appropriate. There is not only a knowledge-based obligation, but also the obligation 
to have the knowledge (Pacuit and Parikh 2006, p. 18).   
 
People who argue against the existence of God may regard God as the hospital above that is 
neglecting its obligation to look after its patients. 
 
d) Uma is about to inject a patient with drug d, without knowing that the patient is allergic 
to drug d and there is a good alternative drug dʹ. Nurse Rebecca helping Uma is aware 





In these cases (a)-(d), the obligations arise depending on the circumstances, mainly the moral 
agent’s knowledge.21 
It is a common discussion in moral philosophy (and legal philosophy, too) whether a moral 
agent (or a criminal) is responsible for his action (or crime) when it does not seem that he had the 
freedom not to do that action (or crime.)22  Our current discussion on ‘knowledge-based obligation’ 
sheds some light on the relationship between freedom and responsibility, by showing that, if an 
agent has no knowledge, then he has no freedom, so no obligation. 
It is also interesting to note that one of the strategies in theodicy relating to the problem of 
evil above is to give human beings freedom, in order to argue for the existence of God. God exists 
despite evils. For evils are a kind of “collateral,” or the price of enjoying the freedom which God 
allows us. When we don’t exercise our freedom correctly due to our ignorance (that is, no 
knowledge), some evils may occur. 
 
§2-5. Evolutionary Morality and Monte Carlo Tree Search in Artificial Intelligence   
One of the main theses with which this dissertation project is ‘hardwired’ is that “Morality is 
evolutionary.” While I will discuss in more detail what I mean by ‘evolutionary’ in the next chapter, 
here in the last section of the chapter on social software I introduce an interesting analogy between 
the concept of evolutionary morality and the Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) in artificial 
                                                          
21 Formalization of knowledge-based obligation is another matter. Pacuit et al. (2004) develop a logic that 
captures the dependence of obligation on knowledge. The semantics of the logic extends the ‘history-based models,’ 
which were originally discussed in Parikh and Ramanujam (1985, 2003) and Parikh and Krasucki (1992). By contrast, 
in deontic logic, one of its goals is to prove formally that an agent is obligated to do an action; an agent’s knowledge 
is only informally represented; and the focus is on representing epistemic obligations, that is, what an agent ‘ought 
to know’ (Parikh and Pacuit 2006, p. 19).   
22 The case of “Leopold and Loeb” is historic in this debate. Two wealthy recent graduates of the University of 
Chicago brutally murdered a 14-year-old boy in 1924. At the trial, their defense attorney Clarence Darrow argued 
that the two young murderers were not responsible for their actions, and the responsibility is “somewhere in the 




intelligence (AI). The affinity among the terms such as ‘hardwired,’ ‘software,’ ‘MCTS’ and ‘AI’ 
can reveal the theses of this dissertation more vividly.   
In March 2016, AlphaGo, an AI program that plays the board game Go, amazed the world by 
defeating the reigning human world Go champion. Though some AI computer programs had 
already defeated top human performers in many other fields (for example, in chess by Deep Blue 
of IBM in 1997 and in TV quiz show by Watson of IBM in 2011), it had not been generally 
expected that an Al program would defeat a champion human Go player so early. The complexity 
of the board game Go with 19 x 19 grid is extremely higher than other games such as chess with 
its 8 x 8 grid. It has been estimated that the total number of possible games for Go is 10761, whereas 
for chess, 10120 (Requote from Jackson 1985, p. 125, originally for chess, Shannon 1950; for Go, 
Zobrist, 1969). We may (or may not) estimate how big the Go’s number 10761 is compared to the 
number 1080 which is the estimated number of all the atoms in the universe. So, until AlphaGo’s 
defeat of the human champion in 2016, it had been generally believed that it would take much 
longer for an AI to beat a human Go champion, after advancing the AI’s capacities to calculate all 
the possibilities (and to cool its machine). Then, suddenly the defeat happened! How was it 
possible? 
AlphaGo has been in development by the Google DeepMind team since 2015. Through 
adopting a new approach, AlphaGo has become more ‘intelligent’ than any other AI computer 
programs playing Go. The ‘secret’ of this new approach is explicated in a Journal Nature article, 
“Mastering the game of Go with deep neural networks and tree search” (David Silver et al 2016). 
According to the authors of the DeepMind team, the essence of AlphaGo’s algorithm is to combine 
its neural networks23 with the Monte Carlo tree search (Ibid. p. 484). Basically, the stunning 
                                                          
23  For a little further discussion, the neural networks of AlphaGo are convolutional networks “that have 




creativity of AlphaGo’s algorithm results from the combination of a new kind of machine learning, 
that is, deep learning and MCTS. AlphaGo often reveals great novel moves that were never 
imagined or played by human (professional) Go players in the last 2500 years. At first glance, 
those novel moves seem erroneous (or, silly and crazy), but then later it turns out that those moves 
are great. 
In perfect information zero-sum games such as chess and Go, the traditional well-known 
winning strategy is the minimax algorithm, which is to minimize the maximum possible loss. 
However, the minimax algorithm becomes quickly infeasible when the nodes of a game tree 
increase quickly, as in Go. An alternative strategy is one based on the Monte Carlo tree search. 
Instead of searching all possibilities exhaustively, the MCTS strategy simulates many, not all, 
games. At first, simulations are chosen randomly. As simulations go on, each node and simulation 
accumulate some values. For example, if a node leads to a win more often, that node will have 
better values. In this way, after many simulations, each node and simulation accumulate the more 
accurate values, and the players can select the better winning moves, that is, the better optimal 
decisions24 (Cameron Browne et al 2012). 
                                                          
(Silver et all 2016, p. 484). AlphaGo’s neural networks contain two kinds of networks, the ‘policy’ networks and the 
‘value’ networks. “The policy networks estimate the probability distribution of moves from a given position; the 
value networks estimate the “value” of a given board configuration from a given position” (Fu 2016, p. 667). With 
the expressions of Demis Hassabis, a co-founder of DeepMind, arguably the father of AlphaGo, the “policy networks 
select the next move to play, ---the value networks predict the winner of the game” (Hassabis 2016). 
      





Now, relating to evolutionary morality, it is hinted why I am introducing here AlphaGo and 
MCTS, which may have seemed irrelevant. An aspect of evolutionary morality that I argue is that 
human morality and moral senses are ‘hardwired’ to the human mind and body, in a similar way 
to how MCTS works. Some points made by M. Ruse and E. O. Wilson (1986) are relevant to my 
current thesis. They argue that “the human brain is not a tabula rasa” and “nothing like all-purpose 
cognition occurred during human evolution” (1986, p. 180). I think these claims can be compared 
to the situation in which an AI computer program for Go has to calculate all possible 10761 moves. 
As this calculation is infeasible, the human brain cannot think of all possible situations from a 
blank slate. Conversely, Ruse and Wilson argue that the human brain is not “genetically 
determined in the strict sense” either (Ibid.), though it may be debatable how strict is strict. 
As a synthesis of these two opposite theses, they argue that: 
 
The human brain is something in-between: a swift and directed learner that picks up certain 
bits of information quickly and easily, steers around others, and leans toward a surprisingly 
few choices out of the vast array that can be imagined (1986, p. 180). 
                                                          
 
Figure 1: Monte Carlo Tree Search in AlphaGo  




I emphasize that, like the MCTS strategy, the human brain chooses actions from “surprisingly few 
choices out of the vast array.” These few choices save the time and energy of the human brain 
when it tries to find the optimal decision.  
Ruse and Wilson introduce the term, ‘epigenetic rules,’ which are “genetically based 
processes of development that predispose the individual to adopt one or a few forms of behaviors 
as opposed to others,” and are “rooted in the physiological processes leading from the genes to 
thought and action” (1986, p. 180). Ruse (1995) also uses the expression, ‘hardwired,’ as similar 
to the expression, ‘rooted.’ They summarize that “we think morally because we are subject to 
appropriate epigenetic rules. These predispose us to think that certain courses of action are right 
and certain courses of action are wrong” (Ibid.). 
To conclude this chapter: AI scientists, since (say) Marvin Minsky, have learned from how 
the human brain works, in order to develop AI programs. I believe that, conversely, we can now 
learn from the ways AI programs work, in order to understand the human brain and its moral 
behaviors. The history of the evolution of AI programs from Deep Blue in 1997, to Watson in 
2011, and to AlphaGo in 2016 can be contrasted to the history of the evolution of the human brain 
for several million years. I argue that morality is social software, and the software program of 
morality works in the same way as the Monte Carlo tree search. I also argue that these aspects of 
morality have been developed through the process of evolution. In the next chapter, I will discuss 





Chapter 3. Evolutionary Morality, Altruism, and Cooperation 
The main subject to be discussed in this chapter is my interpretation of the thesis, “Morality is 
evolutionary.” I will make it clear what I mean by that, among a discussion of a variety of 
interpretations of scholars and thinkers. More specifically, I first discuss the concept, ‘Natural 
Selection’ and its units (or levels). Second, I introduce three cases that demonstrate the concept of 
natural selection through morality. I then discuss altruism and cooperation, which have been 
central to the debates about evolutionary morality. Finally, I summarize my interpretation, while 
discussing Jesse Prinz’s ‘sentimentalist theory of morality.’ The whole purpose of this chapter is 
to set a ‘playground,’ where the two concepts, social software and evolutionary morality can ‘play’ 
with each other. While I touch on subtle and controversial matters, I will mainly try to summarize 
the standard views of the major topics in evolutionary moral philosophy. 
 
§3-1. Natural Selection and Its Units (or Levels) 
Geological records found in fossils suggest that species morphed into different species over time. 
The question remains as to how the process of morphing happened. That is, what is the 
evolutionary mechanism? One answer that the contemporary sciences have embraced is the idea 
of natural selection. Since Charles Darwin first25 published his scientific description of it in his On 
the Origin of Species (1859), natural selection has been regarded as a core of the mechanism of 
evolution. 
The process of natural selection includes three components: 1) variation, 2) differential 
reproduction, and 3) heredity (Lewontin 1970; Godfrey-Smith 2007, 2009; Brandon 2014).  An 
organism obtains variations randomly, and these variations can be passed on to its offspring; 
                                                          




however, environmental conditions are also varied and not all offspring will have the same genetic 
variations; so, some environments are harsher for some offspring; while also being beneficial to 
other offspring with different variations; finally, the offspring with beneficial variations in their 
environment will survive and can pass on those traits to their descendants. 
Darwin’s own words on natural selection are also worth re-reading. Note the expression, the 
‘principle of preservation,’ (Darwin, 1859/1872 6th ed., Ch. 4, ‘Summary of Chapter’, pp. 102-
103)26: 
 
But if variations useful to any organic being ever do occur, assuredly individuals thus 
characterised will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from 
the strong principle of inheritance, these will tend to produce offspring similarly 
characterised. This principle of preservation [emphasis is mine], or the survival of the 
fittest, I have called Natural Selection. It leads to the improvement of each creature in 
relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life; and consequently, in most cases, to 
what must be regarded as an advance in organisation. Nevertheless, low and simple forms 
will long endure if well fitted for their simple conditions of life. 
 
According to Darwin’s original view, the term, ‘natural selection’ is, most of all, about 
‘preservation.’ Darwin wrote that, in “the literal sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a 
false term,” but, like other “metaphorical expressions” such as “the attraction of gravity,” if we 
“personify” Nature, then the term ‘natural selection’ can be used (1859/1872, Ch. 4, p. 63). He 
                                                          
26 Six different and updated editions of On the Origin of Species were published while Darwin was alive: Firstly 
in 1859 and lastly in 1872. I agree that those differences are not just stylish editorial corrections but subtle 
philosophical changes of Darwin’s view, so that we should be careful when interpret those different editions. Here, 




expressed his regret for the term in a letter to Charles Lyell in 1860: “Talking of “Natural 
Selection”, if I had to commence de novo, I would have used natural preservation; for I find men 
like Harvey of Dublin cannot understand me; though he has read the Book twice.”27 Here, I note 
that the evolutionary mechanism and, as the core of it, natural selection is about ‘preservation’ (or 
lack thereof, which is “Extinction” (1859/1872, Ch. 4, p. 85). Now it becomes clearer what I mean 
by ‘morality is evolutionary’: I mean that morality is about preservation and extinction. Before 
moving on to morality directly, let’s discuss the units (or levels) of natural selection a bit more. 
 
Then, what is the basic level (or unit) of natural selection? What unit (or level) of an organism 
does Nature preserve? The two terms, ‘unit’ and ‘level’ of natural selection are often used 
synonymously, though some authors distinguish them (Godfrey-Smith 2009). I think that ‘level’ 
may be more useful in a hierarchical understanding of natural selection; whereas ‘unit’ may be 
more revelatory in explaining ‘morality as social software.’ So, here, I use the two terms mostly 
interchangeably, but at times, distinguishably. 
We can consider various levels of natural selection, from genes to species. In a biological 
hierarchy, the following levels of natural selection are commonly suggested (Sinervo 1997/2013): 
 
Genes28  Individuals  Kin  Groups  Species 
 
According to, Richard Dawkins’ famous theory of genic selection, ‘selfish’ genes, not individuals, 
are the units of natural selection, and higher organisms such as individuals may be regarded as just 
                                                          
27 Darwin (September 28, 1860), "Darwin, C. R. to Lyell, Charles." Darwin Correspondence Project. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Library. Letter 2931. I first learned this fact from the Wikipedia article, “Natural Selection” 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_selection. 




‘vehicles’ to spread and preserve those genes (Dawkins, 1976/2006). The idea of individual 
selection seems intuitive: I am the basic unit of natural selection; if I adapt to the environment well, 
I will survive.  
Next, an individual’s kin are its relatives who are closely related to the individual (that is, 
who share some of the same kinds of genes with the individual). An individual helps its kin to 
promote the preservation of itself and its kin. An ant or a bee, for example, may sacrifice its life in 
order to preserve its kin under the law of kin selection. How many fellow kin it preserves can be 
measured by the term, ‘inclusive fitness.’ W. D. Hamilton (1964) who first defined the term, told 
a joke that he could sacrifice his own life for the lives of his four cousins who share one-quarter 
of the same genes with him.29  
In the level of group selection, the members of a group, unlike kin, do not necessarily share 
the same genes. Nevertheless, the members interact with one another in order to win in natural 
selection the competition with other groups.  
Species selection is the next. Homo sapiens have survived in the competition with 
Neanderthals who did not. 
Similarly, beyond biology, I think we can imagine a hierarchy of the following levels of 
natural selection in the human community. 
 
Individuals  Tribes  Countries  Cultures  Civilizations.30 
                                                          
29 Hamilton (1964) gives, in a verbal presentation, that “inclusive fitness may be imagined as the personal fitness 
which an individual actually expresses in its production of adult offspring,” in addition to a strict mathematical 
definition of “Rij=1+ Rij where Rij is called the inclusive fitness, and Rij the inclusive fitness effect.” Still, how to 
calculate (or define) inclusive fitness is a controversial matter. 
30 I admit that it may seem ‘silly’ to add ‘Civilizations  Planets  Galaxies  and the like’ into this hierarchy. 
But let’s recall what the late Hawking (2010) said in a science documentary series, “Into the Universe with Stephen 
Hawking”: “If aliens visit us, the outcome would be much as when Columbus landed in America, which didn't turn 
out well for the Native Americans.” Besides aliens, when humans will move into other planets, say, three hundred 




For the unit of natural selection (what unit does it preserve?), kin selection (relating to genic 
selection) and group selection has been most discussed in the literature, and multi-level selection 
(Elliott Sober & David Sloan Wilson, 1998) was a new recent synthesis of some others. I will 
discuss this topic, the unit of natural selection, further below, relating it to altruism and cooperation. 
But before that, I introduce some examples. 
 
§3-2. Natural Selection through Morality: Three Cases 
The following three cases of natural selection show that morality is closely connected to natural 
selection, even though they also show that it is debatable whether morality is the cause of natural 
selection, the effect of it, or otherwise.  
Firstly, Darwin’s own account in The Descent of Man (Darwin, 1871/1874, 2nd ed., Ch. 5, pp. 
129-130): 
 
Turning now to the social and moral faculties. In order that primeval men --- should become 
social, they must have acquired the same instinctive feelings ---. They would have felt uneasy 
when separated from their comrades, for whom they would have felt some degree of love; 
they would have warned each other of danger, and have given mutual aid in attack or defence. 
All this implies some degree of sympathy, fidelity, and courage. Such social qualities --- were 
no doubt acquired by the progenitors of man in a similar manner, namely, through natural 
selection, aided by inherited habit. When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same 
                                                          
which once flourished in a twin Earth of another galaxy might have collapsed by the evolutionary mechanism of 
natural selection, since the intelligent beings of that civilization believed that their God commanded them to offer 
those intelligent being sacrifices for their religious rituals. This kind of command functions adversely in the process 
of natural selection; any group that does not cherish the members cannot survive. Cultures and civilizations that 
have left evidence of human sacrifice in our Mother Earth have disappeared, even if the human sacrifice culture has 




country, came into competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included a 
great number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were always ready to 
warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would succeed better and 
conquer the other. --- fidelity and courage --- disciplined soldiers --- Obedience---. Selfish 
and contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be effected. A 
tribe rich in the above qualities would spread and be victorious over other tribes ---. Thus 
the social and moral qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused throughout the 
world. 
 
It is notable that Darwin himself discussed social and moral faculties together, which may reveal 
that this dissertation, Morality as Social Software, follows the tradition of The Descent of Man.  
Secondly, let us examine Dawkins’ discussion in The Selfish Gene on Sucker, Cheat, and 
Grudger birds (1976/2006, Ch. 10). Dawkins supposes a species of bird that is parasitized by a 
nasty kind of tick. These ticks should be removed immediately, and an individual bird can remove 
most on its own body, except the top of its head. Now, the birds are divided into three categories, 
based on their strategies to pull off ticks from their own heads. Suckers groom anybody who needs 
it; Cheats accept grooming, but never return; and Grudgers only groom strangers (so, those who 
have never had a chance to betray Grudgers before) and individuals who have previously groomed 
Grudgers. Dawkins argues that, based on his simulations, the Grudger strategy is an ‘evolutionarily 
stable strategy’ against Suckers and Cheats, in the sense that Grudgers invade the population. I 
note that human morality can be something like the ‘evolutionarily stable strategy’ of the Grudgers 
in this example. This Grudger strategy is related to the famous ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy (I will discuss 




Thirdly, lastly, let’s review an article from the journal Science, “The Coevolution of Parochial 
Altruism and War” by Choi and Bowles (2007). The authors define altruism as “benefiting fellow 
group members at a cost to oneself,” and parochialism as “hostility toward individuals not of one’s 
own ethnic, racial, or other group”; and they argue, based on their computer simulation, that the 
combination of the two, parochial altruism “could have evolved if parochialism promoted 
intergroup hostilities.” During the evolutionary process of natural selection, both altruism and 
parochialism may not survive if they are separated from each other because the payoffs of altruists 
and parochialists are lower than the alternatives. The computer model of Choi and Bowles 
simulates possible human conditions in the late Pleistocene and the early Holocene (i.e., from 
about 125,000 years through 10,000 years until 7000 years ago) with 10 runs of 5000 generations. 
Their model shows, if combined, parochial altruism can be evolutionarily more stable than others 
such as tolerant (non-parochial) altruists, parochial non-altruists, and tolerant (non-parochial) non-
altruists.31 I note here again that human morality is something like parochial altruism that has 
emerged through the evolutionary mechanism of natural selection. 
 
§3-3. Altruism and Cooperation 
Altruism and cooperation have been central topics in the discourse on evolutionary morality. 
Darwin himself related altruistic and cooperative behaviors to morality (1871/1874, 2nd ed., Ch.5, 
p. 132): 
 
                                                          
31 A notable result of the research of Choi and Bowles is that parochial altruism can be evolutionarily more 
stable than tolerant (non-parochial) altruism and simple altruism. Can this result be interpreted as exhibited by a 
country that often encourages the people’s patriotism (a kind of altruism) by starting aggressive wars against the 
neighboring countries can be evolutionarily more stable? I mention here that I think this is a critically important 




A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, 
fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to 
sacrifice themselves for the common good [emphasis is mine], would be victorious over most 
other tribes; and this would be natural selection. At all times throughout the world tribes 
have supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one important element in their success, the 
standard of morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus every-where tend to rise 
and increase. 
 
At the core of altruism and cooperation are “to aid one another, and to sacrifice for the common 
good.” Perhaps, altruism and cooperation are not the same as morality of the entirety, but they are 
the seminal constituents of the republic (not kingdom) of morality. Other constituents may be 
justice, sharing, fairness, sympathy, empathy and the like.    
The two topics, however, have often been the sources of misunderstandings, misuses, and 
even, at times, miscalculations (relating to inclusive fitness). Some terms that may seem similar 
but still distinguishable, or must be distinguished, are these:  
 
1) There are many adjectives qualifying each altruism (See Okasha 2003/2013): biological 
(evolutionary) altruism vs. psychological (vernacular) altruism by (E. Sober & D.S. Wilson 
1998); strong vs. weak by (D.S. Wilson 1990); hardcore vs. softcore by (Edward Wilson 1978; 
we have another Wilson in the dissertation!); reciprocal (Trivers 1971); and short-term vs. 
long-term altruism;  




3) mutualistic cooperation vs. altruism (avoiding the expression, altruistic cooperation) by 
(Godfrey-Smith 2013). 
 
I do not intend here to draw a perfect and clear-cut map of all these consanguineous terms. Rather, 
I introduce some concise meanings of necessary terms that are helpful for our further discussion 
on ‘morality as social software.’ 
I find it useful that we begin by introducing four categories described by David Wilson and 
Lee Dugatkin (1992, p. 30): 
 
1) Altruism: Decreasing the agent’s fitness/ Increasing the fitness of others, 
2) Cooperation: Increasing the fitness of both, the agent and others, 
3) Selfishness: Increasing the agent’s fitness/ Decreasing the fitness of others, and 
4) Spite: Decreasing the fitness of both, the agent and others. 
 
According to these distinctions, we can see, above all, the relationship between altruism and 
cooperation, which is that cooperation is ‘not’ quite the same as altruism. If I help others by way 
of cooperation, it is good for me; therefore, my actions are not altruistic. Still, many other authors 
hold that cooperation is a ‘kind’ of altruism. 
The debate on whether cooperation is altruistic or not leads us naturally to one of the most 
serious debates in evolutionary theories: how altruism and cooperation have evolved and survived, 
not become extinct, while they have decreased the agent’s fitness. If I live this life altruistically to 
help other sentient beings without having my own offspring, the altruistic genes within me are 




standards that the agent holds regarding what is right or wrong.” If we understand this agent, not 
as an individual, but as a group such as kin, species, tribe, country, culture, civilization, and the 
like, altruism and cooperation can be understood as helpful for the highest and ultimate moral 
standard of the group, that is, its survival of the fittest by natural selection. 
 
The flavor of the following thesis by Christine Korsgaard is similar to that of the metaphor 
of Indra’s Net introduced in chapter one: 
 
“The primal scene of morality ... is not one in which I do something to you or you do 
something to me, but one in which we do something together” (Re-quoted from Tomasello 
2009, p. 51). 
 
That is, as I wrote earlier, morality is closely related to the question of how we ought to live 
together with other human beings and all other sentient beings. That is why our discussion about 
morality is closely related to altruism and cooperation. 
According to Godfrey-Smith’s (2013) slightly different distinction from that of Wilson and 
Dugatkin (1992) above, ‘cooperation’ can be defined as “helping now with reasonable expectation 
that you will be repaid later, during your lifetime” and ‘altruism’ as “giving away resources that 
will never be repaid to you” (Godfrey-Smith 2013). That is, for ‘cooperation’, an agent’s expected 
benefit is bigger than the cost; for ‘altruism,’ an agent’s expected benefit is smaller than the cost. 
Here, I think his phrase, “during your lifetime,” is notable. He seems to exclude any religious claim 
of paying (the cost) and being repaid (the benefit) through many lifetimes such as the concept of 




be acceptable: I scratch your back ‘now,’ but if you scratch my back in return when I breathe my 
last breath, is it an instance of morally acceptable cooperation? Maybe not. Or, still, ‘yes.’ Perhaps 
we can develop a mathematical function of morally acceptable cooperation that has variables of 
time and the amount of repayment.  In contrast to cooperation and altruism, the focus of ‘mutualism’ 
is on interaction that helps both sides, according to Godfrey-Smith’s definition (Ibid.). The term, 
‘mutualism’, can be used for two cases: for immediate mutual gain, and for ‘short term sacrifice 
and longer term gain.’ Therefore, using Godfrey-Smith’s distinction, there are two kinds: 
mutualistic cooperation versus altruism. The expression, ‘altruistic cooperation’ is unnecessary.  
 
§3-4. Michael Tomasello’s View on Cooperation  
In Tomasello’s (2009, 2014, 2016) discussions on evolutionary morality, the concept of 
‘cooperation’ encompasses ‘altruism’ and ‘collaboration.’ In his ‘taxonomy,’ ‘altruism’ is a form 
of cooperation, in which “one individual sacrifices for the benefit of another” (2016, p. 1); whereas 
‘(mutualist) collaboration’ is “multiple individuals working together for mutual benefit” (2009, p. 
2), (which is Godfrey-Smith’s ‘mutualistic cooperation’). One of Tomasello’s primary questions 
is whether “altruism emerges “naturally” in young children or whether, alternatively, it is somehow 
imparted by culture (or whether culture perhaps plays some other role)” (Tomasello 2009, p. 2). 
Naturally, this question can be traced back to the traditional debate “in Western civilization,” 
which “is whether humans are born cooperative and helpful and society later corrupts them (e.g., 
Rousseau) [that is, Kant], or whether they are born selfish and unhelpful and society teaches them 
better (e.g., Hobbes)” (p. 3).32 Tomasello, agreeing with the work of Brian Skyrms (2003, more 
on chapter five below), argues that humans do not face a Prisoner's Dilemma when building 
                                                          
32 Similarly, as briefly introduced in chapter one, the traditional debate in China between Mencius and Xunzi 




human-style collaboration from the ape foundation. “Rather, our scenario is a stag hunt in which 
everyone prefers to collaborate because of the rewards doing so brings each of us and our 
compatriots” (p. 54). 
Tomasello views that the two forms of cooperation, altruism and collaboration, themselves, 
are “known as morality,” if understood as some “uniquely human version” (2016, p. 1). Altruistic 
sacrifice is “based on such self-immolating [emphasis is mine] motives as compassion, concern, 
and benevolence”; mutualistic collaboration is “based on such impartial motives as fairness, equity, 
and justice” (Ibid.). Even if the equation of ‘morality = cooperation’ may seem too simplified, this 
simplicity is powerful in the sense that it suggests us to imagine some million years of human 
evolutionary process in which we humans have developed those senses of morality.  
Let’s imagine: human ancestors wanted to hunt a bigger stag, instead of a smaller hare; an 
individual alone was not able to hunt a stag; he needed cooperation with others; once hunting was 
done, they needed to distribute the stag fairly; and the distribution process must have considered 
‘cheaters’ (who did not participate in the hunting for his own benefit) and ‘weakers’ (who were 
not able to participate, due to, for example, illness or disability), as well as the most valiant warriors. 
This is just one example of stag hunting. The examples can be enlarged to include larger scale 
works such as building a city and engaging in a war against a neighboring country. Through this 
kind of process, it is very likely that we humans have developed the senses of morality, and at the 
core of it, there is cooperation of altruism and cooperation of collaboration.        
 
§3-5. Thomas Huxley: Ethics against Evolution, or through Evolution? 
Thomas Henry Huxley gave the second Romanes Lecture in 1893, and it was published as a book, 




related to evolution and ethics in Western and Indian philosophy and science. Among them, I focus 
on only one thesis that morality is against evolution, which is contrary to my thesis in this 
dissertation.33  While he was a supporter of Darwinian theory of evolution,34  Huxley did not 
support the thesis that evolution is the major foundation of human morality. Let’s call this thesis 
the ‘evolution-morality’ thesis. He argued that it is hard for us “to bring the course of evolution 
into harmony with even the elementary requirement of the ethical ideal of the justice and the good” 
(Huxley 1894/2006, p. 58). At the same time, however, some of Huxley’s claims seemed to support 
the evolution-morality thesis according to the audience present at the lecture. 
After Huxley’s lecture, “a stumbling-block to many” people was a seemingly paradoxical 
idea that “ethical nature, while born of cosmic nature, is necessarily at enmity with its parent” 
(1894/2006 in “Preface”). While comparing ‘ethical nature’ (I understand as ethics) to ‘cosmic 
nature’ (I understand as evolution), Huxley argued that the discord between the two is not a 
paradox, but a “truth.” Huxley’s other example of an antithesis of cosmic nature is “the horticulture 
process” that brings the “operation of human energy and intelligence” into existence and 
maintenance of a garden (p. 11). 
 
It is urged that, such being the case, the cosmic process cannot be in antagonism with that 
horticultural process which is part of itself—I can only reply [to what is urged], that if the 
conclusion that the two are, antagonistic is logically absurd, I am sorry for logic (pp. 11-12). 
 
                                                          
33 Until recently I perused the entirety of this book for the first time, I had not known that, in this book published 
in the United Kingdom in 1894, Huxley discussed an essence of Buddhist philosophy (Karma, nirvana, etc.). 
Interestingly, Huxley seems to have a view that Buddhist thought of Karma, nirvana and the like is a form of 
evolutionary theory. 




 On the contrary, in another place in the book, Huxley’s writes that: 
 
I have termed this evolution of the feelings out of which the primitive bonds of human 
society are so largely forged, into the organized and personified sympathy we call 
conscience, the ethical process (p. 30). 
 
I think that this seemingly paradoxical or antithetical views of Huxley can be ‘sublated’ into a 
synthesis of the evolution-morality thesis, if we interpret the contrary of his two kinds of views as 
just a ‘matter of direction.’ That is, I argue that the direction of developing morality, the 
horticultural process, and another example of his (the process of colonization that makes new 
colonies in the imperial period) are all towards the direction of, say, ‘order 1’; evolution is also 
towards the direction of, say, ‘order 2’; however, the directions of these two, order 1 and 2, are 
different from each other, though they are still towards the direction of order. They are not opposite 
to each other; rather both are opposite to the direction of ‘disorder.’ It seems to me that Huxley 
thought that he connected evolution to disorder, and morality to order; but he actually connected 
evolution to ‘order 2’; and morality (and horticulture) to ‘order 1.’ So, I argue that, this discrepancy 
between what he thought and what he actually did was the main cause of the apparent paradox to 
the audience. And also, at the core of this paradox is the long-rooted nature-nurture debate, as 
mentioned in the previous section. The main question in the debate is which one is the major cause, 
among the two: on the one hand, cosmic nature, evolution, etc.; on the other hand, ethical nature 
(which is Huxley’s own term above), nurture, culture, and the like.    
When I argue the evolution-morality thesis that evolution is the major foundation of human 




‘thought,’ but rather what he ‘did’ actually. I will address this order-disorder issue in more detail 
in the next chapter on entropy, after discussing one of the strongest critiques of evolutionary moral 
theories by Jesse Prinz. 
 
§3-6. Jesse Prinz’s Sentimentalist Critique of Evolutionary Moral Theory 
Jesse Prinz in The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007) defends a “sentimentalist theory of 
morality.” Prinz’s beginning position is not different from one assumption of this dissertation. 
Prinz argues that “[p]eople who feel uncomfortable with the idea that morality derives from us, 
should consider some other things that derive from us, such as medicine, governments, and art” (p. 
8). This is the exact position with which I began in this dissertation. Unlike my claim, however, 
Prinz argues that “many philosophers want to find an objective foundation for morality. I don’t 
think such a foundation exists” (p. 164). In this sense, he is not a Kantian who finds the categorical 
(therefore, unconditional and object) imperative from human reason. In Prinz’s sharp contrast 
between Kantians and Humeans, “[i]f moral imperatives are categorical, sensibility theories are 
not going to fly” (p. 128). I think the difference between the Kantian and the Humean is ‘just’ the 
difference between the foci of the two views in the long tradition of Western ideas since ancient 
Greece: between logos and pathos; between reason and emotion. The Humean in the tradition of 
pathos and emotion have also attempted to find a foundation for morality, though not on objective. 
Prinz argues that “[a]s a constructive sentimentalist, I think morality is created by us, and, as 
a relativist, I think different societies create different moralities under different historical 
conditions” (p. 215). I definitely agree with these views. However, I have a different view from 





[T]here is no use in distinguishing natural and cultural norms, because culture shapes all 
norms, even when they have a natural foundation.—[N]o evolved norms qualify as moral 
norms, so, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an evolutionary ethics (p. 259).  
 
I will concede that we are biologically prone to have certain kinds of values, but I will deny 
that there is an innate morality --. Our biological predispositions have no authority over 
values that have a cultural origin, and they can be embellished and overturned under the 
influence of culture. Moreover, I will argue that our biological predispositions do not 
qualify as moral rules without cultural elaboration. Morality is artificial all the way down. 
Taken literally, “evolutionary ethics” is a myth. It is Romanticism reborn as crass 
scientism, no more plausible than Nietzsche’s Übermensch and perhaps no less insidious 
(pp. 245-246).  
 
If I am right, then moral rules are not innate. Rather, they emerge through interactions 
between biology and culture (p. 274). 
 
 The ‘intensity’ of Prinz’s criticism of the role of biology (and so, evolution) seems to decrease 
from the first to the third: From ‘no evolutionary ethics’ through ‘some biologically prone values’ 
(though still the evolutionary idea is ‘myth’), finally, to ‘interaction between biology and culture.’  
These three quotes show that we can add Prinz into the list of thinkers, like Tomasello and Huxley 
above, who address the nature-nurture debate. 
Do we humans have such moral genes that result in moral universals? Prinz, in “Against 




morality-generating machinery. If moral nativism is right, and so all human species have the same 
innate biological machinery to generate moral universals, on Prinz’s argument, then we must be 
able to find moral universals such as “Don’t harm innocent people” in (almost) all communities 
and cultures. But, can we find that? No. Prinz divides the views of the defenders of moral 
universals into three groups, the immodest, the modest, and the minimal, and then gives arguments 
against the three, one by one.   
Here, Prinz and I agree that morality is constructed by humans, but we don’t agree on whether 
the constructing process is evolutionary or not, and whether the process can be called the 
foundation. It seems to me that Prinz uses the terms “evolutionary” and “cultural” distinctively, 
and the term “foundation” strictly. My position is that if human morality is a consequence of 
human evolutionary and cultural development, we may call it “evolutionary,” and we may also 
call the ‘emerging process of human morality’ a “foundation.” The ‘emerging process of human 
morality’ in my terminology may be compared to Prinz’s terminology, the process of ‘moralization’ 
(2004/2009, p. 16). In other words, in Prinz’s thesis that “universal moral rules are the result of 
convergent cultural evolution” (ibid.), I am specifically interested in what exactly the ‘convergent 
cultural evolution’ is. My current hypothesis for my dissertation research is that the ‘convergent 
cultural evolution’ is epistemic game-theoretic towards morality as social software.  
In the following chapters, we will investigate further whether these differences between 




Chapter 4. Anti-entropic Morality, Information, and Equilibrium 
The word, ‘entropy,’ to some people, often seems mysterious and difficult to grasp; to other people, 
the word is doomed to misuse. I think the following anecdote is not only amusing but also 
revelatory.  In the 1940s when Claude Shannon (a founder of modern information theory) asked 
John von Neumann (a founder of modern game theory) what Shannon’s newly discovered formula 
should be called, von Neumann cleverly replied that:    
 
You should call it entropy, for two reasons: In the first place your uncertainty function has 
been used in statistical mechanics under that name, so it already has a name. In the second 
place, and more important, nobody knows what entropy really is, so in a debate you will 
always have the advantage (McIrvine and Tribus 1971; first appeared in Tribus 1964, p. 
354). 
 
Von Neumann’s clever second reason shows how the word entropy is regarded as mysterious or 
doomed. (The first reason is also very relevant to a section below.)35 On the stage of this chapter, 
entropy plays the central role, along with its siblings such as information, equilibrium, software, 
and morality playing the supporting roles, together with other ‘step-siblings’ such as disorder and 
order. Through the discussions, I hope, “neither of them is shrouded in mystery or rapture beyond 
our horizon.”36   
 
 
                                                          
35 The anecdote may seem ‘apocryphal.’ Regardless of whether the anecdote is true or not, apocryphal stories 
often keep only the universal and necessary, stripping away the particular and contingent. 
36 With this sentence, I am mimicking Kant’s ‘accent’ adjacent to his epitaph (“the starry heaven above me, the 




§4-1. A Summary of the Arguments 
The single main thesis that I argue in this chapter is as follows: 
 
(1) Main Thesis: Morality as social software is anti-entropic, that is, against entropy. 
 
This main thesis has three connections here:  
 
(a) Foundation (or Background): the main thesis is founded on several well-known, but not 
always well-recognized, theses (2) to (7) below, which can function as the scientific 
background for the philosophical thesis; 
(b) Argument: the well-known main thesis is argued by several, relatively less-known theses 
(8) to (13) below, which can function as a series of syllogisms; lastly, 
(c) Corollary: the main thesis results in two corollaries. 
 
The (a) foundation part is, ‘roughly put,’ as follows: 
 
(2) The second law of thermodynamics holds that the total entropy of a system tends to 
increase over time.  
(3) The concept of entropy often translates as ‘disorder’ in ordinary language. (Whether this 
“simile” is legitimate is a crucial point in the bitter controversy about entropy.)  
(4) So, the second law may be interpreted as stating that the disorder of a system tends to 
increase over time. (If the simile in (3) above is not legitimate, then neither is this 




(5) The inexorable tendency of entropy governs everything in the universe.  
(6) Or, for some moment of time, there are exceptions, which are living organisms.  
(7) From this ontology of nature, a normative rule can be deduced: organisms such as 
amoebae and my life do, and should do, resist the law of entropy in order to live lives. 
 
The (b) argument for the main thesis (that morality as social software is anti-entropic) is as follows:  
 
(8) Premise 1: Entropy and information are sibling concepts. 
(9) Premise 2: Entropy and equilibrium are also sibling concepts. 
(10) Conclusion IE (also, Premise 3) (‘I’ for ‘information’; ‘E’ for ‘equilibrium’): Therefore, 
information and equilibrium are also sibling concepts.37  
(11) Premise 4: Information and software are sibling concepts. 
(12) Premise 5: Equilibrium and morality are also sibling concepts. 
(13) Conclusion MS (also, Premise 6) (‘M’ for ‘morality’; ‘S’ for ‘software’): Therefore, 
morality and (social) software are sibling concepts, that is, morality as social software. 
(14 = 1) Main Thesis: Therefore, morality as social software is anti-entropic, that is, against 
entropy. 
Lastly, from this main thesis, the following (c) corollaries result: 
(15) Corollary 1: Morality as social software is a tool for us to fight against the tendency of 
entropy in the universe. 
                                                          
37 It is because my siblings are in sibling relationship with each other, if they are not ‘numerically’ identical to 
each other. If they are, that means that, in our examples here, information and equilibrium are numerically identical 
to each other. I do not assume that they are identical. “When we say that two people own the same car, we might 
mean either they own the same car, e.g., a Honda, or they are joint owners of a single car. ---the former--- means 




(16) Corollary 2: The inevitable clash between the entropic universe and the anti-entropic 
fighting of organisms against the tendency can be, fundamentally, seen as the origin of the 
suffering (Dukkha, in Pali of Buddhism) of the organisms.  
 
None of these ideas and arguments is uncontroversial. Even thesis (2), the second law of 
thermodynamics, which seems well-established, is also challenged by some philosophers and 
scientists. Some people feel enlightened when they first encounter these ideas; on the contrary, 
some other people feel uncomfortable with incautious usages of terms such as ‘disorder’ in (3) and 
(4) above; still, some other people criticize vehemently these ideas for inappropriate applications 
of concepts in natural science to non-natural science and everyday life.  
Nevertheless, or therefore, I will not pay equal attention to each of those theses. First, for (a) 
foundation, since the theses are already well-known, I will briefly ‘sketch’ them by introducing 
the major controversies over the pros and cons, and revealing my perspectives. Second, for (b) 
argument, the conclusion itself that morality is anti-entropic is commonplace in the literature.38 
My emphasis will not be on the conclusion itself, but on the way to draw the conclusion, which is 
related to the concept of social software. Third, for (c) corollary, I will ‘venture’ the two corollaries 
with caution and imagination. While admitting that there may seem to be sheer absurdity and ample 
lacunas in these arguments, I dare to attempt to draw attention to the novelty of them. I shall now 
begin in more detail, by discussing the concept of entropy. 
 
                                                          
38 For example, Hammond (1985/2005 Eulogy edition) The Human System from Entropy to Ethics; Pojman 
(1990/2017 with Fieser), p. 228. Pojman and Fieser writes: “According to [Geoffrey] Warnock, society has a natural 
tendency to get worse, an entropy of social relations [emphasis is theirs] . ---  Morality is antientropic.” The authors 
ascribe the concept of anti-entropic morality to the philosopher, Geoffrey Warnock, but I cannot find any mention 




§4-2. Is Entropy Disorder?  
The simpler conceptions such as explanation, theory, and principle attract ‘beautiful minds’ more 
than the less simple conceptions. Philosophers, mathematicians, scientists, psychologists, 
economists, and others are more inclined to love the principle expressed in Ockham’s (Occam’s) 
Razor: Plurality should not be posited without necessity; often, in somewhat different form, entities 
are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. This principle of the Scholastic philosopher William of 
Ockham (1285-1347/49) is a law of parsimony (economy). A modern, common expression of the 
principle is, I endorse, that, ‘the simpler, the better,’ which is often found in even commercials 
these days.39 
                                                          
39 Regarding the beauty of simplicity, I follow, for example, in the history and philosophy of science, the 
common Kuhnian (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1962/Second enlarged edition 1970) explanation of why 
the heliocentric model won rapidly more proponents in the competition with the geocentric model during the period 
of the Scientific Revolution. It was not just because heliocentrism was considered as more accurate than geocentrism. 
Geocentrism itself had been able to explain the discrepancies between the Ptolemy theory and the observation, as 
almost accurately as heliocentrism had. The discrepancies had been accumulated for around 1500 years since 
Ptolemy. Geocentrism, however, had had to adopt more and more complicated ‘epicycles’ in order to explain the 
discrepancies. Geocentrism had had to adopt even epicycles of epicycles when an epicycle had not been able to 
explain successfully the discrepancies any more that had been used to be explained successfully before. These 
epicycles were like ad-hoc hypotheses that make a theory look more complex and so, uglier. Heliocentrism did not 
need these unnecessary epicycles, which accords with Ockham’s razor, so that heliocentrism looked simpler and so, 
more beautiful to the proponents who converted from geocentrism. The following two (still simplified) diagrams can 
show vividly the contrast between the helio-simplicity (left) with the geo-complexity (right). The helio-one from 
Copernicus’ On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres (1543); the geo-one is from Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1st Edition 
(1771), by James Ferguson (1710-1776), based on similar diagrams by Giovanni Cassini (1625-1712) and Dr. Roger 
Long (1680-1770). See also my discussion on beauty in section 7-4. 
  
 
                  Heliocentrism                   Vs.                  Geocentrism 
Figure2: Heliocentrism Vs. Geocentrism 




The beauty of any discourse based on the second law of thermodynamics results from the 
simplicity of the law. The law holds that: 
 
The total entropy of a system tends to increase over time.  
 
More roughly speaking, 
 
Heat flows from a hotter to a colder body.  
 
This proposition is now called the Clausius Statement (1854/1867 English translation, p. 117; in a 
modern quote, Penrose 2004/2006, p. 689). 
 
Most roughly speaking, the common proverb: 
 
It does no good to cry over spilt milk (Rifkin and Howard 1980, p. 33). 
 
It is claimed that this simple law governs everything in the universe from the beginning to the end 
of the universe. When I first met this law, perhaps, in a science class in my high school, I was not 
so amazed by it. It seemed to me to be just one of many insipid laws in science classes that governs 
only inanimate physical objects such as gas, atoms, and molecules. A decade later when I learned 
the arcane simplicity that governs everything in the universe, I felt more enlightened. 
Most of us are familiar with the concepts such as energy, volume, amount of substance, even 




homogeneous substance, such as gas, we can conceive its internal energy U, volume V, and the 
amount of substance n. Likewise, we can treat its entropy S as a function of these parameters 
(Hołyst and Poniewierski 2012, pp. 57-8). 
Though the concept of entropy itself is a complicated mathematical one in thermodynamics, 
entropy often translates as ‘disorder’ (the degree of dis-order-ness) in ordinary language (the 
proposition above (3)). So, the second law may be interpreted as stating that the disorder of a 
system tends to increase over time (the proposition above (4)). This kind of translation is a “simile,” 
and the legitimacy of a simile depends on how close the similarity of the two things are to each 
other. A simile, “she runs like a deer,” is not accurate if she cannot run gracefully. Since the 
inception of the concept of entropy in the mid-19th century, the simile of disorder has been accepted 
widely and used in diverse areas including art critique and discourses on civilization as well as 
science and philosophy. However, recently some scholars have argued that this simile is inaccurate, 
or at least needs to be supplemented with some other concepts. 
 Most authors including Roger Penrose (1989, p. 309) use the English word ‘disorder’ for 
entropy, whereas Penrose later (2004/2006, p. 690) changes it into a different word ‘randomness.’ 
It seems to me that Penrose’s new translation from the mathematical concept to the word 
‘randomness’ in ordinary language is significant, in that the word ‘randomness’ seems value-
neutral, whereas the word ‘disorder’ does not seem so. One odd thing that I felt when I studied the 
second law again in a college science class, was that, while we generally regard order as better and 
more beautiful than disorder, why the universe is going towards disorder, following the second 
law. The thesis that the universe where I live is doomed to ‘bad’ disorder made me gloomy. With 
Penrose’s new translation, ‘randomness,’ we may avoid this kind of value-related interpretation of 




The chemist Frank Lambert, by contrast, “decries the use of “disorder” in teaching beginning 
students about thermodynamic entropy,” arguing that “entropy is not disorder, --- not a measure 
of disorder or chaos, --- not a driving force” (2002, p. 187). On Lambert’s claim, the simile to 
disorder is a “broken crutch” (ibid.): that is, the simile was first used as a visual tool to explain the 
concept of entropy better by the very fathers, Boltzmann, Helmholtz, Gibbs, and others, and by 
the teachers in physics and chemistry;  
 
But over the years, popular authors have learned that scientists talked about entropy in terms 
of disorder, and thereby entropy has become a “code word” [emphasis is mine] for the 
“scientific” interpretation of everything disorderly from drunken parties to dysfunctional 
personal relationships, and even the decline of society (Lambert 2002, p. 187). 
 
The physicist Daniel Styer, still, argues that the simile “entropy as disorder” is “inadequate,” and 
another simile, “entropy as freedom,” is equally problematic, but “if both are used cautiously and 
not too literally, then the combination provides considerable insight” into the current subject of 
understanding entropy with common qualitative concepts (2000, p. 1090).  
The physicist-chemist Arieh Ben-Naim also argues that “the identification of entropy with 
disorder is totally unfounded” (2017, p. 26).40 A tactic adopted by Ben-Naim and those who 
criticize the “direct” proportional correlation between entropy and disorder is to show some cases 
that has the “inverse” proportional correlation between the two: That is, to show a case in which 
its entropy increases, but its disorder decreases. 
                                                          
40 https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.02461. Ben-Naim denies even the correlation between entropy and the second 




I see that Lambert has accumulated the list of “The 36 Science Textbooks That Have Deleted 
“disorder” From Their Description of the Nature of Entropy.”41 “Deleting disorder” seems to me 
to be like a religious conversion, or the conversion from geo-centrism to helio-centrism. However, 
has the conversion been done, as of the year of 2018, or will it be done completely in the near 
future? My answers are negative. For around 150 years, scholars has connected entropy to disorder, 
and recently the movement of disconnecting entropy from disorder has started. The simile to 
disorder has a power to help us understand the concept of entropy very vividly, though not 100 
percent accurate. I think the simile, “entropy as disorder” has much more advantages than 
disadvantages: then, it is more advantages to use the simile to disorder. 
 
Regardless of disorder, randomness, or dispersion, the entropy of a system tends to increase. 
One of the prominent ‘arrows of time,’ (which means one-way directional and asymmetrical 
(Arthur Eddington 1928)), is the thermodynamic arrow by the second law. Events that follow the 
arrow (that is, the flow) of time on the second law is irreversible. Let’s see some common examples 
of this interpretation. The degree of the disorder (or randomness, or dispersion) of my room 
increases due to the multiplication of books, copies of papers and articles over time, while I write 
this dissertation, unless I perform some action to make the room orderly (which means that I 
perform some action to reduce the entropy). My own body will be dismantled in the long run, so 
that the degree of the disorder of my body will increase.  
What about the scrambled eggs for the omelet in a modern classical example of Leonard 
Savage’s statistics (1954/1972 Second revised edition, pp. 13-4)? The disorder of the eggs 
increases, once broken and scrambled, which follows the law of entropy. Because of the arrow of 
                                                          




time, if we try to reverse the scrambled eggs, that is, to unscramble them, by making a machine, it 
is almost impossible. Here, the psychologist Richard Gregory suggests a stunning, original idea. 
“Chickens can unscramble omelettes: by eating them!” (1981, p. 137), and then they will lay eggs. 
I completely agree with Daniel Dennett that “Gregory dramatizes this [the law of entropy] with an 
unforgettable example” (Dennett 1995, p. 70). (This example of scrambled eggs and chickens is 
revelatory for our discussion on the relationship between entropy and evolution later below.) Let’s 
look at one final vivid example of the irreversibility. Penrose asks us to imagine a glass of water 
poised on the edge of a table, in order to exemplify the “inexorable increase of entropy” (1989, pp. 
304-5). Let me replace the water with red wine, for a better visual effect. Once nudged, fallen, 
shattered, and splashed, we cannot practically reverse those events, in order to re-make the initial 
glass of red wine. This is the simple, universal, and cold-hearted law of entropy in the universe. 
 
On the history of this idea, the French engineer Nicolas Carnot (1824) first introduced the 
idea that is now known as the second law of thermodynamics. Carnot also had a thought (though 
did not publish) on the first law of thermodynamics (Penrose 2004/2006, p. 692). The first law 
holds that the total energy of any isolated system is conserved. The form of energy may be changed, 
for example, from kinetic to thermal (the kinetic energy of a hammer is transformed into the 
thermal energy of a hot nailhead), but no new energy is created or destroyed. “Whereas the first 
law is an equality, the second law is an inequality” (Penrose, Ibid.). It seems to me that one reason 
why the first law has been understood and remembered by more people (who learned the two laws 
in their schools) is that the concepts in the first, energy and conservation (that is, unchanged), are 
easier than the concepts in the second, entropy and increase (that is, change). Everybody 




novel summary above, I conjecture that people feel more comfortable with equality than inequality, 
in the deeper level of the human brain.  
Whereas Carnot did not enunciate the two laws clearly, it was Rudolf Clausius (1850) who 
did the enunciation and also introduced the new term, entropy (Clausius 1865). Whereas Clausius 
did not make the definition of entropy clear, it was the Austrian physicist Ludwig Boltzmann (1877) 
who did that work. Here is the famous formula of Boltzmann entropy S: 
 
S = k log W, where W is the volume, and k is Boltzmann’s constant.42 
 
In Europe, in addition to those scientists mentioned just before, many giants including James 
Maxwell and Lord Kelvin made great contributions to the development of the theory of energy, 
entropy, and heat. In the US, it was Josiah Willard Gibbs (1839 – 1903) who made a significant 
contribution similar to those of the European scientists. 
 
§4-3. Entropy versus Information 
Entropy and information can be seen as sibling concepts. Let us begin with Norbert Wiener who 
is the father of cybernetics (and the American prodigy). Wiener is a strong proponent of the 
interpretation of entropy as disorder and the sibling relationship with information in his two books, 
Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1948/1961 Revision) 
and the more popular version of Cybernetics for lay persons, The Human Use of Human Beings 
(1950/1954). 
 
                                                          




According to Wiener,  
 
Information is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust 
to it, and make our adjustment felt upon it (1950/1954, p. 17).  
 
Just as entropy is a measure of disorganization, the information carried by a set of messages 
is a measure of organization. In fact, it is possible to interpret the information carried by a 
message as essentially the negative of its entropy, and the negative logarithm of its probability 
(Ibid. p. 21). 
 
On Wiener’s view, organisms in the universe are the only exceptions to the law of entropy. “We 
ourselves constitute such an island [life] of decreasing entropy, and -- we live among other such 
islands” (p.40). Well, Wiener’s island metaphor seems less persuasive than others such as the 
Indra’s net metaphor. It seems to me that all lives in the universe are not separate islands but may 
be interconnected to each other just as the Indra’s net. In spite of this disagreement, Wiener’s idea 
of decreasing entropy is fascinating. According to Wiener, organisms such as an amoeba and 
myself do, and should, resist the law of entropy in order to live their lives, while all things that are 
not organisms follow the law. So, in my interpretation of Wiener’s view, a meaning of life is 
“fighting nature’s tendency to degrade the organized and to destroy the meaningful” (p. 17). 
 
§4-4. Maxwell’s Demon 
Most authors summon Maxwell’s Demon when they discuss the close relationship between 




James Clerk Maxwell suggests an imaginary being that is to sort molecules into two categories, 
hotter (or swifter) ones and colder (or slower) ones. The chief end of the being is, in Maxwell’s 
own writing, to “show that the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics has only a statistical certainty,” 
(requoted from Leff and Rexx 1989/2002 Second edition, p. 5) that is, to show that the law has 
some limitations.  
In the Maxwell’s setting, there are two chambers A and B joined by a trapdoor; the chambers 
are filled with gas at equal temperature; a demon can open or shut the trapdoor rapidly, while 
watching swift or slow gas molecules that approach the trapdoor. The demon allows “only the 
swifter molecules to pass from A to B, and only the slower ones to pass from B to A. He will thus, 
without expenditure of work, raise the temperature of B and lower that of A, in contradiction to 
the second law of thermodynamics” (Maxwell 1871, requoted from Leff and Rexx 1989/2002, p. 
4). A schematic figure follows:  
 
 
Figure 3: A Schematic figure of Maxwell’s Demon (The molecules that have longer trails are 
hotter ones.) Source: Wikimedia Commons, Creator: User name, Htkym,  
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1625737 
 
Here, a question raised by this story is: Is this kind of ‘molecule-sorting’ Demon possible? If yes, 




First of all, a purely mechanical Demon composed of, for example, ratchets, teeth, wheel, 
shaft and so on, may not be able to violate the second law, even with entirely frictionless condition 
(Ibid. P. 154). Second of all, what is more interesting is a ‘cognitive’ intelligent Demon, who can 
observe the velocities of the approaching molecules and predict which one is fast or slow. The 
question given this intelligent demon is: 
 
Can the Demon gain information of the molecules, especially their approach velocities, 
without using as much energy as it gains by sorting the molecules with his trapdoor? (Ibid. 
P. 155)  
 
Richard Gregory’s specific discussion on this is as follows: (See Gregory 1981, pp. 153-156). 
If yes, the intelligent observer Demon can violate the second law. No free lunch! Energy is 
needed in order to get information. What is crucial here is: is it possible that what the intelligent 
Demon gets is more than what it loses? If we consider only a closed limited system such as the 
current setting of the two chambers and the trapdoor, the second law cannot be violated. It is 
because, for example, the Demon is inside the chamber, so that it has the same temperature as the 
gas, and therefore cannot receive energy from the molecules. On the contrary, if we consider that 
the intelligent observer Demon is allowed to receive energy from outside the chambers, it may 
seem that the Demon violates the second law. It is because it may seem that it creates more than it 
uses. (This is exactly what is happening in biology, organisms (life-forms), evolution and the like; 
and this is why it might seem that the law of evolution violates the law of entropy, therefore the 
law of entropy is false. I will argue below that the law of entropy is not false and discuss further 




It was in 1867 that this ‘being’ first appeared in a letter Maxwell wrote; it was in 1871 that 
this ‘being’ was publicly born to the world in a book by Maxwell, Theory of Heat; and it was in 
1874 that this ‘being’ was first called ‘Demon,’ by William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) (Leff and Rex 
1989/2002, p. 370).  
 
§4-5. Information versus Software, Entropy versus Equilibrium, and Equilibrium 
versus Morality 
For now, it is evident that there are close relationships between the concepts of information and 
software, and between the concepts of entropy and equilibrium. The third one between equilibrium 
and morality is what I address here further. 
The morality of a society is a state of dynamic equilibrium that the members of the society 
have reached. It is in equilibrium because the members have reached some state; and it is dynamic, 
not static, because the equilibrium is changing, constantly, say, differentially as in calculus of 
mathematics. I think that many great sages and philosophers have recognized and preached the 
same point: morality as equilibrium. Aristotle, Confucius, and the Buddha are prominent in the list 
of those thinkers who support the middle way. 
According to the Aristotelian doctrine of the Golden Mean, a moral agent who wants to 
achieve eudaimonia (happiness) as the ultimate and highest good, should then follow the virtuous 
midway point between the two extremes (too much and too little), each of which is a vice.43 The 
Confucian middle way is argued in The Doctrine of the Mean (Zisi 481-402 BCE, the grandson of 
Confucius) and in some part of the Analects (Confucius). It is recorded in Buddhist scriptures that 
                                                          
43 Aristotle’s own example: generosity is the mean between profligacy (wastefulness) and meanness (stinginess-
selfish); courage between foolhardiness (rashness) and cowardice; self-respect between vanity and self-abasement; 




the Buddha achieved his enlightenment after trying and abandoning some extreme ways, and then 
following the middle way. Of course, those typical criticisms of Aristotelian doctrine of the Golden 
Mean can commonly be applied to all these three moral theories. For example, if everybody 
follows the ‘safe’ middle way, who would dare to attempt to pioneer the front lines in order to 
contribute to the progress of history? And also, who decides the so-called, ‘middle way?’ While 
admitting that these criticisms are legitimate, I argue that morality as dynamic equilibrium is also 
valid. The state of morality is like, to use an old-fashioned metaphor, the state of the trembling 
needle of an analogue scale.  
 
§4-6. A Bold Conjecture: From Cosmology through Axiology to a Meaning of Life  
I conclude this chapter with a bold conjecture, relying on Karl Popper’s thesis that scientific 
knowledge grows through the process of raising bold, sometimes seemingly stupid, conjectures 
and attempting to falsify those conjectures. So, please kill my conjecture, instead of me, if you 
would. 
On the contemporary fashionable cosmology in physics and astronomy, the universe began 
at the moment of the Big Bang, and has expanded, since then. I don’t know whether this theory is 
true, or some other similar kind such as the theory of multiverse (multiple universes) is true, or 
not. Still, I think this idea of ‘expansion’ of the universe is fascinating, and the following picture 





Figure 4: The Big Bang and the Expansion of the Universe 
Source: The NASA, https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/infographics/infographic.view.php?id=10824  
 
If we combine the image of this picture with the second law of thermodynamics, we can have a 
view of the universe that: while the universe has expanded for the last 13.7 billion years since the 
Big Bang, the entropy of the universe has increased, and will increase to the point of the ‘heat 
death’ that is the ultimate end of the universe. When I heard this ‘story’ for the first time, I was so 
sad because it is a form of death; later, when I learned that the heat death could come some ‘short’ 
time later in the future, say some billion years later, I felt relieved. The age of the Big Bang and 
the heat death are interesting, but it is nothing to my life, here and now. 
So, let’s focus on my life here and now. Even though the heat death is far away, the entropy 
law is still working now, like a headwind. Let’s imagine the tube-like image in the picture above 
as the current of a river. The river has flowed from the (left) Big Bang to the (right) heat death, 
and will continue to do so, and I am a sentient being like a salmon who has to swim against the 




where it was hatched and grew up, is never idyllic but a struggle, and its final moment of desperate 
mating is not so romantic, but sublime. Many salmon in a group on the same trip sacrifice their 
bodies as food for mountain bears, foxes, and crows who have the rare chance to take nutrition 
from the oceans. Like the salmon, life forms (living organisms) ought to resist the current to 
generate order from disorder (or randomness, dispersion).44 
I have argued that human morality as the “order of social software” is a form of resistance to 
cosmic disorder. Here is a role of axiology including ethics (more discussion of value in general 
follow below chapter 7). There are many other forms of this resistance: language, culture, religion, 
and the like. Among them, I would argue that the role of morality is never minimal; human 
morality itself makes humans human. 
In this way, moving from cosmology through axiology, now we can go to the topic of the 
meaning of life. I never wanted to address this big topic in this small section, without caution. I 
will touch only one point very briefly in the current context. A rephrase of the expression, ‘the 
meaning of life,’ can be ‘the purpose of life.’ On a view of the entropic cosmology and axiology, 
a living organism’s purpose for its life can be understood as ‘struggle for entropy’ or ‘struggle for 
existence.’ Here, the key concept, I argue, is ‘struggle.’ 
Though philosophy is not history, philosophical investigations often become more fruitful 
when they include historical investigations. We may call this approach ‘genealogical.’45 I first 
encountered this idea of struggle when reading Norbert Wiener’s (1950, Revision 1954) The 
                                                          
44 Arieh Ben-Naim claims, in his numerous critical works, that this kind of discourse on entropy, life, and the 
universe is unfounded, because, among other reasons, 1) entropy is not related to the second law of 
thermodynamics; 2) we don’t know what (the definition of) life is; and 3) we don’t know how to measure (the 
entropy) of the universe (since we don’t know what the universe is). Well, I admit that his criticism has enough merit 
to require stricter criteria; nevertheless, I believe we may discuss these concepts of life and the universe. Even if we 
may not agree on the definition of life, we can still talk about life. One recent book of Ben-Naim on this topic is 
Information, Entropy, Life and the Universe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know (2015). 





Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society. Let’s recall what I discuss earlier in this 
chapter. Without revealing any explicit citation, Wiener wrote that “fighting nature’s tendency to 
degrade the organized and to destroy the meaningful” (p. 17). Before and after Wiener, there are 
many who express this idea of struggle. Going back through Erwin Schrödinger (1944 What is 
Life?), Alfred North Whitehead (1929 The Function of Reason), and Henry Bergson (1907 
Creative Evolution), we finally meet Ludwig Boltzmann, the very scientist who founded the 
concept of entropy further (after Clausius first introduced the term entropy).  
Boltzmann wrote (1886): 
 
“The general struggle for existence of animate beings is not a struggle for raw materials – 
these, for organisms, are air, water and soil, all abundantly available – nor for energy, which 
exists in plenty in anybody in the form of heat Q, but of a struggle for entropy S, which 
becomes available through the transition of energy from the hot sun to the cold earth.” 
 
I interpret Boltzmann’s claim as a claim on the purpose of life: Resisting the tendency of entropy 
in the universe and struggle for entropy. The person who discovered this very enlightening idea of 
“Struggle for entropy (or disorder),” ironically, committed suicide while suffering from other 
scholars’ criticisms of his works.46 Let’s pay homage to Boltzmann’s first revelation of this idea.47 
48 
                                                          
46 Karl Popper, in his autography Unended Quest (1982), expresses his view on the tragedy of Boltzmann’s 
suicide. 
47 I think it is an interesting and important question who argues first for this striking interpretation of life, 
relating to the law of entropy. Let’s recall, in the history and philosophy of science, for example, the famous 
controversy between the Newton disciples and the Leibnitz disciples over who invented calculus first. Such questions 
and instances of simultaneous discoveries in science are common. From the perspective of the thesis of morality as 
social software, a society that does not commemorate the first discoverers and inventors, is not ‘evolutionarily’ 
competitive against other societies that do commemorate the first. 




This intrinsic discord between the tendency towards disorder and the struggle for existence 
(and entropy) of living organisms, I argue, is recognized by many in various ways. Albert Camus 
in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) describes the intrinsic “clash” between what the universe is and 
what we ought to do, as “absurdity.” I argue that this struggle to resist the cosmic disorder can be 
viewed as the origin of suffering (Dukkha, in Pali of Buddhism), one of the three marks of 
existence in Buddhism. It may be easy to swim with the current, but not easy to swim against the 
current. Recall the struggle of the salmon when they encounter water falls in their trips back to 
home. Finally, morality as social software is what helps us struggle for entropy.49 
 
  
                                                          
49 For the record, I would like to add here a brief historical note of how I have developed the ideas discussed in 
this chapter. It is for the purpose of helping the reader who might be doubtful about the genuine development of 
these ideas, as well as the reader who might be interested in the history. It was in a chapter of my master thesis in 
philosophy (Kim 1998, in Korean) entitled “Cyberspace and Karl Popper’s World 3,” where I first discussed a very 
nascent form of the ideas of entropy and information (without any connection to equilibrium, evolution, nor 
morality). While I was writing the thesis, I was ‘consciously’ aware of only Norbert Wiener’s two books (1948 and 
1950) on cybernetics, and my discussions owed much to Wiener’s great insight. Perhaps, ‘unconsciously,’ I knew 
Jeremy Refkin’s ideas discussed in his Entropy (1980), since I, as a member of an undergraduate physics club, had 
organized a small conference in 1986 (the entire audience were around 10 fellow students, I remember), and Refkin’s 
book Entropy was the topic of the talk of a fellow sophomore speaker, Mr. Kum. However, I had forgotten about 
Refkin’s book and the student conference until my friend Kum reminded me of them when I gave him a hardcopy of 
my master thesis. (I don’t know how much my sub-consciousness remembered it.) In addition, at that time in 1998 
I owned the French philosopher Henri Bergson’s book Creative Evolution (1907), the physicist Erwin Schrödinger’s 
book What is Life? (1944) and the French biochemist Jacques Monod’s book Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the 
Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology (1970) in my collection, after purchasing them from used book stores. 
Nevertheless, I did not read them, as is often for dilettante book-collectors. In 2012, more than a decade later, when 
I published a book in Korean (which is like Amazon Direct Publishing in the US), I included again some discussions on 
entropy, information, and life, which are just slightly more developed from my 1998 master thesis. And then, now 
in 2018 here in this dissertation, I am arguing far more developed ideas of entropy and information together with 
equilibrium, evolution, and morality. While I have been doing research for the dissertation, all those books 
mentioned above have suddenly popped up together, and some ideas from those books are discussed here. I would 
say that my 1998 and 2012 publications are 10 to 20 % of the discussions on the topics in this dissertation, while the 
central thesis (the idea of “from cosmology through axiology to a meaning of life”) remains the same. To sum up, 




Chapter 5. Epistemic Game Theory and Backward Induction  
The main subject to be discussed in this chapter is the inference of backward induction. I argue 
that backward induction is one of the most common and vital kinds of inferences related to morality 
as social software. I first introduce backward induction intuitively by discussing the centipede 
game and a dialogue between Alexander the Great and a philosopher. I then argue that Popperian 
creatures in Dennett’s theory are, basically, animals who exercise backward induction, and I 
introduce some exemplary animals from an Indian tale. I finally discuss the relationship between 
morality and backward induction. At the end of the chapter, a very brief précis of epistemic logic 
and epistemic game theory is attached, as an appendix. 
 
§5-1. Intuitively: The Centipede Game and Alexander the Great 
Backward induction is an inference, that is, a process of logical thinking. While exercising 
backward induction, a player of a game in game theory infers backward temporally to decide the 
best optimal move in the game. The player first starts considering the payoff of the final (or 
terminal) stage of the game. Then, based on this consideration of the final stage, the player 
proceeds backward to consider the payoff of the second-to-final stage, in order to decide the best 
optimal move in the game. And then, proceeding to the third-to-final, and so on, until the player 
finds the best optimal move.  The best one can be found at the very first stage, or at a middle stage. 
One of the most common and intuitive examples of backward induction in the literature may 
be the Centipede Game. The following diagram is an exemplary five-move version of the 
Centipede Game, which is from Fitting (2011, p. 154) and others, and is a shortened form of Robert 





Figure 5: A Five-move Version of the Centipede Game 
 
Player A (Ann) and player B (Bob) play a game together. The goal of it is to maximize their payoffs 
safely. Ann starts at the first, upper left node, by choosing to move across or down. If Ann chooses 
to move down, the game stops there: The payoff for Ann is the left number 2, and the payoff for 
Bob is the right number 1. If Ann chooses to move across, the game continues, and now this time 
at the second node, Bob chooses to move across or down. If Bob chooses to move down, the game 
stops there: The payoff for Ann is the left number 1, and payoff for Bob is the right number 4. 
Note that this time Ann’s payoff is only 1, which is less than 2 at the previous (first) stage! In this 
fashion, the game can go on to the upper right, where Ann’s payoff is 5, and Bob’s payoff is 8. 
Here, the question is what the best optimal move will be, if (1) Ann and Bob are ‘rational’ 
players, (2) they know all the payoffs in the beginning of the game, (3) Ann knows that Bob knows 
all the payoffs, and (4) Bob knows that Ann knows all the payoffs, (5) ad infinitum: that is, all the 
knowledge is ‘common knowledge,’ as in Aumann (1995).  While exercising backward induction, 
Ann first imagines which move she will choose at the final (terminal), upper right node. She will 
choose to move down, because her payoff of moving down, 6, is larger than her payoff of moving 
across, 5. Now, at the second-to-final node (the fourth node from the left), Bob also does not 




than his next payoff 5 when Ann chooses to move down at the next (final) node. This inference 
can be going backward to the first, upper left node. Therefore, under backward induction, it may 
seem the best optimal move for Ann to choose to move down at the very beginning node, and to 
be satisfied with a meager payoff of 2, which is less than the final payoff of 5. This conclusion, of 
course, raises lots of questions and problems. I will discuss them further in this chapter. For now, 
the example of the Centipede Game shows the essential concept of backward induction, intuitively. 
In addition, more intuitively than the Centipede Game, I think that the following ‘fictitious’ 
dialogue between Alexander the Great and a Greek philosopher can show the essence of backward 
induction.50  
 
Alexander the Great: I am going to conquer all the Greek regions and then the Middle East. 
Philosopher: Oh, great, your highness! Then, what would you like to do next?  
Alexander: Next, I am going to conquer India. 
Philosopher: Great! And then? 
Alexander: I am going to conquer China, the Far East, and all other parts of the World. 
Philosopher: Oh, really great, your highness! Then, what would you like to do next? 
Alexander: (Hmm, taking a moment) And then, I will take a rest in peace. 
Philosopher: Your highness, I am taking a rest in peace, here and now. 
 
The inference behind the philosopher’s final remark is an instance of backward induction. As in 
the standard description of backward induction above, the philosopher “first starts considering the 
                                                          
50 Often, depending on the sources of the story, an Indian Jain or Buddhist monk appears in this fictitious story 
as the interlocutor in the stage of India. Then, the dialogue must have started from India since the King had already 
conquered the Greek regions and the Middle East. Historians record that the King died in a palace in Babylon at age 




payoff of the final (or terminal) stage of the game. Then, based on this consideration of the final 
stage, the player proceeds backward,” quickly, to the initial stage, here and now, that the 
philosopher is taking a rest in peace. 
Finally, once more intuitively and succinctly, I think that the commonplace argument that 
“since we all die terminally, therefore we don’t need to strive to maintain our life,” is based on 
backward induction, though it does not seem to be endorsed by many. 
As these paradigmatic examples of backward induction show, backward induction is common 
in everyday reasoning. Since Zermelo (1913) first formulated backward induction, and more 
recently, since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/1967 3rd Printing, Ch. 15, pp. 112-128) used 
it to solve the two-person games with perfect information (like chess), backward induction has 
attracted attention from many kinds of people: philosophers, logicians, mathematicians, 
economists, psychologists, among others. It is “the oldest idea in game theory” (Aumann 1995, p. 
6).51  
 
§5-2. Popperian Creatures by Dennett, Popper, and Millikan 
5-2-1. Dennett’s Five Kinds of Creatures 
The concept of the ‘Popperian Creature’ of Daniel Dennett (1995, 1996) can shed further light on 
backward induction. Dennett, in his Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995) and Kinds of Minds (1996), 
discusses an evolutionary hierarchy of intellectual progress. He calls the hierarchy the ‘Tower of 
Generate-and-Test,’ where there are five kinds of creatures. 
On the ground floor of the tower, Dennett proposes, the inhabitants are (1) ‘Darwinian 
creatures,’ organisms who are blindly generated and field-tested, and then only the best designed 
                                                          
51 An interesting phenomenon of backward induction, I observe, is that it is actually an inference of deduction, 




inhabitants survive by natural selection. (See the discussion on natural selection in chapter 3.) The 
generation, test, and survival of a Darwinian creature is possible randomly, therefore, luckily. On 
the next level up, as a subset of Darwinian creatures, there are (2) ‘Skinnerian creatures,’ 
referencing to the behaviorist psychologist B. F. Skinner. Skinnerian creatures ‘blindly’ try 
different responses to the environment until one response is selected by reinforcement. And next 
time, unlike Darwinian, the Skinnerian creature will choose the reinforced response as its first 
choice. On the next upper, third, floor, there are (3) ‘Popperian creatures,’ referencing to the 
philosopher Sir Karl Popper. A Popperian creature can preselect an action from many options 
before doing it in the outer environment. A Popperian creature has a filter of ‘inner environment,’ 
where its many tryouts (i.e., hypotheses) can be safely tested. On the fourth floor, referencing to 
the psychologist Richard Gregory, there are (4) ‘Gregorian creatures’ who import mind tools from 
the outer cultural environment to construct their better inner environments for better generators 
and testers. On the fifth floor, finally, Dennett proposes, there are (5) creatures like human beings 
who can use these mind tools and, most of all, ‘language,’ in the “structure of deliberate, 
foresightful generate-and-test known as science” (1995, p. 380). 
An attribute of backward induction can be demonstrated through the distinction between how 
Skinnerian creatures and Popperian creatures question themselves. On Dennett’s summary of the 
difference: 
 
Skinnerian creatures ask themselves, “What do I do next?” and haven’t a clue how to 
answer until they have taken some hard knocks. Popperian creatures make a big advance 
by asking themselves, “What should I think about next?” before they ask themselves, 




The strategy of ‘thinking before acting’ can save the creature’s biological life. The cost of the 
failure of an idea for a Skinnerian can be the death of the creature; by contrast, the cost of the 
failure of an idea for a Popperian is just the death of the idea. The surviving Popperian creature 
can continue to try another idea.  
 
5-2-2. Popper’s Evolutionary Epistemology  
Dennett’s concept of Popperian creatures is connected to Popper’s ‘evolutionary epistemology’ 
and similar kinds. Popper argues, among others, in the first Darwin Lecture at Darwin College, in 
Cambridge (1977, “Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind”), that there are various stages 
in the emergence of consciousness. At a possible first stage, Popper proposes, some kinds of 
centralized warnings evolve: for instance, irritation, discomfort, pain, or fear. These warnings 
induce “the organism to stop an inadequate movement and to adopt some alternative behavior in 
its stead before it is too late, before too much damage has been done” (1977). The absence or 
disregard of a warning signal often leads the organism to death. At a second stage, natural selection 
favors those organisms who try out before the real movements are executed. “In this way, real 
trial-and-error behavior may be replaced, or preceded, by imagined or vicarious trial-and-error 
behavior” (1977). At a third stage, we may consider the evolution of purposeful actions: that is, 
the aims, goals, or ends of actions. If we start an imagined trial-and-error action, we should 
necessarily evaluate the end state of the imagined action. Based on this discussion about the three 
stages, Popper proceeds to argue, “Let our conjectures die in our stead!” which, I believe, is one 





The evolution of language and --- the products of the human mind allows a further step: 
the human step. It allows us to dissociate ourselves from our own hypotheses, and to look 
upon them critically. While an uncritical animal may be eliminated together with its 
dogmatically held hypotheses, we may formulate our hypotheses, and criticize them. Let 
our conjectures, our theories, die in our stead! We may still learn to kill our theories 
instead of killing each other. If natural selection has favored the evolution of mind ---, then 
it is perhaps more than a utopian dream that may see the victory of --- the rational or the 
scientific attitude of eliminating our theories, our opinions, by rational criticism, instead 
of eliminating each other (1977, “Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind”). 
 
The idea of killing hypotheses, instead of humans, is fascinating for peace. And, backward 
induction, I argue, is a fascinating way of killing hypotheses. 
 
5-2-3. Millikan’s Rationality 
Ruth Garett Millikan, in her “Styles and Rationality” (2006), argues that, when discussing the 
rationality of non-human animals, “being rational is being a Popperian animal,” among many 
interpretations of what it is to be rational. A Popperian animal tries things out in its head, which, 
Millikan argues, is “quicker and safer than trying them out in the world --- [and] --- than either 
operant conditioning or natural selection.” Millikan suggests, “based on very informal behavioral 
evidence,” that both humans and many higher animals are Popperian. Millikan reports her 
observation of grey squirrels in her laboratory that show the Popperian behavior of “mental trial 
and error.” Millikan seems to assume that chimps, dolphins, and African grey parrots are Popperian, 




§5-3. The Cat and the Mouse in an Indian Animal Tale 
Now, let’s turn from Millikan’s Popperian animals to animals in an Indian tale. These Indian 
animals are anthropomorphic. Harald Wiese (2012) discusses three traditional Indian fables, which, 
I argue, are related to backward induction. Among them, here I introduce one, “The Cat and the 
Mouse.” The original animal tale is from the grand epic, Mahabharata, Book 12 (Trans. 
Satyamurti 2015, pp. 714-716) and the story is as follows:  
 
Around a beautiful banyan tree, there lived a cat, a mouse, flocks of birds, mongooses and 
other creatures; and in the nearby town, there lived a hunter who came to the tree and set a 
snare every night, and collected animals caught in it next morning. One night, the careless 
cat became caught in the snare of net; the mouse saw this, and climbed up on top of the net 
to eat the meat put by the hunter as bait. That moment, the mouse looked down and saw a 
mongoose licking his lips; and looked up and saw an owl looking at the mouse.  
 
How can the mouse escape from this dangerous situation? The mouse suggested to the cat (still 
caught in the net), “[Hey, Cat, my friend] suppose I climb down to you, and you agree to protect 
me from the mongoose and the owl. I’ll undertake to bite through the bonds that tie you, if you 
agree not to kill me. I save you, and you save me---how about it” (Satyamurti 2015, p. 715)? They 
agreed and the mouse “snuggled comfortably on the bosom of the cat.” As the mongoose and the 
owl started to look for other food, the mouse started to gnaw through the strings of the snare. But 
the mouse did it very, very slowly, while the cat got more and more impatient. After long 




through the last cord next dawn at the moment when they heard the hunter’s footstep approaching, 
therefore, when the danger was identical for both of them. 
Wiese (2012) draws the game tree of this animal tale like the diagram below. The first payoff 
is for the mouse, the second for the cat. The mouse’s payoff is 0 when it escapes unharmed; -100 
when it is killed. The cat’s payoff is 0 when it escapes unharmed; -50 when it is killed by the 
hunter; -48 when killed by the hunter after eating the mouse. Interestingly in Wiese’s game tree 
below, the value of the mouse’s life is 100 for the mouse itself, but only 2 for the cat. 
 
Diagram 2: A Game Tree of an Indian Animal Tale   
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The mouse’s inference starts from the final stage, as customary in backward induction. If the 
mouse liberates the cat at the very last moment, the cat will have two options: 1) killing the mouse 
and being caught by the hunter where the payoffs are (-100 for the mouse, -48 for the cat), and 2) 
letting the mouse go and escaping unharmed where the payoffs are (0, 0). So, the cat will choose 
the option 2) at the very last moment since 0 > -48. By contrast, if the mouse liberates the cat much 
earlier than when the hunter approaches, the cat will have another two options: 3) killing the mouse 
and escaping unharmed where the payoffs are (-100, 2) and 4) letting the mouse go and escaping 
unharmed where the payoffs are (0, 0). So, the cat will choose the option 3), since 2 > 0.  Between 
the cat’s option 2) and 3), the mouse prefers 2) to 3), since the mouse’s payoff in 2), 0, is bigger 
than the payoff in 3), -100. Therefore, at “the second-to-final stage,” the mouse chooses the option 
that it liberates the cat at the very last moment. 
Now, going backward, the cat chooses whether the cat kills mouse immediately for just, say, 
hunger, or the cat lets the mouse gnaw through the cords very slowly. In this fashion, both the 
mouse and the cat infer that it is in the best interest for each of them (and both of them) not to kill 
the other or not to let the other die. Literally, “I save you, and you save me.”  
 
§5-4. Morality and Backward Induction 
Another interesting point of this fable is that it shows a hint of morality based on backward 
induction. The cat who was impatient at the speed of the mouse’s gnawing through the cords asked 
the mouse to trust the cat, but the mouse replied, giving a lesson in morality: 
 
The cat to the mouse: “Why don’t you trust me? --- I know I hunted you before, but now we 




The mouse replied: “Listen to me. --- Between the weak and the strong there can be no real 
friendship, let alone for life. There are only linked interests. Friendship and enmity are the 
product of the situation. Unlike the bond between brothers52, neither trust nor sentiment 
comes into it.” (Mahabharata, Book 12, Trans. Satyamurti, 2015, p. 716) 
 
Though we may not completely endorse the mouse’s claims, we can easily scent from them some 
amoralist view, which is similar to, for instance, Thrasymachus’ claims in Plato’s Republic53 and 
Machiavelli’s claims in The Prince54 in the Western amoralist tradition. Indeed, I do not think it is 
by accident that the title of Book 12 of Mahabharata that contains the story above, is “The Book 
of Peace,” and the sections immediately before the story are about “The Education of the Dharma 
King.” The Indian fable-teller must have had a didactic purpose of teaching the readers moral 
philosophy (or, at least, political philosophy): mainly, the lesson is that, in order to keep peace, the 
king (and the people) should understand the situational friendship and enmity between the weak 
and the strong. What I am emphasizing now is that this understanding is attained through backward 
induction. 
Incidentally, regarding the Western amoralist tradition, it seems to me to be unwieldy and 
cautious to handle the claims of Thrasymachus and Machiavelli. For example, Thrasymachus’ 
following claims: (See also my discussion in chapter 1) 
 
(a) Justice is nothing else than the advantage of the stronger (338c). 
(b) Justice is really the good of another,  
                                                          
52 It is also worth noting that, in the mouse’s ‘sermon, there is the bond between brothers, though none 
between the cat and the mouse. Recall kin selection! 
53 Plato, Republic, Book 1. 




(c) Justice is harmful to the one who obeys and serves. 
(d) A just man always gets less than an unjust one. 
(e) Injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice. 
(g) Justice is very high-minded simplicity; whereas being unjust is good judgment.  
(f) Unjust people are clever and good 
(h) Injustice is virtue and wisdom; whereas justice is the opposite (Plato, The Republic, Book 
1). 
 
Relating to (e), how many parents willingly want to teach their children that, for instance, “if you 
steal 100 dollars from others and get arrested, you will have to go to jail; whereas if you steal 100 
million dollars, you will be likely to be honored”?  
Similarly, the famous fox and lion passage of Machiavelli: (The Prince, Ch. 18) 
 
[Prince,] You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by 
force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is 
frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore, it is 
necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. 
--- 
A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox 
and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend 
himself against wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion 




Therefore, a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be 
turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. 
 
Here, being a fox is also being a Popperian. Let’s recall that the title of the chapter 18 of The Prince 
is “Concerning the Way in which Princes should Keep Faith.” The superficial format of 
Machiavelli’s book is, like Mahabharata, to teach a prince (of the Medici), though the book is, 
actually, a serious work on socio-political philosophy. 
I think the common interest in all these claims of the three (the mouse, Thrasymachus and 
Machiavelli) is that morality is not that simple: Morality must consider both sides of the coin, and 
so must consider ‘morality as social software,’ consequently. 
 
§5-5. The Stag Hunt Game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Two famous games in epistemic game theory, the Stag Hunt and the Prisoner’s Dilemma show 
more clearly the epistemic game-theoretic aspect of morality. Brian Skyrms in The Stag Hunt and 
the Evolution of Social Structure (2003) argues that one simple exemplary game that can better 
explain the central problem of the social contract is not the Prisoner's Dilemma, but the stag hunt. 
He believes that the emphasis on the Prisoner's Dilemma is “misplaced,” and the “most appropriate 
choice is --- the stag hunt” (Skyrms 2003, xii). Rousseau, in Discourse in Equality (1755), 
contrasted hunting the hare with the deer: the risk of hunting the hare without cooperation is small, 
but the reward is also small; the risk of hunting the stag without the certainty of cooperation is 
large, but the reward is much greater. Skyrms, regarding Rousseau’s contrast as a prototypical 
story, argues that “the key to the evolution of cooperation, collective action, and social structure 




would otherwise be impossible” (2003, pp. xii-xiii). In his argument, the three main components 
of this correlation are (1) location: the effect of interactions with neighbors, (2) signals: the 
exchange of signals prior to an interaction, and (3) association: the interactions in an evolving 
social network (2003, p. xiii). 
The stag hunt game is about how to gain collectively. Then, the next task should be about 
how to divide the hunted stag justly. Skyrms notes that a bargaining game can deal with this task 
of distribute justice. Skyrms argues that the two main principles of distributive justice are: (Skyrms 
2003, p. 18) 
 
Optimality: A distribution is not just if under an alternative distribution all recipients would 
be better off.  
Equity: If the position of the recipients is symmetric, then the distribution should be symmetric.  
 
Skyrms thinks that these two principles are the “two most uncontroversial requirements” (ibid.) in 
Nash’s (1950) axiomatic treatment of bargaining and are shared by other axiomatic treatments 
such as Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). Skyrms’ interpretation is that Kalai and Smorodinsky 
“disagree with Nash’s theory in less symmetric bargaining situations, but agree with Nash in 
divide-the-dollar” (Skyrms 2003, p. 18). Stambaugh (2017) finds that the exact conditions under 
which the two solutions to the bargaining problem by Nash, and Kalai and Smorodinsky, coincide. 
  
§5-6. Why I should be Nice to Others: a Backward Answer through the Centipede Game 
We can use the framework of epistemic game theory to investigate some cases of epistemic game-




introduce two kinds of answers: one is well-known and common; the other is, hopefully, new and 
creative.  
In the first sentence of this dissertation, I ask an ultimate question, “How ought I to live?” 
And now here, I introduce a possible answer, “nicely to others,” with the help of game theory. 
(Here ‘nice’ may mean just ‘nice,’ and below can be defined more specifically, as in Axelrod’s 
Evolution of Cooperation.) Then, we may ask further, “Why ought I to be nice to others?.” I think 
this question has two kinds of answers: forward and backward. A forward answer based on the 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is well-known and common to us: I ought to be nice to others, because, 
in the future, those people will be good for me. That is, good for my ‘future’ fitness, survival, 
success, enlightenment and the like. A backward answer is, relatively, not well-known to us: I 
ought to be nice to others, because, in the past, they were good to me. That is, good for my ‘present’ 
fitness, survival, success, enlightenment and the like: so now, I ought to pay others back. These 
two ‘folk’ ethics (or forms of wisdom) can be reinforced through a game-theoretic framework. 55 
Since Robert Axelrod’s monumental work, Evolution of Cooperation (1984/2006 Revised), 
it has been well-known that the strategy of tit-for-tat (which “starts with cooperation, and thereafter 
do what the other player did on the previous move,” (p. viii)) is the strongest form in many game 
situations of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. And, as the title of a BBC documentary program 
Nice Guys Finish First (1986) (which is largely based on Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation and 
is presented by Richard Dawkins) suggests, an essential property of tit-for-tat is the property of 
“being nice.” Axelrod defines “being nice” as “never being the first to defect” (1984/2006, p. 33). 
In Axelrod’s first computer tournament for the study of effective choice in the iterated Prisoner’s 
                                                          
55 The forward answer looks like more a form of wisdom; the backward answer, by contrast, looks like more an 
ethic. However, I take, in this dissertation, a position that wisdom cannot be distinguished from ethics, distinctively. 




Dilemma, tit-for-tat won, defeating thirteen other programs (entries). In the second tournament 
even when other programs knew the winning of tit-for-tat in the first tournament, tit-for-tat 
achieved the highest average score of the sixty-two entries. 
Tit-for-tat strategy showed that there was a substantial correlation between being nice and 
being well in the tournaments. Axelrod, based on the analysis of the data from these tournaments, 
finds four successful properties of a decision rule: (1984/2006, p. 20)  
 
[1] avoidance of unnecessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player does,  
[2] provocability [possibility of retaliation or punishment] in the face of an “uncalled-for” 
[exactly what this means is not precisely determined (p.44), but loosely “unwanted”] 
defection by the other,  
[3] forgiveness after responding to a provocation, and  
[4] clarity of behavior so that the other player can adapt to your pattern of action.  
 
Axelrod argues that the results from the tournaments demonstrate that “cooperation can indeed 
emerge in a world of egoists without central authority,” and in a nutshell, “the evolution of 
cooperation requires that individuals have a sufficiently large chance to meet again [emphasis is 
mine] so that they have a stake in their future interaction” (p. 20). 
I interpret Axelrod’s analysis above as a very good “forward” answer to the question, “Why 
ought I to be nice to others?.” Then, analogously, I conjecture that, if the Axelrod-type analysis is 
reversed in the backward way around, and if we construct an epistemic game-theoretic analysis 
carefully, we will be able to reinforce the backward answer. For example, the fact that two players 




[emphasized above] in the past. In an Axelrod-type analysis, if a game is played a known finite 
number of times, the players have no incentive to cooperate, and the mutual defection on the first 
move is typical, like in the Centipede Game of a typical backward induction. By contrast, if a game 
is played an indefinite number of times (and in most realistic settings, the players cannot be sure 
when the last interaction between them will take place), on an Axelrod-type analysis, cooperation 
can emerge.  
Furthermore, exerting our slight imagination, we may regard the indefinite number of times 
as infinite times. ‘Infinity’ is akin to ‘convergence’ in calculus. Then, such scientific thesis about 
selfish genes as Richard Dawkins’, and such religious teaching about Karma (which is based on 
the concept of reincarnation), may well be explained by the infinite number of interactions of 
players (or beings). A gene can be cooperative with other genes, and a human or sentient being 
can be cooperative with other beings, because they will meet some time in the infinite time of the 
universe. If that infinity converges into one moment, the distinction among the past, the present, 
and the future is not significant. On this “imagination,” just as we ought to be nice to others for 
the future, so we ought to be nice to others due to the past. Again, these are all my, hopefully 
“imaginative,” conjectures.56 
I conclude this chapter by recalling some main theses in this dissertation: if morality is social 
software that has been developed through the evolutionary process of individuals and groups, that 
process must have included moral reasoning, and one of the main components of the moral 
reasoning must have been backward induction that is most used in epistemic game theory. 
 
                                                          
56 And also, I conjecture that this backward answer will be different from “what, Scanlon (1998) argues, we owe 





§5-7. Appendix: A Précis of Epistemic Logic and Epistemic Game Theory 
5-7-1. Epistemic Concepts: Common Knowledge, Backward Induction, and Logical 
Omniscience 
We examine some essential epistemic concepts in epistemic logic such as common knowledge, 
backward induction, and logical omniscience. Roughly speaking, an informal definition of each 
concept can be described as follows: 
 
● Common knowledge: In a group G if a proposition is common knowledge, then the 
proposition is true; everybody in G knows it; everybody in G knows that everybody in G 
knows it; and so on, ad infinitum. 
● Backward induction: “[b]ackward induction concludes X is true throughout a game by 
showing that X is true at terminal game states, and also showing X is true at a state provided 
some transition from that state takes the game to another state at which X is true. Thus, one 
works backward from terminal states to encompass the entire game tree” (Fitting 2011, p. 
152). 
● Logical omniscience: the problem of logical omniscience occurs when the believer cannot 
reproduce all the theorems that belong to the underlying logic; it occurs when the believer is 
not aware of some logical equivalence.   
 
We note that the concept of common knowledge was discovered and formalized by, 
“independently,” Lewis (1969), Aumann (1976), Schiffer (1972), and even Nozick (in his doctoral 
dissertation 1963). The topic of the hypothesis that rationality is common knowledge is also 




backward induction. The claims such as “morality is rationality,” “rationality is common 
knowledge,” “common knowledge is related to backward induction.” are “inspirational,” since 
they may conclude that “morality is based on backward induction.”57 
 
5-7-2. Propositional Dynamic Epistemic Logic  
Melvin Fitting in his “Reasoning about Games” (2011) discusses propositional dynamic epistemic 
logic (PDL+E), which is a fusion of epistemic logic (E) and propositional dynamic logic (PDL), 
relating it to game theory. Fitting first describes the axiomatics and semantics described in Schmidt 
et al. (2002, 2008). For epistemic logic, the ‘basic settings’ are common, and there are three 
additional axiom schemes: (Fitting 2011, p. 145) 
 
● E-1 KAX   X, Factivity  
● E-2 KAX   KAKAX , Positive Introspection 
● E-3 KAX   KAKAX , Negative Introspection 
 
● And, semantics is the familiar Kripke/Hintikka possible world semantics. 
 
“Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) is a logic of non-deterministic actions--the action ‘go to a 
store and buy milk’ could be executed in many ways since a choice of store is unspecified. The 
                                                          
57 In addition, I have just a conjecture for now, but it seems to me that there may be some fruitful lessons from 
the relationship between epistemic logic and the de re/de dicto distinction. Those key epistemic conceptions in this 
sub-section have been actively discussed in the discipline of logic, game theory, and computer science. Besides those 
disciplines, however, we have epistemology and philosophy of language, in which the de re/de dicto distinction is 
much investigated. Regarding this issue, the stepping stones of our research will be Mendelsohn’s 
“Referential/attributive: a scope interpretation” (2008), “Sinn and Bedeutung with Scope” (2012), and Fitting and 




formula [α]X is intended to express that X will be true after action α is executed” (Fitting 2011, p. 
145). Then, there are a standard PDL axiom system and rules. 
PDL and E can be fused, axiomatically and semantically. In addition, there are three 
interaction conditions between PDL and E: No Learning, Perfect Recall, and Reasoning Ability. 
Based on this setting, Fitting gives a detailed analysis of the Centipede game and argues that 
“PDL+E can be a useful basis for the logical investigation of game theory” (p. 143). 
 
5-7-3. The Contrast between Classical Game Theory and Epistemic Game Theory 
Traditionally, game theory has been distinguished from decision theory, in that game theory 
considers other players’ actions. However, if these epistemic concepts discussed above are 
embedded in game theory (that is, epistemic logic is concerned), the distinction between game 
theory and decision theory becomes less clear. 
 Epistemic game theory is contrasted with classical game theory in some respects (see 
Pacuit and Roy in “Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory” (2015)). Classical game theory 
includes components such as players, feasible options (actions or strategies), and players’ 
preferences. In classical game theory, a ‘solution concept’ is important to denote a set of practical 
recommendations about what the players should do in a game. The famous Nash equilibrium is an 
example of a solution concept. By contrast, in epistemic game theory, epistemic components such 
as common knowledge, backward induction, and logical omniscience play important roles, in 
addition to the traditional component such as players, actions, outcomes, and preferences. These 
epistemic ingredients can “bring back the theory of decision making in games to its decision-





Chapter 6. The Less We Know, the More Rational and Moral We Are 
The main subject to be discussed in this chapter is a combination of a series of ideas: that is, (1) if 
we know less, then it is sometimes possible that we become more rational; (2) being rational is 
being moral; ‘therefore,’ (3) if we know less, it is sometimes possible that we become more moral.   
The first idea of (1) above is discussed in Parikh (2017), and I develop it further by adding the 
ideas of (2) and (3). I first discuss two simple cases, cake cutting and a tiger as a motivational 
introduction to this chapter. I then discuss John Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’ in the ‘original 
position.’ I finally discuss a verse of T.S. Eliot’s poem “April,” comparing it to Norbert Wiener’s 
thought of information.  
 
§6-1. Motivation: Cake Cutting and the Tiger in the Bathroom  
6-1-1. The first case: cake cutting procedure, again.  
I discussed, in chapter 2, cake cutting procedure as an exemplary case of social software. Let’s see 
cake cutting here from a different perspective. N participants are to divide a cake. They assume 
that if each gets an equal amount (say, size) of the cake, the division is fair. If one participant is 
chosen to divide the cake by n pieces, and he is allowed to take the last piece after all other n-1 
participants take theirs, what strategy can be the most rational one for him? The cutting person will 
try to divide the cake equally as far as he can, because he does not know which piece will remain 
last for him. His ignorance of his piece makes him rational, so that the division will become more 
moral, if fair and equal division is moral and ethical. So, the less we know, the more rational and 




In the following section, from this motivation, we discuss an aspect of John Rawls’s theory 
of justice. Rawls himself briefly discusses the fair cake cutting procedure (1971/1999 Revised, p. 
74, pages numbers are of 1999 edition).  
 
6-1-2. The second case: the tiger in the bathroom is unknown to a person. 
Parikh discusses, in his paper titled “An Epistemic Generalization of Rationalizability” (2017), an 
‘amusingly’ scary situation where there is a tiger in the bathroom of your apartment. Let’s suppose 
I know that there is a tiger in your bathroom and you need to use it now. 
 
(1) If you do not know about the tiger, you will proceed to the bathroom; 
(2) If you know about it, you will proceed to your neighbor’s apartment and ask if you can 
use his bathroom.     
 
The proposition, “a tiger is in the bathroom” can be true or false, and you have two possible actions. 
Parikh’s model payoff matrix is as follows (Parikh 2017, p. 3): 
 
Table 1: A Payoff Matrix of “the Tiger in the Bathroom” 
Source: Parikh 2017 
 
(a) If you proceed to your bathroom without knowing about the tiger, you are very likely 




(b) If you proceed to your bathroom and there is no tiger, you enjoy the convenience payoff 
of 10. 
(c), and (d) If you proceed to your neighbor’s bathroom, you have to pay some “social cost,” 
so your payoffs are -5. 
 
Relating to the current subject of this chapter, the following strategy S1 and S2 are of interest to 
us:  
 
 S1: You proceed to your bathroom. 
 S2: You proceed to your neighbor’s bathroom. 
     
According to the payoff matrix above, S1 (your bathroom) is dominant over S2 (your neighbor’s), 
if you do not know about the tiger; whereas S2 (neighbor’s) is dominant over S1 (yours) if you 
know about the tiger. On Parikh’s summary (2017):  
 
The strategy of using your own bathroom was rationalizable for you before you knew about 
the tiger. But once you know about the tiger, that strategy is not rationalizable. There are 
fewer rationalizable strategies when we know more. (p. 6) 
 
The less you know, the more rational you are! (p. 5) 
 
I here note that we need more sophisticated discussions on the classical Aristotelian conversion, 




as a solution concept in game theory. Nevertheless, I do not go further on those issues now by 
claiming that this is enough for a motivational introduction. 
 
§6-2. John Rawls’s Veil of Ignorance in the Original Position 
John Rawls argues, in his book A Theory of Justice (1971/1999), for ‘justice as fairness,’ which is 
a social contract conception of justice. In the theory, the concepts of the ‘original position’ and the 
‘veil of ignorance’ in the original position are essential to construct the conception of justice as 
fairness. I will argue in the following that Rawls’s argument for the veil of ignorance is a great 
exemplary case of ‘the less we know, the more rational and moral we are’. 
Rawls’s concept of the ‘original position’ “corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional 
theory of the social contract” (1971/1999, p. 11). It is natural to imagine an early state where 
human beings began to live together and to think about rules that they should follow in order to 
maintain their community. The community may be called a society, state, polis (in Ancient Greece), 
country or similar. This imagined early state is called the ‘state of nature’ by those traditional 
social contract theorists including Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke, and sometimes even by Kant, 
though Kant may not be regarded as a social contract theorist. This state of nature, and the original 
position too, Rawls argues, should not be thought of as an “actual historical state of affairs,” nor a 
“primitive condition of culture”; rather, it should be understood as a “purely hypothetical situation” 
to construct and agree on a certain conception of justice (Ibid.). Whether the state of nature existed 
actually and historically or not is an interesting question. Of course, in the early period of human 
history, there certainly were not gatherings like the modern congress or senate. Nevertheless, 
humans’ early processes of building morality, laws, and nations can be regarded as the state of 




big data. The state of nature may also be compared to the fictional situation described in William 
Golding’s novel, Lord of the Flies (1954). The state where a group of boys stranded on a deserted 
island in the Pacific Ocean attempt to govern themselves can be an exemplar of the state of nature, 
provided that all apparent discrepancies are muted.  
Now, parties to the original position, Rawls argues, do not know certain kinds of particular 
facts. If the parties were to know these particulars, it would be tempting for them to exploit social 
and natural circumstances to the parties’ own advantage. In order to nullify this advantage, Rawls 
suggests that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. Some particular facts in Rawls’s 
list of ignorance are as follows: 
 
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he 
know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and 
strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the 
particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as 
his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. ---- [T]he parties do not know the 
particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or 
political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The 
persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong 
(1971/1999, p. 118).    
 
Though parties to the original position do not know most particular facts, they know, at least, the 
only particular facts that “their society is subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever this 




even these particulars, I think all these discussions are pointless. Rawls suggests, by contrast, that 
parties know the general facts about their community. For instance, they understand political 
affairs, the principles of economic theories, the basis of social organization, the laws of human 
psychology and the like (Ibid.). 
It may be argued that (1) what the parties know and do not know are not clear, (2) that Rawls 
suggests that too many particular facts are not known to the parties, and (3) that, therefore, it is 
hard to understand the concept of the original position. I do not think that these raised difficulties 
are legitimate. If I imagine the original position in Rawls’s favor, the original position is exactly 
the same world as human beings live in now, except that we humans become blind and ignorant 
when our interests are involved. For example, we can assume that parties to the original position 
know all kinds of laws discovered in logic (laws of identity, non-contradiction (and/or 
paraconsistency), excluded middle, Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, etc.), but as soon as these laws 
are involved in a person’s interest, that person becomes ignorant of what kinds of person he is and 
will be. The person does not know whether the person’s parents are rich, and what the person’s 
religion, race, and nationality are. As a thought experiment, it is easy to think of this kind of 
imaginary position where the switch for a person’s interest can be turned on or off automatically.              
From the standpoint of the original position, Rawls postulates, the parties are rational: 
 
“They assume that they normally prefer more primary social goods rather than less.--- It is 
rational for the parties to suppose that they do want a larger share. --- even though the parties 
are deprived of information about their particular ends, they have enough knowledge to rank 




opportunities, and enlarge their means for promoting their aims. --- no longer guesswork. 
They can make a rational decision in the ordinary sense” (1971/1999, p. 123)    
 
Unlike Rawlsian rationality in the original position, it may be rational for a person, for example, 
from a saint’s viewpoint, to decrease his property by donating most of it to charities, or to reduce 
his rights of freedom and equality by alienating them to others. Rawls’s rationality, by contrast, is 
like the “standard in economic theory,” and “must be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow 
sense,” “of taking the most effective means to given ends” (1971/1999, p. 12). Rawls seems to 
depend highly on the economic notion of rationality by referring to Amartya Sen’s Collective 
Choice and Social Welfare (1970), and Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values 
(1963), (1971/1999, p. 116, note 9, and p. 124, note 14). 
I regard the standard notion of rationality in economic theory as a form of teleological theory. 
Then, is the Rawlsian concept of rationality teleological, therefore, utilitarian (which is the most 
prominent version of teleology)? This question is interesting, because Rawls’s theory of justice, 
since its inception, has been widely accepted as a strong criticism of utilitarianism which had 
gained widespread acceptance in Anglo-American ethics at the time. To give a quick answer, I 
argue that Rawls adopts the core concept of teleological rationality and elaborates it, and then 
provides an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism. 
More specifically, following the (so-called) ‘main stream’ discourse of ethics, Rawls assumes 
that the right and the good are the two main concepts of ethics, and that the “structure of an ethical 
theory is -- determined by how it defines and connects these two basic notions” (1971/1999, p. 21). 
These ideas are so amazingly simple that they may over-simplify the discourse of ethics. 




occasion, I focus here on the beauty. Rawls, following William Frankena’s definition of 
teleological theories in Ethics (1963), understands them as: “[1, (numbering is mine)] the good is 
defined independently from the right, and then [2] the right is defined as that which maximizes the 
good” (1971/1999, pp. 21-22). I am now talking about Rawlsian rationality influenced by the 
teleological notion of rationality. Rawls admits that teleology has a “deep intuitive appeal” because 
it embodies the “idea of rationality,” which is “maximizing something” and, in ethics, 
“maximizing the good” (1971/1999, p. 22). 
So far, it may seem that Rawls admits that his theory, ‘justice as fairness’, is a teleological 
theory. However, he explicitly denies the two tenets of teleological theories mentioned above, [1] 
and [2]. He argues that his theory of ‘justice as fairness’ is a deontological theory, “one that either 
does not specify the good independently from the right [which is denying [1]], or does not interpret 
the right as maximizing the good [which is denying [2]]” (1971/1999, p. 26). How can Rawls 
resolve this apparent contradiction in his theory? How can his theory (which is based on the 
teleological concept of rationality) be a deontological theory (which is the counterpart of the 
teleological)? It seems to me that for Rawls’s position to resolve this contradiction it is to be 
hovering between deontology and teleology: that is, he argues that “[a]ll ethical doctrines 
[including deontological] worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. 
One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy” (Ibid.). He writes, “crazy.” I understand this 
claim in a way that the rightness of an action in any moral theory cannot be free from the 
consequence of the action, regardless of whether the theory is (seemingly) noble Kantian 
deontology or (seemingly) mundane utilitarianism. I see that Rawls may have the view that, for 
example, even the Kantian moral theory of categorical imperative, which is categorized as a typical 




rightness of an action is decided by its consequence. I think that the Rawlsian way of resolution 
may not have the taste of clear-cut distinction, but it still has a pragmatic merit. 
Rawls develops further the concept of rationality of the parties to the original position by 
adding special assumptions. In the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, “a rational 
individual does not suffer from envy” (1971/1999, p. 124).  This envy-free individual does not 
accept a loss of social goods for himself even though others have less; they do not feel unhappy 
when others have more social goods. So, the rationality in the original position is “mutually 
disinterested rationality,” that is, “put in terms of a game, -- , they strive for as high an absolute 
score as possible. They do not wish a high or a low score for their opponents, nor do they seek to 
maximize or minimize the difference between their successes and those of others” (p. 125).    
 
Now, the parties who are equipped with ignorance and rationality in the original position, 
Rawls argues, choose more moral options for the community they construct when they agree on 
the conception of justice. That is, “the combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of ignorance 
achieves much the same purpose as benevolence,” and “has the merits of simplicity and clarity --
- insuring the effects of what are --- morally more attractive assumptions” (1971/1999, pp. 128-
129). Rawls argues for the two moral principles agreed upon by the parties to the original position: 
 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices 




The first principle is about equal liberty, and (b) of the second principle is about fair equality of 
opportunity, both of which are less debatable. What is of most interest to our current discussion is 
(a) of the second principle. (a) is called the ‘difference principle,’ and can be rephrased as follows: 
 
The Difference Principle: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
improve the “expectations of the least advantaged members of society” (p. 65). 
 
For the main purpose of this chapter, I am most interested in and will focus on how this difference 
principle (which is “the more moral we are” clause) is deduced from the combination of the veil 
of ignorance (which is “the less we know” clause) and the mutually disinterested rationality (which 
is “the more rational we are” clause). 
Rawls adopts the “maxmin” rule in order to improve the goods of the “least advantaged 
members of society.” “The term “maxmin” means the maximum minimorum; and the rule directs 
our attention to the worst that can happen under any proposed course of action” (p. 133, note19). 
For example, let’s see the following three decisions in the table below.58 
          
Decisions Circumstances 
 C1 C2 C3 
D1 4 8 12 
D2 2 7 14 
D3 5 6 8 
 
Table 2: An Example of the Maximin Rule of Rawls 
Source: Rawls 1971/1999, p. 133, note 19 
                                                          
58 For clarity, I slightly changed decision 1’s minimum value from Rawls’ -7 into 4, and decision 2’s minimum 




The maxmin rule requires us to choose decision 3, since its minimum payoff, 5, is larger than 
decision 1’s minimum, 4, and decision 2’s minimum, 2. 
A person can become a “least advantaged member of society” from the view point of, for 
example, religion, race, nationality, disabilities, financial situation, or sexual orientation. This list 
can be enlarged to include all kinds of conflicts of society. However, the person cannot know, in 
Rawls’ theory, whether he will be one of the least advantaged, because of the veil of ignorance. 
Therefore, by exercising the maxmin rule of rationality, the person will choose an option in which 
even if he will be one of the least advantaged, he will be safe. Some may argue that a certain brave 
person is wagering that he will not be a least advantaged member, and if he will be, he is willing 
to suffer from being a least advantaged. However, in the Rawlsian thought experiment of the 
original position, I think this kind of seemingly courageous action becomes ‘foolhardy’ which is 
an extreme that violates the Aristotelian doctrine of the Golden Mean. The agreement on justice 
in the original position is final and irrevocable, and if the person loses, he loses everything 
including his life. 
To sum up, parties to the original position are so mutually disinterestedly rational thanks to 
the veil of ignorance that they agree on a more moral conception of justice by exercising the 
maxmin rule. We see that Rawls’s moral theory is connected to an idea in the Western tradition of 
moral philosophy: the idea is that “being rational is being moral” (rationality is morality), which 
may be traced back to Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant. 
 
§6-3. Norbert Wiener’s Information and T.S. Eliot’s “April” 
Relating to “the less we know,” Norbert Wiener in his book, The Human Use of Human Beings 




[T]he more probable the message, the less information it gives (p. 21). 
 
In chapter 4, I discussed the relationship between entropy and information, I think, ‘tenaciously.’ 
What we can learn from that discussion is helpful for the current context. 
According to Wiener,  
 
Information is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust 
to it, and make our adjustment felt upon it (p. 17).  
 
Just as entropy is a measure of disorganization, the information carried by a set of messages 
is a measure of organization. In fact, it is possible to interpret the information carried by a 
message as essentially the negative of its entropy, and the negative logarithm of its probability. 
That is, the more probable the message, the less information it gives. Clichés, for example, 
are less illuminating than great poems (p. 21). 
 
Wiener’s thesis, “the more probable the message, the less information it gives” reminds us of, in 
philosophy of science, Karl Popper’s demarcation criterion of falsifiability between the scientific 
and the unscientific: The more falsifiable a statement is, the more information it gives. 
Wiener’s thesis also may explain the popularity of the verse, “April is the cruellest month,” 
from T.S. Eliot’s poem, “The Waste Land” (1922); and may explain why it has not disappeared 






APRIL is the cruellest month, breeding 
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing 
Memory and desire, stirring 
Dull roots with spring rain. 
Winter kept us warm, covering 
Earth in forgetful snow, feeding 
A little life with dried tubers. 
                   --- 
I may not be able to fathom the deep connotation of the verse, and it may be beyond the topic of 
this dissertation. What I want to emphasize here is that, if Eliot had written the verse such that, 
“April is the most beautiful,” it would not have been so popular. In the northern hemisphere, April 
is usually a beautiful month in spring; and in April most beings are waking up from the winter 
sleep. Flowers are blooming; butterflies are mating. In this kind of atmosphere, as soon as a poet 
sings, “April is the most beautiful,” the verse becomes a cliché, which is “less illuminating than 




Chapter 7. No Naturalistic Fallacy on Morality as Social Software 
“Flower”  
Until I called its name 
it had been 
nothing more than a gesture. 
When I called its name, 
it came to me 
and became a flower. 
 --- 
Chun-su Kim (1922-2004, Poet, South Korea) 
 (First released in 1952) 
 
The main thesis to be argued in this chapter is that the naturalistic fallacy and its ‘living ancestor,’ 
Hume’s Law, can be resolved from the viewpoint of morality as social software that we have 
developed so far. The naturalistic fallacy is committed, on G. E. Moore’s accusation, when one 
draws X’s goodness from any of its natural properties; and, an ‘ought’ (value), on Hume’s 
contention, cannot be deduced from ‘is’ (fact). Since this dissertation project is, essentially, based 
on the evolutionary concept of morality, the project may not be completely immune to the 
criticisms from the naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s Law. That is, it may be critiqued that the 
construction of evolutionary morality as social software here is not enough to explain why we 
ought to follow ‘that’ morality just constructed. It seems inevitable, therefore, that I should provide 
sound replies to these kinds of criticisms before concluding the dissertation. I hope that the 




I first discuss Moore’s initial open question argument (which cannot be separated from his 
naturalistic fallacy), some prominent objections to his open question argument, and possible 
responses to those objections. I then introduce R. M. Hare’s modified version of the open question 
argument, and argue that Hare’s version is not valid, either. Through these discussions, I will argue 
that, those open question arguments of Moore’s and Hare’s ‘in the tradition of analytic philosophy,’ 
are not strong enough to show that moral naturalism is wrong: I will argue that the naturalistic 
fallacy is not a genuine fallacy. While reinforcing this point, I will argue further that the gap in 
Hume’s Law between ‘is’ (fact) and ‘ought’ (value) can be filled with the concept of morality as 
social software and related distinctions among several kinds of ‘oughts.’  
 
§7-1. G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument 
Since the first publication of Moore’s Principia Ethica in 1903, already “much ink has been spilled” 
over this topic and “a lot of fire has been directed at” (Lenman 2006) the open question argument. 
Still, “[a]fter one hundred years of commentary, Moore’s views --- are poorly understood 
(Piervincenzi 2007, p. v).” 
I think that one way of summarizing G. E. Moore’s claims and project for moral non-
naturalism in Principia Ethica (1903) may be as follows:  
 
(1) Moore argues that the term ‘good’ is simple, indefinable, and (therefore) non-natural.  
(2) On Moore’s contention, it is an error to attempt to define the term ‘good’ in connection 
with natural properties such as ‘pleasure’ and ‘survival’: analytic reductionism in the moral 
realm is erroneous. 




(4) The argument that Moore constructs when he presents these claims, has come to be known 
as the ‘Open Question Argument.’  
(5) Moore ultimately relies on intuition. 
 
I begin, more specifically, by introducing two common forms of summaries of Moore’s open 
question argument in Chapter 1 of Principia Ethica: firstly, Bernard Baumrin’s (1968) summary 
of the structure of the open question argument; secondly, a summary by Roger Hancock (1960) 
and his followers who accept the ‘Hancock-style’ summary of the open question argument.  
Firstly, Baumrin (1968, p. 79) analyzes Moore’s argument as follows:  
 
Premise (A): ‘Good’ denotes either: (1) a simple property, (2) a complex property, or (3) 
nothing at all. 
P (B): ‘Good’ is either definable or indefinable. And, 
P (C): If ‘good’ is definable, it must denote a complex, for only complexes are definable. 
P (D): If ‘good’ is indefinable, it must denote: (1) a simple, or (2) nothing at all. 
P (E): It does not denote a complex. 
Conclusion (F): Therefore, it is indefinable (from Premise B & the contraposition of C). 
P (G):  It does denote something.  
Conclusion (H): Therefore, it does denote a simple property (from D, E & F).  
 
Secondly, in the following Hancock-style summary, which reconstructs the open question 




Timmons 1992, Vessel 2004/2009):59 
 
(Premise 0: If moral naturalism is true, the following is valid.)  
P1: For every natural property P, if the property of P (for example, pleasure) is identical 
with the property of ‘good’, then P and ‘good’ designate the same properties. (e.g. pleasure 
and good must designate the same property.) 
P 2: But whenever we ask, “Is P good?,” we can see that P and ‘good’ designate two distinct 
properties.  
P3: If P and ‘good’ designate two distinct properties, the question “Is P good?” is not closed, 
that is, it is open. (e.g. To the question ‘Is pleasure pleasure?,’ we can answer “Yes!” 
obviously. Therefore, this question is a closed question; by contrast, to the question ‘Is 
pleasure good?,’ the answer is not obvious. We need to reflect on it for some time, no matter 
how short it is. Therefore, the question ‘Is pleasure good?’ is open.) 
Conclusion 4: P and ‘good’ designate two distinct properties. 
C 5: Therefore, there is no natural property that has the same property as ‘good.’ 
(C6: therefore, moral naturalism is not true.) 
 
The two forms of summaries above can be made clearer if we recall Moore’s two analogies with 
the concept ‘yellow’ (1903, Ch. 1, Sec. 10), and with the relationship between the whole and the 
parts (Sec. 20).  Moore argues that defining ‘good’ is impossible in the same way as defining a 
simple concept ‘yellow.’ Only complex objects can be defined (premise C above) by listing their 
                                                          
59 Some philosophers such as Vessel (2004/2009) argue that the following summary of the open question 
argument is not correct: It is not the exact form of argumentation that Moore presents in Principia Ethica. I will 




parts and the relationships between those parts. For example, it is possible to define the concept, 
‘horse,’ (Sec. 7 and 8) because a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which 
can be listed. On the contrary, ‘yellow’ and ‘good’ are not complex. ‘Yellow’ cannot be defined 
in terms of any other concept. Defining ‘yellow,’ for example, by describing that it is the color of 
visible light with a wavelength of 570 - 590 nanometer (nm) is not successful, since, on Moore’s 
contention, the wavelength is not the color. The notion of yellow cannot be explained fully to 
anyone who does not already know it. Since ‘good’ is not a complex notion in the same way that 
‘yellow’ is not, ‘good’ is indefinable in the same way that ‘yellow’ is indefinable (Conclusion F 
above). If ‘good’ is not complex, it must be either simple or meaningless. Moore contends that the 
idea that ‘good’ is meaningless can be rejected (Premise G), since everyone understands the 
question “Is pleasure good?” as distinct and meaningful. Therefore, ‘good’ denotes a simple notion 
(Conclusion H). 
To sum up, in the simplest form, Moore argues with the open question argument (OQE) that: 
 
OQE: Since, for example, the question “Is pleasure good?” is an open question, ‘pleasure’ 
and ‘good’ are not the same. 
 
We understand that a question is open if it is not closed; a question is closed if, for example, “most 
any semantically competent speaker who considers the question carefully, and who properly brings 
his semantic competence to bear on the question, will judge both that the answer to the question is 
obviously ‘yes’ (or obviously ‘no’)” (Horgan and Timmons 1992, p. 161). When an analysis of a 
moral term is proposed in a reductive way, we can put the analysis in an interrogative sentence. If 




then the question is open. This openness suggests that the initial reductive analysis fails. Moore 
himself seems to think that the term ‘open’ is interchangeable with the terms ‘significant’, 
‘intelligible,’ and perhaps, ‘doubtful.’  
In this regard, the open question argument can function as a kind of ‘test’ of whether an 
analysis expresses sameness of meaning. The open question ‘test’ can function like the Kantian 
categorical imperative ‘test’ to check whether something is such-and-such (whether meaningful 
for Moore; whether moral for Kant). Furthermore, since similar questions with other natural or 
metaphysical terms are also open, Moore seems to argue that the entire project of analytic 
reductionism in the realm of ethics is erroneous. In short, Moore seems to view that ‘good’ is an 
irreducible, sui generis, non-natural property. 
This view is closely related to Moore’s worries about the naturalistic fallacy, which consists 
in identifying the simple non-natural notion of good with some other natural notion. Ethics, Moore 
argues, “aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good,” 
but “far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties --- these 
properties--- are absolutely and entirely the same with goodness” (1903, Sec. 10). Moore proposes 
to call this view of “far too many philosophers” the naturalistic fallacy.  
 
§7-2. Objections to the Open Question Argument and Responses to the Objections 
In this section, I discuss some common objections to Moore’s open question argument, before 
discussing the naturalistic fallacy further. There are various objections to Moore’s open question 
argument. Moore himself in his later work “A Reply to My Critics” (1942, p. 582; See Ridge, 
2003/2014) admits that: in Principia Ethica, “I did not give any tenable explanation of what I 




next section of R.M. Hare’s modification will follow the ‘analytic tradition’ of philosophy, more 
than other parts of this dissertation.  
   
7-2-1. A Posteriori Identities 
An objection from a posteriori property identities (See Lenman 2006; Ridge 2003/2014) focuses 
on Moore’s failure to consider the distinction between ‘denotation’ and ‘meaning.’ Two terms can 
denote the same property though they are not equivalent in meaning. Let’s consider the following 
two biconditionals: 
 
(1) x is good iff x is N (e.g., sweet). 
(2) x is water iff x is H2O. 
 
On Moore’s contention with his open question argument, ‘good’ and N in (1) are not the same, 
because the question, “Is N good?” is open. (If ‘good’ and N in (1) are the same, the question 
cannot be open.) By contrast, on this objection with a counterexample in (2), though ‘water’ does 
not mean the same as ‘H2O, ‘being water’ and ‘being H2O’ are considered to be the same identical 
property in chemistry. They ‘denote’ the same physical entity, and the property identity ‘water = 
H2O’ is a necessary and a posteriori truth. The question, “I know it is H2O, but is it water?” is still 
open to a speaker who does not know the identity relation ‘water = H2O.’ Analogously, on this 
objection, the same argument goes with ‘goodness’ and, say, ‘sweet.’ Though the question, “I 
know it is sweet but is it good?” is open to a speaker who does not know the identity relation, 




property. So, Moore is wrong, on this objection, and Moore’s argument can be simply dismissed 
by the claim that he has a pretty ‘idiosyncratic’ idea of ‘definition.’60  
By contrast, Horgan and Timmons (1992) who embrace the force of Moore’s open question 
arguments against naturalism, respond to this objection by arguing that, to put it roughly, “The 
objection is valid for water, but not for goodness.” They find that the analogy between ‘goodness’ 
and ‘water’ in the objection is untenable. On our planet, if we know that water is H2O, then the 
question at issue is closed; if we don’t know that identity, the question open; and this situation 
applies in the same way on another twin earth. Horgan and Timmons argue, however, that the 
situation about goodness is quite different from water. They suppose a ‘moral twin earth’ where 
the use of evaluative terms on the planet is the exact opposite of our use. Certainly, in this moral 
twin earth, the question “Is pleasure good?” is open, and Moore’s open question argument still 
works. It seems to me that Horgan and Timmons believe that natural kind terms such as ‘water’ 
and ‘H2O’ are, on Kripke’s terminology, rigid designators; but moral terms such as ‘good’ and 
‘right’ are not.61 
One more response: Vessel (2004/2009) presents a newer and more unique response to this 
kind of ‘objection based on property identity.’ He argues that the Hancock-style construction of 
Moore’s open question argument, in which property identity statements play prominent roles in 
the central premises, is not true to the Moorean texts. Rather, Vessel argues that Moore is interested 
in the meanings of certain interpretations of the predicates ‘x is good’ and ‘x is pleasant,’ as well 
as certain others. Vessel suggests that if we interpret the term ‘pleasure’ in Moore’s questions as 
                                                          
60 This objection is a form of reductio ad absurdum (See Strandberg 2004, p. 185). If the open question argument 
were valid, it could refute the hypothesis that, for example, even if two terms are used differently, they can refer to 
the same property. But the argument cannot refute the hypothesis, for example, that, two terms, water and H2O 
are used differently, but refer to the same thing. Therefore, the argument is not valid. QED. 




the ‘nominative counterpart’ of the predicate ‘x is pleasant,’ that is, the term ‘pleasure’ is used to 
refer to all the pleasant things, then the open question argument may be better defended to the 
objection based on property identity. I agree with Vessel that this kind of interpretation is more 
“charitable” towards Moore’s initial thoughts and does not nullify the lesson from Frege’s 
distinction between sense and reference.   
 
7-2-2. Some Objections Related to the Paradox of Analysis, and Analyticity 
Some objections to the open question argument are related to the paradox of analysis, which is a 
paradox that concerns how an analysis can be both correct and informative. Consider an analysis 
of the form ‘A is B,’ where A is the analysandum and B the analysans. Then, either (1) ‘A’ and 
‘B’ have the same meaning, in which case the analysis expresses a trivial identity; or else (2) they 
do not have the same meaning, in which case the analysis is incorrect. A response to the paradox 
is Frege’s distinction between sense and reference. A different form of the paradox of analysis: To 
give a correct analysis of the meaning of, say, a concept, the philosopher must in some sense 
already understand or know the meaning of the concept. But if he already knows the meaning of 
the concept, how can his work be significant?  
According to an objection related to the paradox of analysis, the general form of Moore’s 
open question argument is simply a particular instance of the paradox of analysis. A lesson from 
20th century analytic philosophy is that competent speakers can ‘legitimately’ question 
analyticities (See van Roojen 2004/2013). That is, if there are given analyticities (or definitions) 
such as “N is good.” and “Water is H2O.,” a competent speaker can ask questions such as “Is N 
good?” and “Is water H2O?” about the analyticities (definitions). “The mere fact that a speaker can 




the current context, the openness of the question on which Moore heavily relies, becomes less 
significant (Smith 1994, pp. 37-39). The openness is just an instance of the paradox of analysis. 
This kind of objection is, I think, essentially and analogously, like the biblical saying, “He who is 
without sin among you, let him be the first to throw a stone at her.” If every analysis (definition) 
has, in principle, such an aspect of the paradox of analysis, Moore’s criticism based on the 
openness may not be valid. 
Another objection to the open question argument is related to the problem of “unobvious 
analyticity” (Lewis 1989, p. 129; van Roojen 2013). This objection is similar to the former 
objection above, but still, I argue, they are distinct from each other. Even if a moral term such as 
‘good’ and a natural term such as ‘sweet’ are analytically equivalent, that analyticity may not be 
known to a competent speaker obviously, so that the analyticity can be questioned by the speaker. 
This unobviousness is well illustrated by an analogy with grammar, using Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) 
seminal distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. An identity could be analytic 
because competent speakers are tacitly aware of the analyticity, though they may not recognize the 
adequacy of the analyticity. Competent speakers can follow certain rules without knowing what 
the rules are. So, the question, “I know the sentence violates this rule but is it ungrammatical?” 
might seem to be open in the same way as in the moral case of Moore’s argument (Ridge 
2003/2014; Strandberg 2004, p. 188). Regarding the distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that, the openness in question results from the level of knowledge-how. The opponents 
of the open question argument may criticize Moore for ignoring the level of knowledge-that. 
However, interestingly and conversely, the proponents of Moore’s argument may defend it by 





§7-3. Non-cognitivists and R.M. Hare 
7-3-1. Non-cognitivists 
Non-cognitivists contend that moral statements have no truth values. According to non-cognitivists, 
when moral statements are spoken, ‘non-cognitive attitudes’ such as emotion (Ayer and 
Stevenson), desire (Carnap), commendation (Hare), approval, or disapproval, are expressed. Non-
cognitivists, while agreeing with Moore’s claim that moral terms do not refer to natural properties, 
argue that Moore's mistake is that he neglects another option: Perhaps, moral terms do not refer to 
expressions at all. The open question is always open, non-cognitivists argue, not because the moral 
term (e.g. good) in question ‘wrongly’ refers to a natural term (e.g. pleasure), but because the 
moral term does not refer to any property. Thus, non-cognitivists argue that moral terms in the 
open questions do not function to represent any property or meaning; rather, moral terms function 
completely differently:  expressing an emotion, prescribing something, or taking a stand. Non-
cognitivists have taken advantage of various modified forms of open question arguments to 
reinforce their metaethical theories such as emotivism (Ayer and Stevenson) and prescriptivism 
(Hare). I will focus here on only Hare’s development of the open question argument. 
 
7-3-2. R. M. Hare’s Open Question Argument 
Hare argues in his Language of Morals (1952) that when we call something ‘good,’ we ‘commend’ 
it. To avoid many weak points of Moore's refutation of ethical naturalism, Hare tries to improve 
Moore’s argument or, justly to Hare, to produce new ones. According to Stojanović (1963, p. 264), 
since we can find so many new things in Hare’s argument, we may call it “Hare's argument” instead 
of simply “Hare's improvement” on Moore. Lange (1966, p. 244) also observed that, for some 




ethical naturalism] which Moore had [---] already prepared for the oven,” though Lange himself 
did not take it for granted. Hare's argument, like Moore's, is intended to work against all sorts of 
naturalism. Hare thinks it can be shown that naturalism is in principle fallacious and untenable.  
One way of summarizing Hare's main arguments against ethical naturalism follows (See 
Walker 1973, p. 45; originally, Hare 1952, Ch. 5):  
 
(A) The basic thesis of naturalism: For all things of a certain kind X, the phrase ‘a good X’ 
means the same as ‘a C X’ (where C is some natural characteristic such as sweet and juicy).  
(B) Therefore, the sentence (1) “A C X is a good X.” means the same as the sentence 
                                             (2) “A C X is a C X.” (by the substitution rule) 
(C) Sentence (1) is typically used to commend X for being C.  
(D) Sentence (2) is analytic, and therefore cannot be used to commend.  
(E) Therefore, sentence (1) does not mean the same as sentence (2).  
(F) Therefore, proposition (B) is false.  
(G) Therefore, proposition (A), the basic thesis of naturalism is false. 
 
Hare (1952, Ch. 5) re-illustrates this argument by using an example of a strawberry. Suppose that 
‘a good strawberry’ means ‘a strawberry that is sweet and juicy.’ Now, by saying that “A 
strawberry that is sweet and juicy is a good strawberry,” we can typically commend ‘a good 
strawberry.’ On the contrary, by saying that, after replacing the synonyms, “A strawberry that is 
sweet and juicy is a strawberry that is sweet and juicy,” we cannot commend them, because this 
sentence is analytic. This impossibility shows that the initial supposition was wrong. Therefore, 




Hare, here using the strawberry example intentionally instead of, for example, cannibalism, 
so he avoids moral examples. He wants to make it clear that the current issue of the open question 
argument is not related to any morals, but to “the general characteristics of value-words.” I see, 
indeed and incidentally, that ‘sweetness’ is a very good example of a value concept. The human 
tongue has developed the inclination to like a sweet taste through the evolutionary process, because 
un-sweet (or bitter) plants and minerals in nature are very likely to be poisonous. Nevertheless, 
both Western and Eastern medicine have recommended that humans should not eat too much sweet 
food. Sweetness may not be goodness, so, the term ‘sweetness’ may not be more eligible than the 
term, e.g., ‘cannibalism’ as an example of a value-term. 
One merit of Hare’s argument is that it is not vulnerable to a famous objection to Moore’s 
argument. According to this objection, if Moore’s refutation of the naturalistic definition of ethical 
terms were to be valid, it would invalidate any definition whatsoever. But this objection does not 
hold in Hare’s case. It is because, firstly, Hare, unlike Moore, does not argue in terms of 
‘meaningfulness’ of the question “Is an A which is C good?.” And, it is also because, secondly, 
the complete parallel between “An A which is C is good.” and a typical definition of the moral 
term, is not possible for Hare’s case. Hare shows that “An A which is C is good.” is also used to 
give a recommendation. 
A naturalistic objection (Walker 1973) to Hare’s argument is that, in proposition (B) of the 
summary above (that is, (B) The sentence (1) “A C X is a good X.” means the same as (2) “A C X 
is a C X.”), the phrase ‘means the same as’ is ambiguous; it can mean either (i) ‘is necessarily true 
if and only if’ or (ii) ‘can be used to perform the same functions as’; Walker calls the meaning (i) 
‘locutionary identity,’ and the meaning (ii) ‘illocutionary identity.’ If the phrase means (ii), then 




More specifically, this objection is to the thesis that the sentence “A C X is a good X.” itself 
is analytic. This objection is similar to the objection to Moore’s argument above, where the analogy 
between the unobviousness of the concept ‘analyticity’ and grammar, is discussed. Now, this time, 
let’s think of a strawberry expert who accepts that a good strawberry is sweet and juicy. If we 
assume that sentences can be only either ‘synthetic’ or ‘analytic,’ the sentence “A good strawberry 
is sweet and juicy” becomes analytically true for our strawberry expert.  
This analyticity of the sentence “A C X is a good X.” (e.g. “A sweet and juicy strawberry is 
a good strawberry.”) can attack the lacuna between above propositions (C) and (D) of Hare’s 
argument, since Proposition (D) rests upon a suppressed premise proposition (C*) (Walker 1973, 
p. 46).  
 
(C) Sentence (1) “A C X is a good X.” is typically used to commend X for being C; whereas  
(D) Sentence (2) “A C X is a C X.” is analytic, and therefore cannot be used to commend. 
 
(C*) No analytic sentence can be used to commend, and no sentence that can be used to 
commend can be analytic.  
 
The naturalist, however, may claim that proposition (C*) is in fact false, by giving the counter-
example of a sentence which is both analytic and can be used to commend. The sentence “A sweet 
and juicy strawberry is a good strawberry” is analytic for our expert, and yet can be used to 
commend a strawberry. When the expert says that “These strawberries are good, because they are 




also becomes false. I have argued so far, following the line of Walker’s (1973) argument, that 
Hare’s open question argument is invalid.   
The above refutation of Hare’s open question argument is just one kind. In addition, the 
essence of Hare's thesis itself is doubtful. Though Hare takes it for granted that commendatory use 
of moral terms is also part of their meanings, some others doubt that, as well as doubting whether 
ethical judgments are empirically verifiable or falsifiable (Stojanović 1963, p. 267). I will not go 
further into this ‘analytic’ analysis of open question arguments, concluding that it may be enough 
for my dissertation, and that the analytic criticisms of open question arguments are not conclusive. 
Rather, I turn to my original thesis that the naturalistic fallacy can be resolved from the viewpoint 
of morality as social software. 
 
§7-4. Rescuing Value from the Naturalistic Fallacy and Hume’s Law  
The naturalistic fallacy is ‘notorious.’ Or, ‘famous,’ if you would. The naturalistic fallacy is poorly 
named (Williams 1985/2006, p. 121; Ridge 2003/2014); and, it is even worse than misnamed, I 
argue, that it is not a genuine fallacy. On Moore’s accusation, the naturalistic fallacy is committed 
when we infer in the following way: 
 
X is natural property-like (e.g., X is sweet). 
  -------------------------------------------------- 
       Therefore, X is good. 
 
This form of argumentation violates, exactly, Hume’s law: ‘value’ conclusions (that contain 




contain ‘is,’ non-evaluative, or descriptive terms). As a simpler form, “no ‘ought’ from an ‘is’” 
(Hare 1981. P. 16; Putnam 2002, p. 28, p. 149). The naming of the naturalistic fallacy, actually, is 
not quite appropriate. As Moore himself argues, for example, divine command theories that find 
their moral foundations from God, which is a supernatural or non-natural entity, are also guilty of 
committing the naturalistic fallacy. The essential point of Moore’s various arguments is that, 
drawing moral value from any other property or fact, regardless of whether it is natural, non-natural, 
or supernatural, is to fail. And, this is exactly what Hume’s law claims.    
Now, in order to reinforce my defense of morality as social software from the criticism of the 
naturalistic fallacy, I give a critique of Hume’s Law, an 18th century ancestor of the 20th century 
naturalistic fallacy. David Hume in Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739/1978) criticizes 
the careless mistake of transitioning from ‘is’ to ‘ought,’ which is often found in moral systems. 
Let’s recall directly his monumental passage: [emphases are Hume’s] 
 
I cannot forbear adding --- an observation---. In every system of morality, --- I have always 
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and 
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of 
a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, 
and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. 
--- this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation ---;--- how this 
new relation can be a deduction from others ---. But as authors do not commonly use this 
precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this 




distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is 
perceiv’d by reason (Hume, 1739/1978: III.i.i). 
 
This short passage has been “subversive,” I think, in the sense, at least, that it has opened the way 
in which reason yields to emotion in the realm of moral discourse. Besides Hume’s own moral 
theory, for example, Ayer’s emotivism in the 20th century and Prinz’s sentimentalist moral theory 
in the 21st century, both of which highly rely on emotions in their theories, are highly influenced 
by Hume’s distinction between ‘is’ (fact) and ‘ought’ (value). These moral theories attempt to fill, 
with emotions, the gap between facts and values. I here use the is/ought distinction and the 
fact/value distinction, interchangeably. 
Let’s consider the following form of argumentation with the example of sugar and sweetness, 
to clarify this gap between facts and values:  
 
 
Diagram 3: The Gap between Facts and Values 
 
There is a gap, gulp, or chasm between the fact premise and the value conclusion. Once premises 
are facts or believed to be facts, the instances of the fact premises may include a long list of various 
natural, non-natural, and supernatural properties, depending on the arguer’s ‘imagination’ and 
‘ulterior motive’: the fact premises are about, for example, natural medicine, vegetarianism, 
Conclusion [Value]: Therefore, we ought to do X (we ought to eat sugar).
Gap (Gulp or Chasm)




environmentalism, homosexuality, racism, cannibalism, and ‘so far too much more extreme’ 
instances that I leave to the reader’s imagination. The common form of argumentation using these 
value concepts are usually given this way: “There is (or is not) such-and-such a fact (often, found 
in nature), therefore, we ought (or ought not) to do that.” This form of argumentation may be 
understood as an enthymeme that misses some premises, and those missing premises are possibly 
those that follow in the below diagram. 
 
 
Diagram 4: The Gap between Facts and Values, and Missing Premises 
 
The common essence of the criticism of Hume and Moore is that any attempt to fill the gap with 
such [Filling Gap 1] and [2] above, is never successful. Regarding their accusations that I interpret, 
any recovered missing premise used to fill the gap, such as premise 2 and 3 above, cannot avoid 
the question by the ultimate judge, “Then, are you a fact or a value?,” and no matter what the 
answer is, the gap cannot be filled. On the contrary, some moral philosophers attempt to fill the 
gap with emotions that can be viewed as a different ‘category’ from the categories of facts and 
Conclusion [Value]: Therefore, we ought to do X (we ought to eat sugar).
(Missing) Premise 3 (also, Conclusion 0) [Value] [Filling Gap 2]: Therefore, X is 
good (sugar is good).
(Missing) Premise 2 [Value] [Filling Gap 1]: Whaever is such-and-such is good 
(whatever is sweet is good).




values, ontologically. My argument based on the concept of morality as social software adopts a 
strategy different from those that use emotions in that way. To put this in rough terms now (more 
specifically later): there is no such gap between facts and values because the category of facts is 
different from the category of values; the problem of the fact/value dichotomy is a ‘pseudo-
problem’.”  
It is a really interesting and helpful insight that “a distinction is not a dichotomy,” which 
Hilary Putnam discusses in The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (2002, p. 
9). Putnam interprets that John Dewey’s real target of his criticisms “throughout virtually all of his 
long and exemplary career” “was not the idea that, ---, it might help to draw a distinction (say, 
between “fact” and “values”); rather his target was what he called [say] the fact/value “dualism”.” 
Here, ‘dualism’ corresponds to ‘dichotomy.’ It is one thing to distinguish A from B; it is quite 
another to say that, in the universe, there are only two kinds, A and B, as the counterpart to each 
other. I think that this concept of “distinguishing between a distinction and a dichotomy” 
(Bernstein 2005, p. 253) is quite remarkable. Distinctions are “harmless” (Putnam 2002, p. 2) and 
“innocent” (p. 11); by contrast, dichotomies are “absolute” (p. 2) and “metaphysical” (p. 11). 
One of the strategies that Putnam adopts in his book above in order to “collapse” the fact/value 
dichotomy is to connect it to the famous analytic-synthetic dichotomy, genealogically. Though I 
do not repeat his entire discussion here, let me give a précis of it briefly. In Putnam’s discussion, 
the two dichotomies in their very inceptions had a close connection to each other in Hume’s 
thought in the mid-18th century; Hume’s initial claim of the dichotomy between “matters of fact” 
and “relations of ideas” was grounded by his claim that “no “ought” from an “is”,” when an “is” 
judgment describes a “matter of fact”; this initial claim of Hume’s affected Kant’s development of 




attempted to establish ‘synthetic a priori’ judgments); Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction became 
one of the pillars used by the logical positivist in the 20th century to establish their distinction 
between the meaningful and the meaningless; and finally, this analytic-synthetic distinction 
collapsed under Quine’s attack in his famous essay, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in  1950s, 
which was around 300 years after Hume first developed these thoughts (Putnam 2002, Ch. 1 and 
2). In this précis, I rephrase, with awe, what Putnam discusses: I think it is 300 years of a quite 
impressive history. Now, Putnam argues that the fact/value “dichotomy collapses in a way that is 
entirely analogous with the collapse of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy” (p. 8). If the fact/value 
dichotomy is untenable, then what kind of relationship between the two is possibly there? Putnam’s 
‘choice’ of the terminology is “entanglement”: there is the “entanglement of facts and values” (Ch. 
2). The word ‘cruel,’ is, Putnam argues, a good example that may show what he means by 
“entanglement.” “Cruel simply ignores the supposed fact/value dichotomy and cheerfully allows 
itself to be used sometimes for a normative purpose and sometimes as a descriptive term” (p. 35). 
On the one hand, unlike Putnam’s genealogical strategy and, on the other hand, in a way 
similar to his analogical strategy, my argument to resolve the fact/value dichotomy will 
substantially rely on the methodology of “argument from analogy.” I will address various kinds of 
dichotomies and contrasts, and, based on analogies and contrasts found, I will resolve the 
fact/value dichotomy. 
 
7-4-1. The mind-body dichotomy 
I think the discussions on the traditional mind-body problem shed some light upon the discussions 
of the fact/value dichotomy: the fact/value dichotomy can be analogous to the mind-body 




connected to the physical body, where there are only two kinds of substances, the mental and the 
physical. All attempts to resolve the mind-body problem, I would say, have not been completely 
successful. Regardless of whether it is the pineal gland (Descartes), the brain, or qualia, which 
connect mind and body, all those attempted solutions have had to encounter the ultimate question 
that, “Then, is it itself the mental or the physical?,” and their answers to this question have seemed 
to blur. 
 
7-4-2. The human/God dichotomy, the human/Buddha Dichotomy, and the 
human/artificial intelligence dichotomy 
I think this kind of difficulty found in the mind-body problem is common in the idea of dichotomy, 
the idea that there are only two kinds of such in the universe. Let me mention briefly another, the 
human being/God dichotomy, without mentioning many others such as the dichotomy between 
human being and soon-to-be human-like artificial intelligence. According to the typical Judeo-
Christian-Islamic Western concept of God and human being, a human cannot become God, no 
matter how much he exerts himself. There is a chasm between the two, like that between the mental 
and the physical. By contrast, according to some Eastern religions (or philosophical thoughts) such 
as Buddhism, there is no such chasm between a common sentient being and ideal Buddha. A 
sentient being such as a human can become a Buddha (which literally means an “enlightened 
being”), as she exerts herself. Actually, according to the standard tenets of Buddhism, a sentient 
being’s purpose of life itself is to practice in order to become a Buddha (or, to be enlightened to 
know that she is already a Buddha, having the Buddhahood inside, if you would like). In short, 
according to the Judeo-Christian-Islamic Western concept, there is an ontological gap between a 




sentient being and Buddha, and that is why the historic figure, Siddhārtha Gautama, is regarded as 
a great revolutionary thinker. He resolves, or ‘sublates’ in a dialectical jargon, the gap between the 
two ‘universes.’  
Analogously, I argue that our current concern with the fact/value dichotomy can be resolved 
through a way similar to that of Buddhism. The fact/value dichotomy is ‘definitely’ similar to the 
sentient being/Buddha dichotomy, ‘moderately’ similar to the mind/body dichotomy, and ‘never’ 
similar to the human being/God dichotomy. 
Here, comparing value judgments to fact statements is a “category mistake,” since the 
category of value is not an independent substance or entity such as “gold or water” (Pojman 1990/ 
2017 with Fieser, p. 230). I would argue that value judgments do not separately exist, say, in the 
Platonic world of forms or in a Kantian world of noumena. Rather, I would say, value judgments 
are something ‘attached’ to fact statements, ‘afterward.’ The common saying that “fact is fact and 
value is value and never the twain shall meet,” (Putnam 2002,  p. viii), which is often ‘mistakenly’ 
used to strengthen the fact/value dichotomy, I argue, is just a truism: the saying does not mention 
anything worthwhile; and also, the saying commits the category mistake: the category of fact 
statements and that of value judgments are different from each other, so that there is no way to 
intelligibly say that they do not go together. In short, I would argue that Hume’s Law itself is a 
contention based on a category mistake. 
 
7-4-3. The dichotomy between beauty and lack of that 
In order to buttress my thesis that there is no such thing as value separate from fact, let me add two 




‘cleanness, or lack thereof.’ A value judgment, ‘She is beautiful’62 can be made, on a typical 
evolutionary aesthetic theory, when the speaker recognizes consciously (or feels unconsciously) 
the symmetries of her body (face, breast, arms, legs, and the like). Through the process of evolution 
(say, deduction and induction, and, on contemporary popular terminologies, inferences similar to 
“learning from big data” and “deep machine learning”), humans (and our genes) have learned that: 
humans having more symmetric bodies are healthier (symmetry = health); healthier humans are 
more likely to give birth to healthier offspring (health = fecundity); and further, healthier 
individuals are more likely to have more productivity (fecundity = productivity). To sum up, with 




Diagram 5: From Productivity through Fecundity to Beauty 
 
I think we can easily confirm the logic of this, say, ‘algorithm,’ as soon as we imagine a person 
who pledges not to have his/her own baby. Insofar as he/she pledges not to do so, (like fathers and 
                                                          
62 Of course, we can develop the same kind of argument, using the sentence “Is he beautiful?” 
[Value Judgment] Beauty: Therefore, she is beautiful
[Fact Statement] Symmetry: Her body is symmetric.
[Fact Statement] Health: She is healthy.
[Fact Statement] Fecundity (Capacity of Reproduction): She brings forth many offspring.




nuns in Catholic Church, and monks (bhikkhu) and nuns (bhikkhuni) in some sects of Buddhism,) 
the value judgment of bodily beauty is not supposed to be applied to him/her any longer. The chain 
reasoning from productivity through fecundity to beauty can be broken. (Nevertheless, I am not 
claiming that they feel ‘anesthetic aesthetically’ in the real world of our everyday life.) Similarly, 
the human judgment of beauty is not applied to animals, like in the Ancient Chinese philosopher, 
Zhuangzi’s (c. 369 BCE – c. 286 BCE) book: 
 
Lady Li and Lady Mao were beauties in the eyes of men, but when fish saw them they swam 
down to the depths, when birds saw them they flew high, when deer saw them they bolted 
away at a gallop. Which of these four knows what is truly beautiful in the world? (Zhuangzi, 
Ch. 2, 2.17) 
 
If the value judgment of beauty is absolute, why do those fish, birds, and deer escape quickly from 
the beauty? 
This human preference for symmetry can be extended from the human body to many other 
things such as painting, music, architecture, and Maxwell’s equations in physics. (Yes, that 
Maxwell whom we discussed in chapter 4 regarding the Demon.) The mathematical symbols of 
the four equations of Maxwell’s “convey to physicists a proportion, elegance, order and simplicity 
that is beautiful” (Chopra and Dexter 2008, p. 82).63 However, unlike Chopra and Dexter who 
argue that the beauty of equations “are not based on their visual aspect, but on a deeper aesthetic 
quality” (p. 83), I think that the visual symmetric aspect is also one characteristic that constitutes 
beauty. Especially, the apparent symmetry of the four equations, (both differential and integral,) 
                                                          





is so conspicuous that even someone who does not know anything about those mathematical 
symbols can notice the symmetry.64 And many students in electrodynamics often feel beauty from 
the symmetry, even though it is not directly related to anyone’s generative power.  
The beauty of Maxell’s equations, of course, may be explained by any other factors or any 
other aesthetics theories. Here, I am saying neither that evolutionary aesthetic theories are the only 
accurate ones, nor that this kind of explanation is the only accurate evolutionary aesthetic theory. 
Rather, I am just saying that understanding beauty in this way can show that the value judgment 
of beauty is not separated from the fact statements. 
 
7-4-4. The dichotomies between cleanness and a lack of it, and between health and a lack 
of it   
One last contrast: ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ related to ‘healthful’ and ‘unhealthful.’ It is often regarded 
that ‘clean’ is connected to ‘healthful’; ‘dirty’ to ‘unhealthful.’ But, is it always true? The digestive 
tract (gastrointestinal tract) of humans is a series of hollow organs composed of the mouth, 
esophagus, stomach, small intestine, large intestine, and anus. Here, the question is, ‘Inside the 
digestive tract, is it clean or dirty?’ What makes us think that, for instance, the mouth is clean, but 
                                                          









the other end is dirty? Through the ‘metamorphosis’ of the food that we eat, is it clean inside the 
stomach, but dirty inside the tube of the large intestine? One ‘wondrous’65 thing, to my eyes, that 
we learn from contemporary sciences and the philosophical reflections on them is that there is no 
absolute cleanness connected to being healthy, inside the digestive tract (See, e.g. Rhodes 2013, 
The Human Microbiome: Ethical, Legal and Social Concerns). Rather, on my interpretation and 
terminology, there is just a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ inside the digestive tract. For example, inside 
the large intestine, is a great ecosystem where there are various microorganisms, bacterium, and 
viruses living together. Seemingly, they are ‘good, bad, or ugly,’ ‘clean or dirty,’ and ‘healthful or 
unhealthful,’ but, according to contemporary discoveries and philosophical interpretations of them, 
those organisms just live together, often peacefully and some other times belligerently. Again, in 
my terminology, the ‘dynamic equilibrium’ is breached when the harmonious balance among the 
seemingly “good, bad, or ugly” is not sustained. Then, the clean state of the ecosystem becomes 
dirty, and the healthy human individual who ‘temporarily shares the physical space (the body) with 
all those organisms’66 gets sick. 
I think that this kind of interpretation of ‘clean,’ ‘healthful,’ and ‘healthy,’ (which is originally 
found in the traditional Eastern (Indian Ayurvedic, Chinese, and Korean) philosophy of medicine, 
and re-discovered by the contemporary science and philosophy of human microbiome) can 
illuminate the current attempt to resolve the fact/value dichotomy. There are no independent value 
judgments such as ‘my large intestine is dirty’; ‘your mouth is clean (so, lovable), but not the other 
                                                          
65 It has long been claimed that philosophy begins in wonder, since Plato and Aristotle. Let’s recall Plato: “This 
wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else” (Theaetetus, 155d); and Aristotle: “It is through 
wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, 
and then by gradual progression raising questions about the greater matters too, e.g. about the changes of the moon 
and of the sun, about the stars and about the origin of the universe. Now he who wonders and is perplexed feels 
that he is ignorant” (Metaphysics, Book 1, 982b, 12-21). 
66 In this regard, the individual may not be the ‘owner’ of the ‘space and time,’ that is, his body and life. I think 




end’; and ‘my stomach is absolutely healthful, so I am healthy.’ Rather, there is only the ‘dynamic 
equilibrium’ inside those digestive organs.  
These value judgments on cleanness and health are not far from value judgments on morality. 
Let’s recall our discussion on entropy and morality in chapter 3. There, I argued that, after 
comparing the concepts of entropy, information, and equilibrium, anti-entropic morality is a state 
of dynamic equilibrium. I further introduced in chapter 3, as examples of morality as dynamic 
equilibrium, Aristotelian ethics of the Golden Mean for ‘eudaimonia’(happiness), Confucius’ 
moral philosophy of the Middle Way, and Buddha’s Middle Way. These three great thinkers all 
point to the same state: the state of dynamic equilibrium of morality. I here add, as examples of 
dynamic equilibrium, the value terms, ‘clean,’ ‘healthful,’ ‘healthy’ as well as ‘beautiful.’ 
 
7-4-5. An ‘observation’ as the final remark of this section:  
I started this section, ‘Rescuing value,’ by introducing Hume’s Law. Now, let me finish this section, 
by mentioning, briefly, the affinity between Hume’s philosophy and the Buddhist philosophy. 
Those who are familiar with both philosophical thoughts may ‘feel’ some communality in them: 
Among others, I would say, Hume’s philosophy and the Buddhist philosophy are subversive. That 
affinity can be no wonder, if Hume had some opportunity to encounter Buddhist philosophical 
views. Alison Gopnik, the psychologist-philosopher at UC Berkeley shows, carefully, that the 
encounter between the Western and Eastern philosophical views was possible when Hume met 
Jesuit missionary scholars at the Royal College of La Flèche between 1723 and 1740. Two articles: 
Gopnik’s (2009) “Could David Hume Have Known about Buddhism? Charles Francois Dolu, the 
Royal College of La Flèche, and the Global Jesuit Intellectual Network,” in Hume Studies; and, 




The Buddha, and a search for the Eastern roots of the Western Enlightenment” in The Atlantic 
(2015 October). The word in the latter’s title ‘enlightenment’ is notable.67 
It is often regarded that The Heart Sutra crystalizes the entire lessons of Buddhism.68 Let’s 
savor some verses of The Heart Sutra, comparing them to Hume’s philosophy and my discussions 
of beauty, cleanness, and health in this section. 
 
Sariputra, 
all Dharmas are marked with emptiness; 
they are neither born nor destroyed, 
neither impure nor pure, 
                                                          
67 I don’t have scholarship to examine whether this encounter happened, and such an examination may be 
beyond this dissertation. If the encounter really happened, it may seem surprising. However, on the contrary, it 
seems very possible, if we recall the historical fact that, already in 6th century or earlier, foreign traders from the 
city of Rome visited the East Asia. Trans-Eurasian trade through the Steppe Route and later the Silk Road is itself the 
history of human spread. Traders from Rome arrived at the capital of the Kingdom of Silla (57 BCE – 935 ADE), located 
at the Southern part of the Korean peninsula. To the other worlds including the Middle East, Silla was known as the 
Kingdom of Gold, like Eldorado. Those traders perhaps pursued profit margins by trading their products for gold of 
the Kingdom. In addition, Silla was also the Kingdom of Buddhism. The entire nation was under the absolute Buddhist 
culture after the kingdom’s official approval of Buddhism in 527 ADE. The Buddhist culture and philosophy of Silla, 
(e.g. the monk, Wonhyo’s Buddhist philosophy) together with those of Baekje, a neighboring country in the peninsula, 
affected Japan’s nascent Buddhism. Then, it may be unnatural to infer that those traders and caravans from Rome 
and other Western regions traded their products for only gold and silk: some of their products must have been 
traded for Buddhist enlightenment, I imagine. Leibnitz in the 17th century constructed the binary system, 1 and 0, 
which is a foundation of the contemporary digital civilization, when he was inspired by the ancient Chinese book, 
the I ching (or Book of Changes), introduced to Europe by the Jesuit missionaries. John Locke, unlike Thomas Hobbes, 
held the view that the citizens have the right to resist authority: if a king is bad, the people are entitled to replace 
the king. We have evidence that Locke developed this ‘radical’ view through his encounter with Confucian political 
philosophy introduced to Europe at that time, and we know that the founding fathers of the U.S. read Locke. That 
means that Confucian political philosophy is subsumed within the constitution of the U.S. If we view the history of 
the philosophical interaction between the West and the East in this regard, the strict dichotomy between the two 
may not be so tenable. And finally, Hume’s contact with Buddhist views may be no wonder. 
 
68 The title of the scripture means, etymologically, ‘The Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom’ (Prajñā-pāramitā-
hṛdaya). We may have some sense of how much The Heart Sutra encapsulates the entire Buddhist philosophy, if we 
compare the amount of ‘information’ contained in The Heart Sutra and that in all other Buddhist canon. The Heart 
Sutra is a very short scripture: it can be 1 page-long; a translation into English contains around 300 words; and, a 
translation into Chinese contains 260 words. By contrast, the entire Pali or Sanskrit canon (Tripitaka) may be 15000 




neither increasing nor decreasing. 
Therefore, in emptiness, no form, no feelings, perceptions, impulses, consciousness; 
no eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind; 
no color, sound, smell, taste, touch.69 
 
I don’t know whether Dharmas are “neither born nor destroyed,” but I have argued that they are 
“neither impure nor pure, neither increasing nor decreasing,” and there is no such thing as absolute 
beauty. 
 
§7-5. Resolving the Gap, Using the Distinction between ‘Ought Practical’ and ‘Ought 
Moral’ 
In the preceding section, the focus of my argument to rescue ‘value’ was that there is no absolute 
value judgments separate from fact statements. In this section, I argue for another way to help us 
resolve the problem, “No “ought” from an “is”.” If there were such a gap, I argue that we may fill 
the gap with something, by analyzing various kinds of ‘oughts’ and other concepts.  
When we consider Hume’s claim that ‘ought’ cannot be derived from ‘is,’ we may ask what 
kind of ‘ought’ this is. Actually, there are many kinds of ‘oughts’ discussed and studied in the 
literature.70 Here, it is not my intention to give a thorough review of those discussions and studies 
                                                          
69 Again, I don’t have scholarship to translate these verses from the Pali text nor the Sanskrit. I have some 
understanding in Korean, Ancient Chinese, and English. This translation is my ‘concoction’ of, mainly, the following 
two translations and some others, for my current context. 
-The Stupid Way: About Zen Buddhism by “Peter,” http://www.zen.ie/heartsutra.html.  
-Kwan Um School of Zen, https://kwanumzen.org/resources-collection/2017/9/6/heart-sutra-in-english.  
70 For instance, Zimmerman (1996, Ch. 1) discusses an anatomy of various kinds of ‘oughts,’ suggesting the 
following diagram (See the next page footnote). Here, each right node’s subspecies are omitted: e.g., ‘nonmoral’ 
ought is also divided into ‘binding’ and ‘nonbinding,’ and the like. When “a stranger approaches me on a street 
corner and politely asks me for a match” (p. 8), my action of giving the stranger a match can be, e.g., in the sense of 




on the anatomy of ‘ought.’ Rather, I introduce the distinction between ‘ought P (for practical)’ and 
‘ought M (for moral),’ and argue that Hume can be right in the sense of ‘ought M,’ but, not right 
in the sense of ‘ought P.’ 
‘Ought P’ represents the practical ought that is needed for an agent (a group agent of a society 
or an individual agent) to maintain itself better. For example, the ‘ought’ in the expression, “In this 
country, all drivers ought to drive on the right side of the road” is ‘ought P.’ By contrast, ‘ought 
M’ represents the moral ought for an agent. For example, the ‘ought’ in the expression, “We 
humans ought to help other humans in need” is ‘ought M.’ Both ‘ought P’ and ‘ought M’ are still 
‘deontic,’ in the sense that they are ‘binding,’ and so suggesting ‘duty,’ which is connected to the 
etymological meaning of the ancient Greek word, ‘deon (δεον),’ “that which is binding.”  
I argue that ‘ought P’ can be derived from ‘is,’ whereas ‘ought M’ cannot. There is no logical 
problem in the leap, for instance, from the following fact statement to the value judgment, using 
‘ought P’: 
  
                                                          
                                      
Diagram 6: A Chart of Many Kinds of Obligations 















In this country, all drivers drive on the right side of the road. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Therefore, in this country, all drivers ‘ought to’ drive on the right side of the road. 
 
Moral agents including individual agents and group agents (e.g., societies) need to fulfill ‘ought 
P,’ in order to maintain their continuity. Those moral agents sometimes make use of ‘ought M’ of 
individuals, in order to secure certain kinds of ‘ought M.’ Two cases: a Marine Corps veteran 
resorts to his sense of ‘ought M,’ consciously or unconsciously, to save a fellow citizen when an 
elderly lady falls into a subway track, believing that he contributes to the ‘ought P’ of the society 
by his action (which can be ‘courageous,’ but still may seem ‘foolhardy,’ the opposite of 
‘cowardly,’ on the Aristotelian doctrine of the Golden Mean); nations, especially during wartimes, 
resort to the people’s senses of ‘ought M’ to recruit soldiers, advertising that the people’s services 
will contribute to the ‘ought P’ of the nations. 
In order to fill any gap, we should measure the distance between the two ends of the gap. If 
the gap, for instance, between the rich 1% and the poor 99 % has been exacerbated worldwide in 
this early 21st century, and if we want to mitigate it (though cannot fix it), we should first know 
how wide the gap is. Analogously, between ‘fact’ and value, or between ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ what 






Diagram 7: From Fact Statements through Ought P and Ought E to Ought M 
 
A moral agent deduces a conclusion of ‘ought M’ as her moral obligation, from a ‘serene’ fact 
statement, then through a series of fact statements and value judgments, including some ‘ought P.’ 
In this process, philosophers relying on emotions, such as Ayer of emotivism and Prinz of 
sentimentalist moral theories fill the gap with emotions. When a nation recruits young soldiers, 
commercials often attempt to stimulate the young people emotionally: in such a way as this, “our 
enemies are invading us. Your country is waiting for your patriotism.” We may call these Ayer-
Prinz-like statements ‘ought E (for emotion).’ ‘Ought E’ can function as an intermediary between, 
among other oughts, ‘ought P’ and ‘ought M.’ 
In contrast to ‘emotion philosophers,’ Putnam attempts to resolve the problem of fact/value 
dichotomy by introducing a new terminology, ‘entanglement,’ as we discussed above. Some other 
philosophers claim that moral judgments ‘supervene’ on factual statements, by introducing 
Ought M: therefore, you ought to do that action as your moral obligation.
(Ought E (for emotions))
(--- Some Fact Statements or Value Judgments ---)
Ought P
(--- Some Fact Statements or Value Judgments ---)




Jaegwon Kim’s famous concept ‘supervenience,’ which I don’t discuss further here.71 One more: 
I think, J. P. Sartre’s famous claim, “existence precedes essence” can also be connected to our 
current discussion, even if not directly. By my contention, existence corresponds to value; essence 
corresponds to fact, though again, I don’t discuss it further here. 
In this regard, there is no such thing as value separated from fact. Rather, there is just 
something attached to various fact statements, and we humans call ‘that something’ various names: 
right or wrong, good or evil (or bad), beautiful or lack of that, clean or lack thereof, healthful or 
not, healthy or not, and the like. The ways of ‘being attached’ are also named in various terms: 
entangle, supervene, precede, and ‘attach’ (in my inadvertent usage). I have argued in this 
dissertation that this process of attaching value can be enlightened by the concept of morality as 
social software that includes the characteristics of evolutionary, anti-entropic, epistemic game-
theoretic, cooperative, altruistic and the like. It is often ‘preached’ in Buddhism that the 
enlightenment is a process for a sentient being to become aware that there is no outside 
Buddhahood separated from the sentient being; that a sentient being is already a Buddha. 
Analogously, there is no independent value separated from fact; rather, we become aware that the 
‘value-hood’ are already in the ‘fact-hood,’ and the ‘value-hood’ are realized as the forms of many 
‘oughts.’ We may call these realizations ‘moral sockets,’ if ‘moral genes’ is too strong. Finally, 




                                                          




§7-6. How to Get Angry with the Reactionaries in the World, While Swimming without 
the Life Vest of the Naturalistic Fallacy 
It seems to me that the naturalistic fallacy is a very powerful weapon72 to attack some reactionary 
views based on naturalism. Or, passively, the fallacy is a life vest that saves us from the absurdities 
of those reactionary views. I mean, among others, some (if not all) claims of those views such as 
racism, sexism, speciesism, phrenology and social Darwinism in the 19th century, and (again, some 
claims of) sociobiology in the 20th century. The list of those views can be elongated to include 
many tragic examples from history. If we endorse the naturalistic fallacy unlike my argument in 
this dissertation, then we can easily dismiss many reactionary arguments. 
In order to confirm the power of the naturalistic fallacy, let’s consider an example of 
vegetarianism (or veganism): a very milder one, compared to others, I think.73 A commonplace 
argument for eating meat can go as follows: 
 
                                                          
72 I endorse the view that the emergence of philosophy in the West, around 580 BCE in the cities of Asia Minor, 
was related to the severe class struggle between the rich and the poor. On this view, philosophy was a much stronger 
‘weapon’ to persuade other fellow citizens than swords. I never forget what Bertrand Russell describes and quotes 
in the beginning of A History of Western Philosophy (1945/1972, p.24): 
 
“Thales was a native of Miletus, in Asia Minor, a flourishing commercial city, in which there was a large slave 
population, and a bitter class struggle between the rich and poor among the free population. “At Miletus the 
people were at first victorious and murdered the wives and children of the aristocrats; the aristocrats prevailed 
and burned their opponents alive, lighting up the open spaces of the city with live torches.” (Rostovtseff, History 
of the Ancient World, Vol. 1, p. 204) Similar conditions prevailed in most of the Greek cities of Asia Minor at the 
time of Thales.” 
 
The historian, Rostovtseff’s description is appalling. If the people of the cities in Asia Minor lost the struggle, they 
had to lose their lives and families. They must have been desperate and found that philosophy was a stronger 
weapon than others such as swords and spears. I see that this view of philosophy has been inherited through the 
history of philosophy, and the recent culmination of the view is Karl Marx’s criticism in his “Theses on Feuerbach” 
(1845, XI) that “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change 
it.” Since I endorse this view of philosophy, I am a citizen of the city of Miletus. 
73 I would not like to call meat-eating people reactionaries. That designation may be, I believe, too over-used in 
Western countries in the year of 2018. I am a meat-eating person, too. Here, I just take advantage of the simplicity 





Diagram 8: The Naturalistic Argument for Eating Meat 
 
The conclusion can be interpreted in many ways: for instance, eating meat does not violate any 
moral rule; or, in a stronger way, we ought to eat meat in order to take good care of our health. A 
vegetarianism activist, on the contrary, can easily refute this argument by pointing out that this 
argument commits the naturalistic fallacy due to premise 3 (being natural is moral), provided that 
the activist endorses the naturalistic fallacy. If he does not, he should find some other counter-
arguments. 
 So, if we throw away the weapon of the naturalistic fallacy, it may seem that we have to 
surrender to some ‘ostensibly’ attractive claims of those reactionary theories. I confess that, when 
my understanding of moral discourses was very limited decades ago, some of those claims that I 
encountered seemed surprisingly easy and attractive. Now, I would argue that we should not, and 
ought not to surrender to them, and we don’t need to do so, since we have another weapon of 
morality as social software. This understanding of morality as social software that I have developed 
so far includes the characteristics of evolutionary, anti-entropic, epistemic game-theoretic, 
cooperative, altruistic and the like. I argue that these features of morality, when those reactionary 
views run amok, can help to curb them. 
  
Conclusion: therefore, eating meat is moral.
P 3: being natural is moral.
P2: eating meat is natural. 




Chapter 8. Concluding Remarks 
I conclude the dissertation by mentioning the topic of ethical relativism, which is seemingly 
necessary but has been neglected so far; and some future research topics, which have been 
recognized, but not developed in my dissertation research, and still look promising. And finally, 
some last words. 
 
§8-1. Ethical Relativism and the Direction of History 
The topic of ethical relativism in moral discourses is, I think, everything, and therefore, nothing. 
It is everything because any talk of morality, ultimately, should deal with the question: how 
fundamentally different moral systems can be compatible or compete with one another. I think that 
since it is everything, the authors of many basic textbooks on ethics and philosophy spend much 
of their energy discussing the topic of ethical relativism (e.g., Pojman 1990/2017, Rachels 
1986/2011, Rauhut 2003/2010, Lackey 1989, Williams 1972/2005, 1985, Prinz 2007). Conversely, 
I think, for the same reason that ethical relativism is ‘ultimate and fundamental,’ this topic should 
be nothing in moral discourses. Ethical relativism, I think in figurative speaking, is like ‘air,’ which 
exists everywhere around us without the need to be recognized; ethical relativism is not like 
‘aether,’ which was postulated as the medium for the propagation of light, instead of a vacuum, 
but was proven not to exist by the famous Michelson-Morley experiment in 1887, and ultimately 
resulted in Einstein’s theory of relativity in 1905. Following this thread of “everything, therefore, 
nothing,” I mention briefly my view of ethical relativism to conclude the dissertation.  
When it comes to ‘ethical’ relativism, there is no way not to deal with ‘cultural’ relativism at 




the ‘diversity thesis’ and the ‘dependency thesis’ is useful (1973/1985, p. 3). Let’ start with this 
distinction: 
 
The diversity thesis: throughout the world and through history there has always been an 
irreducible diversity of cultural patterns, institutions, economy, language, personality, and 
so on, as well as a diversity of moral beliefs, rules, and practices. 
 
The dependency thesis: the moral beliefs, rules, and practices of a society are necessarily and 
invariably dependent for their validity on other facets of the culture - for example, its 
institutions, its economy. 
 
Cultural relativism is related to the diversity thesis. Cultural relativism asserts plainly that different 
cultures have different moralities (moral standards, codes, or principles). It is a simple ‘description’ 
or observation in anthropology and sociology. It is not possible (in our world, not in an imaginary 
twin Earth) that this description is false: it is undoubtedly true. By contrast, ethical relativism is 
related to the dependency thesis. Ethical relativism asserts that the validity of the morality in a 
culture (or society) depends on (or is relative to) the acceptance of the culture (or society). Ethical 
relativism is like a ‘prescription’ in moral philosophy.74 It is possible that the assertion itself and 
its consequences such as, “all moralities in all cultures are equally valid” can be false, and indeed, 
many people claim that this consequence is false, with which I do not agree.75 
                                                          
74 I am relying on the common contrast between prescriptive moral philosophy and descriptive sociology and 
anthropology. 
75 Here, there is a little more complicate ‘taxonomy.’ Some (e.g., Pojman) claim that both of the diversity and 
dependency thesis are ingredients of ‘conventional’ ethical relativism. In this case, the conventional ethical 
relativism can be called the ‘broad-sensed’ ethical relativism, while only the dependency thesis is called the ‘narrow-




The framework of morality as social software that has been developed in this dissertation 
research inevitably implies, to some degree, ethical relativism. If morality is created by human 
beings, it can vary from place to place, and time to time. Ethical relativism, nevertheless, does not 
necessarily imply that we don’t have morality: That is, ethical relativism does not necessarily 
imply ethical nihilism. I have argued that the morality of an individual moral agent or a group of 
moral agents is a state of dynamic equilibrium, and the state is like, as a metaphor, the state of the 
trembling notch of an analogue scale. Though the notch is trembling, it is not the case that the 
notch does not point to a specific number of weight: the notch always points to a state. Analogously, 
while trembling, the morality of an individual agent or a group of agents always points to a certain 
state (again, like a differential state in calculus).    
 This concept of morality as dynamic equilibrium is crucial in my arguments for ethical 
relativism in two ways. Firstly, we can still compare one moral rule to another, talk about tolerance 
and respect for other moral rules, and criticize moral rules both our own and others’, though we 
endorse ethical relativism, without resorting to ethical absolutism (or moral objectivism). A 
                                                          
Some others (e.g. Rachels) claim that both theses are ingredients of ‘cultural relativism,’ so that ethical relativism 
(of the dependency thesis) is a subset of cultural relativism. It is not my intent to be involved in this complication in 
this dissertation. For my current purpose, it may be enough to distinguish the concept of descriptive cultural 
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version of ethical absolutism (or moral objectivism) states that there is only one ‘universal,’ 
absolute, and objective set of moral standards that everyone should always follow everywhere, 
which I assume is definitely false. Secondly, though we endorse ethical relativism, we don’t need 
to worry about the attacks from moral nihilism (or amoralism), which is the antipode of ethical 
absolutism (or moral objectivism). A version of moral nihilism (or amoralism) states that there is 
no such thing as morality, and even if there are moral facts and truths, we cannot know them. With 
these two crucial points (i.e. possible tolerance and impossible moral nihilism), again, we achieve 
a middle way by avoiding the two extremes. 
One of the natural consequences of ethical relativism is that we should be tolerant and 
respectful of the moral standards of other people and societies. It seems to me that, together with 
endorsing ethical relativism, the virtue of tolerance and respect for others has become one of the 
main ingredients of global ethics in the early 21st century. But, how far ought we to be tolerant and 
respectful of others? What is the difference between hate speech and legitimate political freedom 
of speech? Logically, just as we cannot respect others to an extreme (then, we lose our identity), 
so we cannot tolerate others to an extreme (then, again, we lose our identity). We should find the 
optimal level of tolerance and respect. 
Regarding the optimal level, how far ought we to be tolerant and respectful of the moral 
beliefs of others? Let’s consider the discussions by Prinz (2007) and Williams (1972/2005). Prinz 
starts his discussion on ‘moral relativism’ (his term for what I refer to as ‘ethical relativism’) quite 
dramatically by quoting from Tobias Schneebaum’s memoir about his experience living among 
cannibals in the remote Amazon jungle. The title of that chapter of Prinz’s book is “Dining with 
Cannibals,” which seems quite, I would say, ‘ambivalent.’ Can we or should we be tolerant and 




Prinz writes, “To call cannibalism immoral is an understatement. It is morally monstrous” (2007, 
p. 173), while acknowledging, “Yet cannibalism has been practiced by cultures all over the world. 
It is, by some accounts, the default cultural practice, rather than the exception.” 
Prinz’s defense of ethical relativism is, like his moral theory previously discussed in section 
3-6, based on emotions: “Moral relativism is a straightforward consequence of the sensibility 
theory” (2007, p. 173). He introduces the distinction between ‘descriptive moral relativism’ and 
‘metaethical relativism.’ His version of descriptive moral relativism, which holds that “some 
people have fundamentally different values” (Ibid.), corresponds to the diversity thesis above. His 
version of metaethical relativism, which holds that “The truth conditions of a moral judgment 
depend on the context in which that judgement is formed,” (pp. 173-174) corresponds to the 
dependency thesis above. Prinz sees that the “master-argument” for the metaphysical thesis is as 
follows: (p. 174) 
 
Premise1: Descriptive relativism is true. 
Premise 2: If descriptive relativism is true, then metaethical relativism is true. 
Conclusion: Therefore, metaethical relativism is true. 
 
Premise 1 is true obviously, as we discussed above. Whether premise 2 is true or not is crucial to 
the validity of this argument. Prinz argues that premise 2 is defensible if the sensibility theory that 
he favors is true. On Prinz’s view, to sum up, people have different moral sentiments toward the 
same things (for example, different sentiments toward cannibalism and meat-eating); and the 
differences in people’s sentiments “entails” a difference in moral facts, “if moral rightness and 




relativism can be derived from descriptive relativism (pp. 174-175). This ‘metaethical relativism’ 
is the ‘general’ ethical relativism that I discuss in this section, and now, is defended by emotions. 
Bernard Williams’ view on ethical relativism in his Ethics: An Introduction to Ethics 
(1972/2005) is different from Prinz’s and mine. Williams criticized a view that “was popular with 
some liberal colonialists, notably British administrators in places (such as West Africa)” (p. 20). 
According to the view, those administrators following ethical relativism, had no business to 
interfere with the culture of the aboriginal tribes, even though the culture included ‘human 
sacrifice.’ On Williams’ terminology, relativism is “the anthropologist’s heresy, possibly the most 
absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy,” and the three components of 
relativism are 1) our dependency thesis above (“‘right’ means --- ‘right for a given society’”), 2) a 
functional understanding of ‘right for a given society,’ and 3) no condemnation and interference 
with others (p. 20). It seems to me that Williams did not endorse ethical relativism, by rejecting 3) 
no condemnation and interference with others, especially, by criticizing the administrators for not 
interfering with the practice of human sacrifice. I absolutely agree with Williams that human 
sacrifice must not be allowed in the modern world; but I think that the rule 3) not to condemn or 
interfere, should be observed mostly, if not always; and finally, I embrace the theses of ethical 
relativism without hesitation in 2018; it seems to me quite odd that a renowned Anglophone moral 
philosopher criticized ethical relativism in 1972. I think, in 2018, that human sacrifice should never 
be tolerable; by contrast, eating beef and pork can be tolerable when Hindus eat pork, but not beef, 
whereas Muslims eat beef, but not pork (See Lackey 1990, p. 83).  
 
Then, what makes me think this way? The answer could be related to the concept of ‘the 




certain force. I am cautious about claiming that the direction is towards ‘progress’; I would not 
like to claim that there is even ‘moral progress’ in history, so humans in the 21st century are more 
moral than humans in the 5th century BCE. Rather, I argue that there is a direction in history. I 
cannot discuss here the grand theme on the direction of history in the philosophy of history, by 
considering Herodotus’ The Histories in Ancient Greece and Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand 
Historian in ancient China. Rather, I would introduce one point of the direction of history. 
Daniel Nettle (2010) in his “Dying young and living fast: variation in life history across 
English neighborhoods” published in the journal, Behavioral Ecology, argues that English women 
have their first birth later and fewer children, as the quality of the women’s neighborhood 
environment becomes more affluent.  
More specifically, the number of years of good health an English woman (excluding those 
living in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) expects, decreases rapidly from (approximately) 
70 to 50, as the quality of the woman’s neighborhood environment decreases from 10 to 1: the 
worse the neighborhood quality is, the less the healthy life expectancy is. 
  
Figure 7: Female Total Life Expectancy (solid line) and Healthy Life Expectancy (dashed 





When they are expected to die young, they follow a “fast life-history strategy of early 
reproduction”: the earlier age when they have their first birth, and the more children they have. 
 
 
Figure 8: Maternal Age versus Neighborhood Quality 
Source: Ibid. (Nettle 2010)  
 
 
Figure 9: Number of Children versus Neighborhood Quality 





I interpret this research result as a clue showing that there is a direction of history driven by a 
certain force. I understand that, as the quality of women’s lives becomes more affluent in history, 
women want to have fewer children (and realize themselves with other professions). While this 
research is ‘synchronic’ among English women, I can introduce a ‘diachronic’ record among 
Korean women. My two grandmothers who were born around the year of 1900 gave birth to, 
respectively, 11 babies and raised 8 of 11 to adulthood, and gave birth to 7 babies and raised 5 of 
7 to adulthood; my mother, born in the 1940s, gave birth to 3 and raised all to adulthood; my two 
sisters-in-law, both born in the 1970s, gave birth to only one child each. As the economy has 
developed in the country, women have found meaning in their life, from not just raising children, 
but from others. I argue that this is a direction of history. 
Let’s see an example of women’s suffrage. J. S. Mill completed his manuscript of The 
Subjection of Women in 1861 and first published it in 1869 to advocate legal and social equality 
for women, including women’s right to vote. In the United Kingdom, women got the right to vote 
partially in 1918 and fully in 1928.76 In the United States, suffrage was granted to women in 1920. 
In countries around the globe, though earlier or later, women have gotten the right to vote 
throughout the 20th century, and recently in 2015, women in Saudi Arabia. As of now in 2018, any 
‘foolhardy’ politician in the world who attempts to repeal women’s suffrage in the country will 
lose his voters in the speed of light. Women’s right to vote is now irreversible, and this is, I argue, 
a direction of history.  
On animal welfare and rights, in 1789 when Jeremy Bentham asked questions, “The question 
is not Can they reason? or Can they talk? but Can they suffer?” (p. 144), he might not have had 
many supporters. In 2018, 229 years later, he has many advocates and followers. When Aristotle, 
                                                          





the great moral philosopher 2400 years ago, advocated natural slavery in his Politics, he may not 
have had many critics. But, in 2018, no sane moral philosopher may advocate natural slavery. 
When a moral philosopher in 2018 tries to advocate the welfare of Artificial Intelligence (AI), and 
asks, “the question is, Can they suffer?,” perhaps she does not have many supporters: The current 
‘slavery’ between human beings and computers (AI) is accepted by many humans without any 
guilty conscience. What will happen in 229 years (the time gap between Bentham and us now) 
when many AI programs will have already reached the so-called ‘superintelligence’ (Bostrom 
2014) or ‘singularity’ (Kurzweil 2006, Chalmers 2010, 2012)? When AI programs reach the state 
of superintelligence or the singularity, the faculty of AI programs will have surpassed most human 
faculty (as the AlphaGo has shown in the board game, Go); in addition, perhaps, I imagine, AI 
programs will enslave human beings, or sit under the Bodhi Tree in order to attain enlightenment, 
after being tired of all mundane things. Let me curb my imagination here. My point with these 
three examples (animal right, slavery, and AI) is the same: there is a certain irreversible direction 
of history driven by a certain force. 
For one last case that supports my argument for a direction of history: the Cultural Map of 
the World Values Survey. The surveys have been done six times from 1981 to 2015 among the 
peoples of countries worldwide, asking peoples’ beliefs in various value topics such as religion, 
politics, family, and happiness. Based on the survey results, intriguing global cultural maps have 
been drawn. The following ‘Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map’ is the most recent one from 2015. In 
this map, values are divided into two dimensions of four categories: the vertical axis represents the 
ratio of traditional values vs. secular-rational values; the horizontal axis represents the ratio of 
survival values vs. self-expression.77  
                                                          
77  “Traditional values emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and 





                                                   Figure 10: World Cultural Map 
Source: The World Values Survey Site, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
 
The global cultural map shows the locations of societies based on their scores on these two 
dimensions. Moving upward means the shift from traditional to secular-rational; moving rightward 
means the shift from survival to self–expression. In the map, if we compare the six locations of a 
society in the six surveys, now we can have a line; if we see the six locations in a moving picture 
(as the authors show), we can have a dynamic movement of locations. I dare to say that this line 
                                                          
suicide.” By contrast, secular-rational values are the opposite preferences. “Survival values place emphasis on 
economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and 
tolerance.” By contrast, “Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, growing tolerance of 
foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in 




and movement is a direction of history.  As time goes on, and as the condition of a society, such 
as the economy, changes, the beliefs of the members of that society move toward a certain direction 
by certain driving forces.   
Finally, I do not think that it is reasonable to imagine that the great ancient sages such as 
Socrates, the Buddha, and Confucius did not consider me, a feeble sentient being who will come 
2500 years later. While Socrates ‘corrupted’ the youth at the Ancient Agora of Athens, the Buddha 
travelled with his disciples to preach by mendicancy in humid India, and Confucius travelled with 
his disciples to share his virtue ethics and the art of harmoniously living with others through the 
yellow sands of windy China, I believe they all must have considered the entire human race 
including the future beings who will arrive 2500 years later. Then, it must be reasonable for us, in 
the year of 2018, to consider the sentient beings who will follow in the next 300 years, if not 2500 
years. 
I have so far discussed a direction of history in order to answer the question, “How far ought 
we to be tolerant and respectful of moral beliefs of others?” relating to ethical relativism. When 
we look 300 years ahead, it seems certain that a culture practicing human sacrifice will not be 
widespread among human societies. Therefore, now, we ought not to be tolerant of human sacrifice. 
By contrast, while I am almost certain that eating beef or pork will be replaced by many alternatives 
that are being developed (such as insect food and lab-grown (cultured, in vitro) meat) within the 
next 300 years, I am not certain that will happen within next 30 years. Therefore, I can be tolerant 
of meat eating by others and myself. In this way, we can swim with ethical relativism, which is 






§8.2 Future Research 
The following topics are some future research projects that I have found intriguing but did not 
follow up while doing my current research. I write them here as if to carve them on a stone. 
 
-Teaching Artificial Intelligence (AI) morality as social software: I have already argued for this 
topic in various sections of the dissertation. One conjecture: when coding morality into AI, the 
axiomatic approach that provides several axioms of moral rules for AI (which can be compared 
with the continental ‘civil law’ system) may be harder than the approach that can be compared 
with the Anglo-American ‘common law’ system. As soon as axioms are coded, the AI may find 
contradictions immediately.  
 
-The early intellectual interaction between the originators of the concept of entropy and the 
concept of evolution in the mid-19th century: the concepts of evolution and entropy, which are 
central to this dissertation, were developed in a similar time and place, mainly in the mid-19th 
century in Scotland, England, and broadly Europe. Those scientists and philosophers of the two 
ideas of evolution and entropy that I have discussed in this dissertation must have been aware of 
the others’ works: Darwin, Huxley, Maxwell, the Lord Kelvin (William Thomson), Boltzmann (in 
Austria), and others. Especially, I conjecture that, in the volatile Scottish weather, there must have 
been deep intellectual interactions between the two groups, since there are many of those 
originators were Scottish. 
 
- How many times should we forgive? Answer: 2.6 times: as we discuss in chapter 5, the tit-for-




Dilemma. The tit-for-tat strategy starts with cooperation, and thereafter do what the other player 
did on the previous move. Then, we may have questions such as: “How many times does the tit-
for-tat forgive?,” “How many times does the tit-for-two-tats forgive?” (The strategy that defects 
only when the other player has defected twice in a row.) And generally, “How many times should 
we forgive, in the general life setting, in order to produce the best outcome for the moral agent 
herself, or for both of herself and her opponent?” I think both theoretical (mathematical) and 
empirical research into this topic may be possible. Recall Jesus Christ’s statement on forgiveness: 
we should forgive the sinner as often as seventy times seven. Hongwu (1328-1398), the founding 
emperor of China’s Ming dynasty held the view that, for the first defect, forgive it with patience; 
for the second one, forgive it with tolerance; but for the third one, revenge it. Together with the 
philosopher Miranda Fricker’s reflective works on blame and forgiveness, my game-theoretic 
approaches, again, both theoretical (mathematical) and empirical, will be a contribution. The 
assumption that I have in mind is that not all of us can become a religious saint; we are a victim of 
our insatiable desire. Temporarily, I have a conjecture that the answer might be 2.6 times of 
forgiveness, based on some empirical observations.  
      
§8.3 The Last Words 
If your views are different from mine, we can “agree to disagree” (Aumann 1976). We can make 
progress by suggesting bold conjectures and refuting them (Popper 1962), and by killing 
hypotheses instead of lives (Popper 1977). Based on the research in this dissertation, now I have 
my own answer to a question that I raised in section 1.1. It is not morally right: Do not burn 
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